Dr. Bernstein

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer paid benefits up to the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) limit and denied further treatment plans.

The applicant argued she should be removed from the MIG due to a pre-existing fibromyalgia condition, physical injuries including a partial shoulder tear, and psychological injuries.

The Tribunal found insufficient evidence of a documented pre-existing condition that precluded recovery within the MIG.

The Tribunal also found the physical injuries met the definition of minor injuries and rejected the applicant's psychological evidence due to inconsistencies and omissions in self-reporting.

As the applicant remained within the MIG and its limits were exhausted, the disputed treatment plans were not payable.

The Tribunal also found the insurer's denial letters complied with the notice requirements under the Schedule.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a jury's finding of negligence and causation in a birth injury case, arguing the jury misapplied the "but for" test and that the verdict was unreasonable due to lack of evidence on timely delivery.

The appellant also claimed the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's application of the "but for" test, finding the verdict reasonable based on expert evidence, and concluding the trial judge's questions were proper clarifications within established judicial protocol.

Following an obstetrical malpractice trial where the jury found the defendant obstetrician 32% liable for the infant plaintiff's severe cerebral palsy, the defendant brought a motion under Rule 52.08 to dismiss the action or order a retrial.

The defendant argued the jury gave conflicting answers on causation and that there was no evidence to support their findings on the standard of care and delay in delivery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the jury's use of the word 'contributed' did not conflict with the 'but for' causation test, and that there was ample expert evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that the defendant's failure to promptly prepare for an emergency c-section caused the infant's brain damage.

Judgment was ordered to be entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The respondents sued the appellant hospital and several doctors for medical malpractice following the birth of their daughter, who suffered severe brain damage due to asphyxia during labour.

The trial judge dismissed the claims against the doctors but found the hospital vicariously liable for its nurses' failure to properly monitor the fetal heart rate between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m.

The trial judge inferred that proper monitoring would have detected the asphyxia, leading to an expedited delivery that would have spared the child's injuries.

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapplied the law of causation by using a 'robust and pragmatic approach' to infer causation without reviewing and making necessary findings on conflicting expert evidence regarding whether the earlier period of asphyxia was actually detectable by intermittent auscultation.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against an obstetrician following a birth injury that resulted in the infant suffering from cerebral palsy.

The appellants argued the obstetrician breached the standard of care by failing to prepare for an immediate caesarean section before attempting a mid-forceps delivery, and by failing to deliver the baby within ten minutes of declaring a dire emergency.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the standard of care only required an operating room to be immediately available, and that the obstetrician acted as expeditiously as possible under the circumstances.