Christine Elinor Mary Bartlett-Hughes

The appellant challenged his conviction for indecent assault and a sentence of two years less one day arising from prolonged historic sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The principal issue on conviction concerned refusal of third-party therapeutic records under the post-Bill C-46 production regime in the Criminal Code.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Mills, the court held the request was supported only by speculative assertions and lacked a case-specific evidentiary foundation for likely relevance.

The court also rejected an attack on the trial judge's credibility assessment based on the complainant's differential memory of incidents, and dismissed the sentence appeal after granting leave.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision that had granted a Charter application and awarded $5,000 in costs after an unsuccessful firearm storage prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court had jurisdiction because a Charter claim had been raised and either determined or left undecided at trial, engaging the appeal right under s. 830(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court found no evidentiary basis for concluding that the Crown's conduct in proceeding to trial was egregious, oppressive, or high-handed so as to constitute a breach of s. 7 or justify a remedy under s. 24(1).

The court also held that the record could not support an award of costs under s. 809(1), and set aside the costs order.

The respondent was convicted of touching his six-year-old daughter for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge admitted the child's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, despite inconsistencies with her viva voce testimony on cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the contradicted portions of the videotape were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the strict adoption test for prior inconsistent statements does not apply to s. 715.1.

A videotaped statement is adopted if the child acknowledges making it and attempting to be truthful at the time.

Inconsistencies elicited during cross-examination go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The police stopped a car for speeding and, after the driver could not produce documentation, conducted a computer check.

While waiting, the officer questioned the passenger and noticed garbage bags full of new clothing with price tags in the back seat and trunk.

The driver and passenger were charged with possession of stolen property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the bags.

Although the search violated the driver's section 8 Charter rights, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because the breach was minimal, the evidence was reliable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants, the owner and manager of a tavern, were charged with allowing indecent performances under s. 167(1) of the Criminal Code after undercover police observed lap dancing involving sexual contact between nude dancers and patrons.

The trial judge acquitted both, finding the performances were not indecent and the owner lacked mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the performances were indecent as they exceeded the community standard of tolerance due to the degrading nature of the sexual contact in a public tavern.

The manager's conviction was upheld.

However, the Court restored the owner's acquittal, finding the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's factual finding that the owner lacked the requisite mens rea because he had reasonably delegated entertainment responsibilities to the manager.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed his convictions for theft, break and enter, and mischief.

The first part of his statement to police was inadmissible due to non-compliance with s. 56 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the second part of the statement was a continuation of the first, and the caution preceding it did not constitute a 'fresh start' because the effect of the first statement was not dispelled by appropriate language.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.