Darryl A. Cruz

This costs endorsement follows the Court of Appeal’s decision allowing the appellants’ appeal in part.

The court found that the trial judge erred in requiring Mak Mera Limited to repay US$405,000 and in awarding $200,000 in defamation damages to James Bay Resources Limited.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal and, after submissions on trial costs, the court awarded the appellants $400,000 in trial costs, payable by James Bay, as a fair and proportionate amount in light of the appeal outcome and the parties’ relative success.

In a class action seeking certification against the Crown and two psychiatrists (Defendant Doctors) regarding treatment in a psychiatric hospital program, the plaintiffs moved for a partial discontinuance of the action against the Defendant Doctors.

The court granted the discontinuance, finding it to be in the best interests of the putative Class Members.

The decision was based on the lack of additional recovery from the doctors, the streamlining of the claim, the doctors' later involvement in the program, and their agreement to provide de bene esse examinations to preserve evidence.

The court confirmed that the discontinuance was not for an improper purpose and did not prejudice the class members or the co-defendant Crown, as the doctors' evidence remained available.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful 25-day medical malpractice trial where they "beat" a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants proposed a lower costs amount.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $3 million in costs, finding their request consistent with similar complex medical malpractice cases and justified by the defendants' conduct, which unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding and increased the plaintiffs' legal work.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' complete success, and the defendants' late disclosure and attempts to introduce contradictory evidence.

The plaintiff suffered a catastrophic brain bleed and traumatic brain injury during an elective multi-step medical intervention for an asymptomatic brain AVM.

The plaintiff brought a medical negligence action against the treating physicians, alleging a failure to obtain informed consent.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the physicians failed to adequately disclose the cumulative risks of the multi-step procedure, the likelihood of requiring surgical resection, and the risks of conservative management.

The court concluded that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have proceeded with the intervention had they been properly informed, and held the physicians liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

This is an appeal in a class action concerning an infectious disease outbreak at a pain care centre.

The appellant, Dr. Stephen James, challenged the trial judge's findings of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and the application of the limitation period, as well as the award of punitive damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusions that Dr. James breached the standard of care by failing to consistently use aseptic technique and to report/investigate infections.

The court affirmed the use of statistical evidence to establish a rebuttable presumption of causation for the class, and found no error in the breach of fiduciary duty or the appropriateness of punitive damages.

The appeal on costs, including the order for Dr. James to pay the successful co-defendant nurses' costs, was also dismissed.

This is an appeal from a medical negligence judgment.

The appellants, two doctors, challenged the trial judge's findings on standard of care and causation after Ms. Stevenhaagen suffered severe neurological injuries following an angioplasty procedure and subsequent aortic rupture.

The trial judge found the doctors liable for failing to consult a cardiovascular surgeon promptly and for transferring the patient to the Coronary Care Unit instead of directly to the operating room after temporary stabilization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's conclusions that the standard of care was breached and that this breach caused Ms. Stevenhaagen's injuries, applying the 'but for' test for causation.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to exclude the defendants' expert witness, a vascular neurosurgeon and interventional neuroradiologist, on the basis of bias.

The court conducted a voir dire and reviewed the expert's reports, past testimony, and relationship with the defendant physicians.

The court found that the expert was not impartial, acted as an advocate, failed to disclose his professional and personal relationship with one of the defendants, and assumed the defendants' evidence was credible while ignoring the plaintiffs' evidence.

The court concluded that the expert was unable and unwilling to comply with his duty to the court and excluded his evidence in its entirety.

This is an appeal from a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's refusal to enter judgment in accordance with a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case.

The jury found the defendant physicians negligent and that their negligence caused the plaintiff's severe disabilities.

The trial judge ordered a new trial, finding the jury's answers on causation insufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to enter judgment.

The court emphasized the high standard for setting aside jury verdicts and the presumption that juries understand and apply judicial instructions, even if their answers are conclusory.

The judgment of $14.9 million in damages was reinstated.

The plaintiff brought a motion on consent for an order granting leave to discontinue the proposed class action without costs and without notice to putative class members.

The certification motion had previously been dismissed and the action continued as an individual action.

The court granted the motion, finding no prejudice to former proposed class members who had sufficient opportunity to bring their own claims, which were being case-managed together.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the issue of costs.

Due to a lack of agreement between the parties regarding the costs incurred below, the Court of Appeal reserved the determination of costs to the trial judge hearing the second trial.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a jury's finding of negligence and causation in a birth injury case, arguing the jury misapplied the "but for" test and that the verdict was unreasonable due to lack of evidence on timely delivery.

The appellant also claimed the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's application of the "but for" test, finding the verdict reasonable based on expert evidence, and concluding the trial judge's questions were proper clarifications within established judicial protocol.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal in a medical negligence action, ordering a new trial.

The plaintiffs alleged delayed diagnosis of hydrocephalus in their child, leading to brain damage.

The trial jury found no breach of standard of care.

The appellate court found that the defendants' expert witness exceeded his role by opining on the credibility and reliability of the parties, thereby breaching his duty of independence.

The trial judge erred by not specifically instructing the jury to disregard these improper opinions and by failing to exclude them.

Despite the appellants' counsel not objecting at trial, the errors constituted a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, tainting the jury's verdict and warranting a new trial.

In a class action alleging bacterial infections from epidural injections, the defendant physician, Dr. James, moved for documentary discovery and oral examinations of class members.

The court, considering the plaintiff's novel epidemiological causation theory, granted further documentary production for relevant, non-duplicative information.

However, it denied oral examinations for most class members, ordering written interrogatories for a selected sample instead, citing concerns about litigation delay, expense, and the passive role of class members.

The representative plaintiff could be re-examined orally.

During an ongoing medical negligence trial involving a minor plaintiff who suffered severe brain damage at birth, the parties disputed the phrasing of the jury question on causation.

The plaintiffs argued for the phrase 'caused or contributed to', relying on recent jurisprudence involving multiple tortfeasors.

The defendant argued for the conventional 'but for' standard.

The court held that the factual matrix was not so confusing as to preclude the conventional 'but for' test, and ordered the jury questions to be phrased using the 'but for' standard.

Following the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action regarding unreliable hair drug testing at the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory, the plaintiff brought a motion under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue her action and join approximately 200 co-plaintiffs.

The court held that the limitation periods for the putative class members remain suspended under s. 28 of the Act until the defendants successfully move to dismiss the proceeding without an adjudication on the merits.

The court also held that the test for joining co-plaintiffs under s. 7 is the same as the test under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion to join the co-plaintiffs was dismissed without prejudice due to insufficient pleading of material facts.

This decision addresses whether a finding of contributory negligence against a plaintiff mother (Kimberley York) should reduce the global damages awarded to all plaintiffs, including her injured child (Cole Parliament) and husband (John Parliament), or only her personal damages.

The court held that such a reduction would only apply to the mother's personal damages, as the defendants failed to properly advance a counterclaim for contribution and indemnity against her within the applicable limitation period, as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Limitations Act.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to disqualify the defendants' proposed expert medical witness, Dr. Karen Fleming, from testifying on the standard of care.

The court reviewed Dr. Fleming's two reports and her testimony during a voir dire, finding that her opinions were based on improper credibility assessments and fact-finding, rather than objective expert analysis.

Dr. Fleming's reports and cross-examination revealed a lack of impartiality and a preferential treatment of the defendants' evidence while disregarding the plaintiffs' evidence without adequate explanation.

The court concluded that Dr. Fleming lacked the necessary independence and objectivity to provide an impartial opinion, rendering her not a properly qualified expert under the Mohan framework.

Consequently, her evidence was deemed inadmissible, and the plaintiffs' motion to disqualify her was allowed.

The plaintiffs sought to exclude a December 17, 1999 note from Dr. Conley's Clinical Notes and Records, which contained hearsay regarding a past conversation about Cole Parliament's head size.

The plaintiffs argued the note was unreliable hearsay, not a proper business record, and highly prejudicial.

The defendants contended it was a business record and admissible.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding the note admissible as a business record under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act.

The court noted that the availability of all relevant witnesses (record keeper, informant, and parties to the original conversation) at trial would allow for cross-examination, satisfying reliability concerns and mitigating prejudice.

The motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The respondents appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice directing a new trial on the basis that the jury's answers on causation were fatally flawed.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that an order directing a new trial is interlocutory in nature, as it does not finally determine the substantive rights of the parties but rather requires another trial for that purpose.

The appeal was quashed and transferred to the Divisional Court.