Charles T. Hackland

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding the assessment of a solicitor's account.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding that a Master's order had to be set aside before he had jurisdiction.

The corporate client was permitted to proceed directly to an assessment of its account, while the individual client was not.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant sought compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for physical and sexual abuse suffered at a training school as a youth.

The Board denied compensation, taking into account the appellant's subsequent criminal behaviour, including a conviction for rape.

The appellant appealed, arguing that subsequent conduct should not be considered under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's broad discretion to consider 'all relevant circumstances' includes the claimant's subsequent criminal conduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Board had concluded that the applicant's employment was terminated for willful disobedience, which disentitled him to termination pay under O. Reg. 288/01 of the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision to be reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review with no costs.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision regarding an employee placed on administrative leave without pay due to bail restrictions following an arrest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator reasonably applied established arbitral jurisprudence requiring employers to attempt to identify an appropriate temporary position for employees precluded from performing normal duties due to pending criminal charges.

The court rejected the employer's argument that this principle was inapplicable because its actions were in response to bail restrictions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Kingston Area Taxi Commission revoking his taxi licenses.

The Divisional Court found that the applicant was denied procedural fairness because he received only 6 days' notice instead of the required 14 days, and the Commission continued the hearing on a later date without notifying him or his representative.

The court set aside the Commission's decision and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university senate appeals committee decision denying him a specialized accounting degree.

The dispute centered on whether a specific strategic management course could be included in calculating his grade point average for the specialization.

The Divisional Court held that the committee's decision on an academic matter was subject to a reasonableness standard of review and found the decision to exclude the course was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement regarding costs.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements plus HST.

The costs were directed to be paid to Legal Aid Ontario.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement fixing the costs of the appeal.

Costs were fixed in the amount of $9,000 inclusive of disbursements, plus HST, payable forthwith by the respondents to the appellant.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement fixing the costs of the appeal.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant $10,000 inclusive of disbursements, plus HST.

The court also granted the parties leave to provide written submissions on whether the trial judge's award of costs of the trial should be varied.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing its appeal against the City of Ottawa's Official Plan Amendment (OPA 77) without a hearing.

The applicant argued the OMB erred by reviewing evidence on the motion to dismiss, akin to a summary judgment motion, rather than assuming the facts in the notice of appeal were true.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the OMB's procedure was reasonable and necessary to screen out appeals with no chance of success.

The court also found no error in the OMB's conclusion that the applicant's environmental and storm water management concerns could not form a land use planning basis to refuse OPA 77 at this stage.

The appellant, a junior lawyer, was summarily dismissed by her employer after writing a highly critical letter regarding office administration and compensation, which included an accusation of dishonesty and negligence.

The trial judge found the letter constituted insolence justifying summary dismissal.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to apply the contextual approach mandated by McKinley v. BC Tel.

Applying the contextual approach, the Court found the single incident of harsh communication did not irreparably destroy the employment relationship.

The appeal was allowed and damages in lieu of reasonable notice were awarded.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order striking her two Superior Court proceedings, which claimed damages of $8.2 million and $100,000.

The Divisional Court found that an appeal of a final order in these amounts falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the appeals were transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal regarding the administration and calculation of her entitlements under the Ontario Works Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that appeals under the Act are restricted to questions of law.

Because the appellant raised only administrative and factual complaints, the court found no error of law.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent bank recovery of a credit card debt.

The central issue was whether the action was barred by the six-year limitation period.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the limitation period began to run when the bank terminated the credit card agreement and the entire debt became immediately payable, rather than on the date of the initial missed minimum payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant employer successfully sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, resulting in the reinstatement of the grievor's employment termination.

The parties agreed the applicant was entitled to partial indemnity costs, leaving only the quantum to be determined.

The court assessed the claimed fees and disbursements, reducing the fees to $10,000 and disbursements to $2,535, noting the complexity of the proceeding and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party under Rule 57.01(1).

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal, the successful respondents sought costs of $31,804.58.

The appellants submitted that costs should be fixed at $20,000.

The Divisional Court agreed with the appellants, fixing costs at $20,000 inclusive, noting that this amount was fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the amount at issue.

The appellant solicitor appealed an order requiring him to personally pay $10,000 in costs under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motions judge had awarded costs against the solicitor largely due to allegations of unprofessional conduct and conducting the litigation in an unreasonable manner.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge failed to apply the 'extreme caution' principle and did not establish how the solicitor's conduct caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily.

The court emphasized that Rule 57.07 is compensatory, not punitive, and should not be used to sanction professional misconduct that does not result in wasted costs.

The appellants appealed a judgment that awarded the respondents a declaration of trespass, general damages, punitive damages, and costs following a property line dispute over a fence.

The application judge had decided the matter under Rule 14.05(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure despite conflicting affidavit evidence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that Rule 14.05(3) is not available for the resolution of general and punitive damage claims where material facts are in dispute.

The court set aside the damages and costs awards and directed a trial of an issue regarding the respondents' entitlement to damages.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for certification of a class proceeding against a tour operator regarding a norovirus outbreak at resorts in the Dominican Republic.

The Divisional Court found that while the motions judge did not err in narrowing the class definition, he erred in principle in his analysis of the preferable procedure criterion by failing to assess it in the context of the narrowed class.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal and costs orders were set aside, and the matter was referred back to the motions judge for consideration of a revised litigation plan.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the disclosure of police records.

The Ministry argued the records were exempt under s. 19(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because copies of the records were contained in the Crown brief.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that s. 19(b) does not exempt records in the possession of the police that were created during an investigation merely because copies later became part of the Crown brief.