Christine Elinor Mary Bartlett-Hughes

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately explain his findings on whether the complainant cocked his fist.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had found a reasonable doubt on that point, but correctly concluded that the appellant's response was disproportionate given his martial arts training and could not be justified as self-defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence and lifetime driving prohibition for impaired driving and refusing a breath test.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the egregious circumstances and the appellant's record, noting the trial judge properly considered his guilty plea and gap in alcohol-related convictions.

The court varied the sentence to 17 months to clarify the trial judge's intention to grant one month of pre-trial custody credit, but upheld the lifetime driving prohibition.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and carrying a firearm for the purpose of forcible confinement.

At trial, the Crown relied on DNA and fingerprint evidence, while the appellant relied on a denial and an alibi defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made three reversible errors: giving a deliberate fabrication instruction without independent evidence, improperly instructing the jury on the late disclosure of his alibi, and making a prejudicial Corbett ruling that allowed the Crown to elicit that he had other unspecified convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors cumulatively rendered the trial unfair and deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to have the jury consider his defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder following the death of his wife, which the Crown alleged was a staged suicide via drug overdose and blunt force trauma.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct and the absence of proven motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and properly summarized the defence's position.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of criminal harassment.

At trial, the judge excluded evidence of six prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the respondent toward the complainant, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value under the Handy framework.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapprehended the probative value of the evidence.

The prior conduct was highly relevant to establishing the context of the harassment, the reasonableness of the complainant's fear, and the respondent's knowledge or recklessness regarding that fear.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of both the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to time served plus a 15-month period of probation.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) entered by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant and his counsel were fully aware that an NCR hearing was being conducted, which could result in hospital confinement.

As no request was made for an adjournment to retain a defence psychiatrist, and there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's disposition on the merits, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an order for DNA testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's assertion that DNA testing would affect his risk assessment or the Board's dispositions was speculative and highly unlikely.

The Court declined to determine whether the Board had jurisdiction to make the requested order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of spermatozoa, threats to the victim's children, and sexual sadism.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding sexual assault, forcible confinement, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and the treatment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the admission of evidence or the jury instructions, concluding that the charge read as a whole properly instructed the jury on all issues, including the insanity defence and reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of inconsistent verdicts.

He had admitted participation in all charged offences but relied on the defences of duress and necessity, which applied equally to all crimes as part of a single transaction.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury must have reached an unjustifiable compromise, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of possession of child pornography based on written stories depicting sexual activity between adults and children.

The court held that written material may advocate or counsel sexual activity with children implicitly as well as explicitly under the governing interpretation of s. 163.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge erred in law by focusing on the absence of overt exhortation and by failing to assess whether the stories' combined messages — that children want and enjoy sex with adults, and that trusted adults routinely engage in it because it is good for children — implicitly conveyed that sex with children can and should be pursued.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and attempted murder.

The appeal raised numerous issues, including the validity of his warrantless arrest, the legality of a gunshot residue test and the seizure of his clothing, and the admissibility of similar fact evidence and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the gunshot residue test was a valid search incident to arrest.

However, the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial similar fact evidence of a subsequent shooting, as it lacked the requisite degree of similarity to prove identity.

The trial judge also failed to properly resolve factual issues regarding an alleged violation of the appellant's right to counsel.

Due to the erroneous admission of the similar fact evidence, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the activity in the VIP room of his business did not exceed the community standard of tolerance and that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the activity resembled that in R. v. Mara and East, and it was open to the trial judge to find it exceeded the community standard of tolerance.

The court also found the appellant was actively involved in the day-to-day management and the conviction was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that excessive force was used, and that the elements of the threatening charge were made out.

The court amended the information for the threatening charge as there was no prejudice.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied as the appeal was utterly without merit.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect in accordance with R. v. Handy.

The trial judge's assessment was entitled to great deference and was not unreasonable.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, was transferred from a medium security facility to a maximum security facility by order of the Ontario Review Board.

The Review Board concluded that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code did not apply to the specific conditions of the disposition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement applies to the disposition order as a whole, including its conditions.

The Court found that the Review Board committed an error of law and that the Crown failed to demonstrate that no substantial wrong occurred, entitling the appellant to a re-hearing.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for an assault with a weapon due to a mental disorder.

The Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security hospital with privileges, applying the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test to the conditions of his detention.

The Court of Appeal held this test only applied to the choice of disposition, not the conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code applies to both the disposition and the particular conditions forming part of it.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the defence of accident and failed to adequately address conflicting expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made clear findings of an intentional assault and properly handled the conflict in expert evidence.

The court noted that the trial judge's careful analysis of the expert testimony justified rejecting the basis for the defence expert's opinion.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant pleaded guilty to touching a child for a sexual purpose following a plea bargain.

Before sentencing, he brought a motion to strike his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary because the plea bargain was presented to him on the day of trial and he feared physical violence in jail.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding the plea was informed and voluntary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, noting that inducements inherent in plea negotiations do not render a plea involuntary, and dismissed the conviction appeal.