Christine Elinor Mary Bartlett-Hughes

The Crown appealed a 21-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for touching a seven-year-old girl for a sexual purpose.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence and understated the breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the trial judge aptly described the trust relationship and that the conditional sentence was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a 9-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for possession and distribution of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence was inappropriate and that a substantial reformatory sentence was called for, given the gravity of the offence and the volume of images involved.

However, because the respondent had already served seven and a half months of the conditional sentence and had recently obtained psychiatric counseling, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the original statement of a witness for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence demonstrated the appropriate level of reliability and the trial judge did not err in admitting it.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice, seeking a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal considered the fresh evidence but found it unpersuasive for imposing a conditional sentence.

Finding no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the discretion exercised by the sentencing judge.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown requested to re-open a sentence appeal after discovering that an unknown 90-day consecutive sentence had nullified the probation order previously imposed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal re-opened the appeal and, on consent, varied the sentence for criminal harassment to twenty months plus three years probation to ensure the total period of incarceration remained under two years, preserving the probation order.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that evidence led to explain the absence of a witness was highly prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence left the jury with the erroneous impression that the witness had helpful evidence for the Crown and that the appellant was responsible for his absence.

Given the weaknesses in the Crown's case, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant appealed his conviction for assault, which arose from an attack by a group of skinheads on an unidentified black man.

The trial judge convicted the applicant based on a process of elimination, relying on the testimony of an accomplice and independent witnesses to conclude the applicant was the third participant in the chase.

The Court of Appeal found the independent evidence regarding the number of participants was too contradictory and unsatisfactory to form a safe basis for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault, criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation arising from the termination of a common-law relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Brown v. Dunn to reject the appellant's self-defence evidence on the assault charge, as the record showed the complainant had been cross-examined on the issue.

The assault conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The remaining convictions were upheld.

The global sentence was reduced from four years to two years less a day, plus three years' probation, to account for pre-trial custody and to avoid double punishment for conduct already sentenced.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on alibi and failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of an accomplice and an admitted perjurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

Two dissenting justices would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The appellant was convicted of living off the avails of prostitution and exercising direction for the purpose of aiding prostitution in relation to an escort agency.

On appeal, he argued that business records containing double hearsay were improperly admitted and that breaches of a publication ban deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records admissible under the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule and that the publication ban issues did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the sentence from two years less a day to 12 months' imprisonment due to the appellant's lack of prior record and the trial judge's refusal to allow time for sentencing submissions.

The accused was charged with murder.

A third party, the appellant, had allegedly confessed to the murder to his girlfriend and to his lawyers.

The accused brought a McClure application seeking production of the appellant's solicitor-client files to raise a reasonable doubt.

The motions judge granted the application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal, finding the application was premature.

The accused had not established that the information was unavailable from any other source, as the girlfriend's testimony might be admissible.

Furthermore, it was not yet clear that the accused could not raise a reasonable doubt in any other way.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that ordered a new trial and the production of joint counselling records in a sexual assault case.

The summary conviction appeal judge held that the Criminal Code's third-party records provisions did not apply to counselling sessions attended by both the accused and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the provisions do apply, as the complainant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in therapeutic records despite the accused's presence.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the order for a new trial on the alternative ground that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence regarding the complainant's statements during the alleged assault.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give limiting instructions regarding a videotaped experiment, another individual's prior assault and alleged confession, and the appellant's after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant also argued the Crown's closing address improperly contained personal opinions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding that while the Crown's expressions of personal opinion were improper, they did not undermine the fairness of the trial.

The respondents, operators of adult entertainment parlours, were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house contrary to s. 210 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the charges were stayed on the basis that the terms 'acts of indecency' and 'prostitution' were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that it was bound by stare decisis, as previous Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal decisions had already established that the community standard of tolerance test provides an intelligible standard and that the terms are not impermissibly vague.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction involving a forged endorsement on a cheque.

The central issue was whether the named payee was a non-existent entity or merely a misdescription.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact that it was a misdescription, meaning the cheque was not payable to bearer under the Bills of Exchange Act.

Consequently, the forged endorsement was a material addition to a genuine document, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, appealing a conviction for second degree murder, brought an application for the disclosure of an affidavit relating to the mental state of the principal Crown witness.

The Crown had put the witness's mental state in issue at trial to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the information in the affidavit suggested a previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder might have been in error, making it necessary for the applicant to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the disclosure of the affidavit subject to conditions.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the principles governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence during a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge stated the correct principles and fully appreciated the legal significance of the proposed evidence during submissions.

Given the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial rulings on similar fact evidence, the court declined to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of post-conviction recorded telephone conversations in which the complainant explicitly and implicitly admitted that her trial testimony was false.

The court held that, although inconsistencies in the Crown's case did not render the verdict unreasonable, the fresh evidence satisfied the Palmer requirement that it could reasonably affect the result.

The fresh evidence was admitted, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.