R. v. R. (D.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 881
Darryl R. Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
Indexed as: R. v. R. (D.)
1994: April 27.
Present: Sopinka, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Criminal law ‑‑ Young offenders ‑‑ Evidence ‑‑ Statements ‑‑ Admissibility ‑‑ First part of statement inadmissible ‑‑ Second part of statement continuation of first part ‑‑ Caution preceding second part not "fresh start" ‑‑ Second part of statement also inadmissible ‑‑ Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1, s. 56.
Cases Cited
Applied: R. v. I. (L.R.) and T. (E.), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1, s. 56.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (1993), 1993 CanLII 8599 (ON CA), 14 O.R. (3d) 585, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 126, 65 O.A.C. 145, dismissing the accused's appeal from his conviction on charges of theft, break and enter and mischief. Appeal allowed.
Maureen Forestell, for the appellant.
Christine Bartlett‑Hughes, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered orally by
Reasons for Judgment
Sopinka J. ‑‑ This appeal is governed by the principles expressed in this Court's recent decision in R. v. I. (L.R.) and T. (E.), 1993 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504, which was decided after the judgment of the Court of Appeal herein. We agree with Labrosse J.A., dissenting, in his characterization of the second part of the statement as a continuation of the first part. The first part of the statement was inadmissible by reason of the non‑compliance with s. 56 of the Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. Y‑1. Applying the principles in I. (L.R.) and T. (E.), the second part of the statement was, therefore, also inadmissible.
It was submitted by the respondent that the s. 56 caution which preceded the second part of the statement was a "fresh start" rendering the inadmissibility of the first part of the statement irrelevant. We disagree. In the circumstances of this case, in order to constitute a "fresh start", the effect of the first statement would have had to be dispelled by appropriate language. This was not done.
Disposition
The appeal is therefore allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside, the convictions are quashed and a verdict of acquittal is entered on each count.
Judgment accordingly.
Solicitors for the appellant: Bennett, Forestell, Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: The Ministry of the Attorney General, Toronto.
