Charles T. Hackland

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.

The defendant municipality brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of an action alleging bad faith in cancelling a request for proposals for municipal garbage collection services.

The plaintiff bidder alleged that the municipality improperly relied on a privilege clause after negotiations with another bidder and after treating the plaintiff’s bid as the lowest based on a clarified unit price.

The court held that the municipality was contractually entitled to cancel the RFP pursuant to the privilege clause provided it acted in good faith and for legitimate municipal purposes.

Evidence showed the cancellation arose from legal concerns about the bidding process, bid compliance issues, and evolving municipal policy favouring waste diversion and recycling.

The court concluded there was no evidence capable of establishing bad faith and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence claim against a solicitor.

The claim alleged that the solicitor failed to advise the plaintiff regarding a limitation period for commencing an action against a disability insurer.

The court considered whether the absence of expert evidence required dismissal of the claim at the summary judgment stage.

It held that expert evidence is not invariably required when the moving party has also failed to file such evidence and the evidentiary record does not permit a full appreciation of the issues.

Leave to appeal was denied because the motion judge reasonably concluded that the factual record required further development at trial.

The plaintiff, a former Member of Parliament and cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his senior advisors, and others for conspiracy, defamation, and other torts following her removal from cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the decisions to remove the plaintiff from cabinet and caucus were protected by Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, respectively, and were therefore not justiciable.

The court also held that communications between the prime minister and his advisors were protected by absolute privilege, and that the Conservative Party of Canada, as an unincorporated association, lacked the capacity to be sued.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to amend her statement of claim to add a derivative claim against an insurer on behalf of a corporation.

The respondent sought to recover her investment losses under a fidelity bond issued to the corporation, alleging the corporation's principal committed fraudulent acts.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the principal was the controlling mind of the corporation and could not defraud his own corporation.

As the proposed derivative claim was bound to fail, the respondent was not a proper complainant under the Business Corporations Act.

Multiple applicants charged with bid‑rigging under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act and conspiracy under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry.

They argued that the government Requests for Proposals used to procure information technology services merely created standing offers or pre‑qualification lists and therefore could not constitute “calls for bids or tenders” within the meaning of the Competition Act.

The court reviewed the Contract A/Contract B tendering framework and relevant procurement jurisprudence, emphasizing that the existence of a bidding contract depends on the parties’ intention to create binding rights and obligations.

It held that there was some evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the RFP process created contractual relations sufficient to constitute bids or tenders, even though the government retained discretion not to award work.

The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.

The defendant brought a threshold motion during jury deliberations in a motor vehicle personal injury action, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed to suffer from chronic pain syndrome resulting from a minor rear-end collision.

The court preferred the evidence of the defendant's medical expert and relied heavily on video surveillance showing the plaintiff engaging in vigorous physical activities inconsistent with her claimed limitations.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical function.

Consequently, the jury's award of $50,000 for general damages was disallowed, and judgment was entered only for the $32,000 awarded for past loss of housekeeping services.

In a civil action alleging Canadian government complicity in torture by foreign authorities, the plaintiffs sought the imposition of a discovery plan mirroring one ordered in related proceedings.

The court accepted that the actions should proceed in parallel with the related litigation at the production and discovery stage.

However, the court declined to impose a “show cause” sanction requiring the Attorney General to justify why its statement of defence should not be struck if document production deadlines were missed.

The judge held that the volume of documents subject to national security privilege screening in the present action was substantially greater and that the Attorney General had demonstrated diligence and good faith in complying with disclosure obligations.

The discovery plan from the related actions was adopted with this modification.

The defendant moved for summary judgment seeking a declaration that his motor vehicle insurance policy with the third-party insurer was in full force and effect when he struck the plaintiff pedestrian.

The insurer brought a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the policy was validly terminated for non-payment of premiums prior to the accident.

The court found that the defendant had implicitly agreed to the premium amount by paying it for three months before defaulting.

The court also accepted the insurer's calculation of the 30-day notice period required by the Statutory Conditions.

The insurer's cross-motion was granted, and the defendant's motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff invested funds with a corporate entity, with another corporation acting as escrow trustee.

After losing her investment, she sued the escrow trustee, its principal, and others.

She also sued the insurer that had issued a fidelity bond to the escrow trustee.

The plaintiff successfully moved to add a derivative claim against the insurer on behalf of the escrow trustee under s. 246(1) of the Business Corporations Act.

The escrow trustee and its principal appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the plaintiff was not a proper complainant under s. 245(c).

The court held that the proposed derivative claim fell outside the scope of the fidelity bond because the principal was the controlling mind of the escrow trustee, not an employee, and could not have committed a fraudulent act against his own alter ego.

The appellant mother appealed two orders of Crown wardship regarding her two children, who were apprehended at birth.

She argued that the child protection provisions of the Child and Family Services Act were unconstitutional, that the matters should be heard in criminal court, and that she was denied procedural fairness at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that child protection falls under provincial jurisdiction, child protection hearings must be separate from criminal proceedings, and the trial judge made no procedural errors in managing the trial.

The court also confirmed that a finding of a child in need of protection is based on the risk of future harm, not past harm.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their Rule 21 motion to strike the action as statute‑barred and an abuse of process.

The dispute arose from a payment allegedly made to facilitate the purchase of a condominium, which the responding party claimed was held in trust to provide lifetime accommodation.

The court found there was good reason to doubt the motion judge’s conclusion that the claim for ongoing support avoided the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also expressed doubt that a claim for parental support under s. 32 of the Family Law Act could succeed where the moving parties had never been supported or cared for by the responding party as children.

Leave to appeal was granted on these issues but refused regarding the costs award.

Two shareholders of a hotel holding company each sought oppression relief following a complete breakdown in their business relationship.

The court had previously found that neither party validly invoked the buy‑sell clause in the shareholders’ agreement and that the parties could no longer operate the business together.

The issue was the appropriate court‑ordered mechanism to separate the shareholders.

The court ordered an independent valuation of the holding company and directed the majority shareholder to purchase the minority shareholder’s interest without a minority discount, together with repayment of the minority shareholder’s loan plus interest calculated under the shareholders’ agreement.

Costs were awarded to the majority shareholder as the substantially successful party.

The defendant manufacturer brought a motion seeking relief from an earlier consent arrangement requiring it to maintain an exclusive distribution agreement with the plaintiff distributor pending further court order.

The court interpreted the earlier arrangement as permitting the matter to be brought back before the court and considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction to maintain the agreement until trial.

Applying the test from R.J.R. MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that although there were triable issues regarding the duration and alleged breaches of the agreement, the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm and the balance of convenience did not favour injunctive relief.

The court emphasized that enforcing exclusive distribution agreements through injunctions can require ongoing judicial supervision of deteriorating commercial relationships.

The request for an interlocutory injunction was refused, though the agreement was temporarily maintained for 60 days to allow the distributor to transition its business.

The appellant suffered severe physical and psychological injuries, including a leg amputation and clinical depression, in a motor vehicle accident.

He sought enhanced statutory accident benefits, arguing he was catastrophically impaired.

The trial judge held that physical and psychological impairments could not be combined under section 2(1.1)(f) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to meet the 55 per cent whole person impairment threshold.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, finding that the language of the Schedule, the purpose of the American Medical Association's Guides, and the goals of the statutory scheme permit the combination of physical and psychiatric impairments to determine catastrophic impairment.

The appellants sued the respondent for breach of confidence, alleging the respondent misused ticket booking data provided to it for billing and settlement purposes to create a competing data product.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the information was not communicated in confidence, largely due to the absence of a confidentiality clause in favour of the appellants in the relevant agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in his assessment of the factual matrix and the reasonable person standard.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion seeking to re-litigate a matter previously dismissed at trial in 2007, which had been upheld by the Court of Appeal and denied leave by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellants claimed they were bringing new evidence and a new cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the claims were not different from those previously decided and were barred by res judicata.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action.

The action arose from a statement of defence in a wrongful dismissal suit alleging the appellant installed undisclosed surveillance cameras in employee living accommodations.

The motion judge found the respondents established the substantial truth of the allegations, noting the appellant failed to file responding affidavit material as required by Rule 20.02(2).

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence supported the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering payment of unpaid invoices, arguing the motion judge erred in rejecting its claim for equitable set-off and denying a stay of execution pending the determination of its counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the set-off factors or the test for a stay.

The appellant appealed a default judgment ordering him to pay a lump sum spousal support award of $193,385, secured by a charge on his property, after his pleadings were struck for failing to fulfill undertakings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the application judge's order, particularly given the appellant's abusive behaviour, intention not to pay support, and probable non-compliance with court orders.