F. Bruce Fitzpatrick

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his complaint of workplace discrimination on the basis of race.

The Tribunal had dismissed the complaint because the 2009 and 2011 allegations were out of time, the 2014 termination was appropriately dealt with through a union grievance and arbitration, and there was insufficient evidence for the 2015 allegations.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable, there was no denial of procedural fairness, and the Charter did not apply to private workplace interactions.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of a rent-to-own agreement for a home on the Whitesand First Nation reserve after the First Nation allocated the home to another member.

The plaintiff had vacated the home years earlier due to an abusive relationship but continually expressed her intent to return.

The court found that the plaintiff had not abandoned the home and that the First Nation breached the agreement by failing to address her requests in good faith.

However, the court declined to order specific performance, finding it inequitable to displace the current innocent occupant and noting the plaintiff's delay.

Instead, the court awarded the plaintiff $18,000 in damages for breach of contract and $5,000 for lost personal property.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from an Ontario Securities Commission decision finding them guilty of securities fraud, the Commission and the intervenors sought costs.

The Commission sought $40,000, which the court awarded in full on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, who were the appellants' former counsel and intervened to defend against allegations of ineffective assistance, sought over $53,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the intervenors were entitled to costs as parties to the appeal, but reduced the scale to partial indemnity and fixed their costs at $20,000.

The appellants appealed the Ontario Securities Commission's decisions finding them liable for securities fraud and imposing severe sanctions, including lifetime trading bans, disgorgement, and administrative penalties.

The appellants argued that the presiding commissioner was biased, that their counsel at the hearing was incompetent and in a conflict of interest, and that the findings of fraud and the penalties were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, rejecting the fresh evidence regarding counsel's competence as it would not have affected the outcome, and concluding that the Commission's findings on fraud and sanctions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The defendant, Melissa Harrison, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien claim against her personally.

The plaintiff alleged an oral contract for construction services was made exclusively with Harrison.

Harrison argued the contract was with her corporation, 2427087 Ontario Inc. The court found that based on the objective evidence, including a confidentiality agreement and correspondence, the plaintiff was on notice that it was dealing with a corporate entity.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the claim against Harrison personally.

The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents vexatious litigants.

The individual respondent had commenced multiple actions in Ontario regarding matters already settled in California, all of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process.

He also engaged in harassing and abusive communications with opposing counsel.

The court found the respondent's conduct met the criteria for a vexatious litigant and ordered that he and his corporations require leave to commence any new proceedings in Ontario.

Requests to stay existing appeals and seal the court file were dismissed.

The defendants, Emilio and Kristi Feletto, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs' claim arose from the purchase of a residential property allegedly built with major structural defects.

The court struck two subparagraphs against Emilio with leave to amend, but declined to strike the remaining impugned paragraphs, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims in negligence, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation would fail.

The plaintiffs were awarded costs of the motion.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced two civil actions against police officers and their employer, seeking over $1 million in damages following his conviction for impaired driving.

He alleged the officers' conduct caused him to hire incompetent counsel, leading to his conviction.

The defendants moved to strike the claims.

The court granted the motions, finding the claims were a collateral attack on the plaintiff's criminal conviction, which had already been upheld on appeal.

The court held the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process, striking them out without leave to amend.

Following a 41-day trial where the plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims regarding TMJ implants were dismissed as statute-barred, the successful defendant hospital sought costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs to the date of its offers to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court declined to apply Rule 49.10 to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no egregious behaviour by the plaintiffs deserving of sanction.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the entirety of the action, totalling $540,604.09 across the three actions.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home almost two years after separation.

The parties disputed the length of cohabitation and the wife's ability to earn income.

The court awarded interim spousal support of $3,100 per month, partially retroactive to January 1, 2017, noting the delay in bringing the motion.

The court also ordered the matrimonial home to be listed for sale, finding no vexatious or oppressive reason to deny the partition, and directed the husband to maintain the wife as a beneficiary on his pension and benefits.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to strike a jury notice and granting the respondent's motion for late delivery of a jury notice in a consolidated action involving a denied life insurance claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered the test for late jury notices, including the circumstances of delay and lack of prejudice.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondent's claim, while framed as seeking a declaration of entitlement to a $400,000 death benefit, was in pith and substance a claim for monetary damages, and therefore a jury notice was permissible.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy and ordering her eviction after her sons were arrested in the unit for possessing an illegal handgun and drugs.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness when the Board proceeded with the hearing in her absence after she left to seek medical attention for a toothache without waiting for a ruling on her adjournment request.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of natural justice in proceeding in her absence and no error in the Board's conclusion that possessing an illegal handgun impaired the safety and reasonable enjoyment of other tenants.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination complaint against the Regional Municipality of Peel.

The HRTO had dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that the substance of her complaint regarding social assistance eligibility and shelter allowance had already been appropriately dealt with by the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's decision was reasonable and that the applicant's benefits were assessed based on her own application and a reasonable interpretation of the regulations, not discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The parties separated after a 7-year marriage.

The applicant, a self-employed dentist, sought to enforce a spousal support waiver in their marriage contract and impute income to the respondent, a stay-at-home mother.

The court imputed an income of $37,500 to the respondent and determined the applicant's income at $330,000 by adding back personal expenses paid by his corporation and rejecting aggressive amortization deductions.

The court found the marriage contract explicitly permitted a review of the spousal support waiver upon the birth of a child, and awarded the respondent $4,800 monthly in spousal support, along with set-off child support.

The defendants moved to strike or stay the Canadian action brought against them by the plaintiffs, arguing it was an abuse of process or should be stayed due to a parallel U.S. action commenced by related plaintiffs against related defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the U.S. action involved different defendants, different causes of action, different laws, and different jurisdictions.

The court held that the plaintiffs' conduct was not vexatious or oppressive, and the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice to justify a permanent or temporary stay.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving with excess blood alcohol.

At trial, the judge found that the police officer arbitrarily detained the accused because the officer was looking for a specific green pickup truck, but stopped the accused's red pickup truck and continued the detention even after realizing it was the wrong vehicle.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the Crown argued the stop was a valid traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual finding that the stop was an investigative detention, not a traffic stop, was supported by the evidence and not an error of law.

The moving party (former husband) brought a motion to change a 2010 consent order that required him to pay $900 per month in spousal support.

He argued that his loss of long-term employment in 2013 and subsequent inability to secure comparable income constituted a material change in circumstances.

The responding party (former wife) opposed the motion and argued that income should be imputed to him for intentional underemployment.

The court found a material change in circumstances and declined to impute income, finding the moving party had made reasonable efforts to find work.

The court reduced ongoing spousal support to $200 per month based on his current seasonal employment income.

No costs were awarded due to the moving party's late disclosure of his new employment.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace following alleged breaches of a prior release.

The accused argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law regarding the presumption of innocence and that the detention was clearly inappropriate.

The Superior Court found no error of law but concluded the detention was clearly inappropriate because the Justice of the Peace gave insufficient weight to the accused's proposed release plan.

The plan to reside in a supportive housing facility in a different city, combined with the remote fly-in nature of the victim's community, adequately addressed secondary ground concerns.

The detention order was vacated and the accused was released on strict conditions.

The defendant Jevco Insurance Company brought a motion under Rule 21.01 for a determination of a question of law: whether an automobile owned by the plaintiff's spouse, driven without consent by an uninsured driver, constitutes an "uninsured automobile" under the Insurance Act and the relevant insurance policy.

The court found that the statutory and contractual language explicitly excludes such a vehicle from the definition of "uninsured automobile" when it is owned by the insured or their spouse, even if the result may seem unfair.

Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured automobile coverage from Jevco.

The applicant, Drew Mitchell, sought to vacate a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The application for bail review was based on alleged errors of law by the Justice of the Peace and the presentation of new evidence demonstrating a material change in circumstances.

The court found no error of law in the Justice of the Peace's assessment of the Crown's opposition to bail or in the finding of fact regarding compliance with previous conditions.

The new release plan, while offering some improvements, still had a significant gap in supervision and was not considered a material change in circumstances.

The application for bail review was dismissed.