CITATION: Smith et al. v. Feletto et al., 2017 ONSC 7250
COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-0129
DATE: 2017-12-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
JONATHAN SMITH and LINDSAY SMITH
L. Kruse, for the Plaintiffs (Responding Parties)
Plaintiffs
- and -
EMILIO FELETTO, KRISTI LYNNE FELETTO, THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF THUNDER BAY, GLEN FERLAND, PILLAR TO POST HOME INSPECTIONS, and FCT INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
D. Treilhard and K. Commisso, for the Defendants (Moving Parties)
Defendants
HEARD: November 3, 2017, at Thunder Bay, Ontario
Mr. Justice F. Bruce Fitzpatrick
Judgment on Pleadings Motion
[1] The Defendants, Emilio Feletto (“Emilio”) and Kristi Lynne Feletto (“Kristi”), bring a motion to strike out portions of the Amended Statement of Claim as against them. They do so on the grounds that certain portions do not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Defendants, the Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay, Glen Ferland, Pillar to Post Home Inspectors and FCT Insurance Company Ltd. took no part in this motion. No relief is claimed against these defendants.
[2] The Defendants allege the Plaintiffs, Jonathan Smith and Lindsay Smith (the “Plaintiffs”), have failed to allege materials facts in their claim that would satisfy the elements of the certain pleaded causes of action. In addition, the Defendants assert the Plaintiffs have asserted certain causes of action that are unknown to our law in Ontario.
[3] The Defendants argue that the impugned pleadings if not struck out may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action. The Defendants rely on Rules 21.01(1)(b), 25.06 and 25.11(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Background
[4] As this was a pleadings motion based largely on the provisions of Rule 21.01(1)(b), the Court had only the statement of claim and the facta of the parties to consider. The statement of claim was issued on March 7, 2017. The causes of action set out in the statement of claim arise from the Plaintiffs’ purchase of a residential property in Thunder Bay from Kristi on July 18, 2014. The transaction was concluded through an agreement of purchase and sale. As well, on April 6, 2014 Kristi had completed a Seller Property Information Statement (“SPIS”). The Plaintiffs plead certain representation were made in the SPIS designed to entice the Plaintiffs to purchase the home and upon which they relied to their detriment. The statement of claim also alleges the property was built by Emilio and had major structural defects about which he was aware.
[5] Following service of the notice of motion, the parties had further discussions. This resulted in the Plaintiffs agreeing to make further changes to the amended claim in the hopes (according to the Plaintiffs’ counsel) of resolving the issues and avoiding the motion. Apparently, the agreed changes were not good enough for the Defendants. However, that process did reduce the scope of the motion from that contained in the original notice of motion.
[6] The disputed portions of the claim are confined to two paragraphs, 20.1 and 20.2 of the Amended Statement of Claim. The moving party quite helpfully in its factum provided a chart setting out the remaining specific subparagraphs which it seeks to strike following discussions with the Plaintiffs.
The Law
[7] The legal principles applicable to Rule 21 motions were not in dispute. Both parties relied on the decision of Shaw J. in Metz v. Tremblay-Hall, 2006 CanLII 34443 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 4134 (OSCJ). In that decision Shaw J. held:
The material facts pleaded are to be taken as proven unless they are patently incapable of proof;
Neither the complexity of the issues, the novelty of the cause of action, nor the potential of a strong defence is to prevent a party from proceeding with its case; and
A pleading should be read generously so as not to unfairly deprive a party of the benefit of the pleading.
[8] The Defendants also relied on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Deep v. Ontario, [2004] O.J. no 2734 for the following additional principles:
A claim will be found to be legally insufficient when the plaintiff either (a) seeks relief for acts that are not proscribed by law or (b) fails to allege the necessary elements of a claim that would, if properly pleaded, be a reasonable cause of action.
In order to survive a challenge under rule 21.01(1)(b), a statement of claim must, at minimum, plead the basic elements of a reasonable cause of action pursuant to which an entitlement to damages or other relief is claimed. The absence of a necessary element of the cause of action will constitute a radical defect on the basis of which it is plain and obvious that the plaintiff cannot succeed. Accordingly, such a claim should be struck out.
[9] As noted above, the attack on the pleading travelled down two separate roads. The first alleged factual deficiencies. The second alleged that certain paragraphs claimed relief unknown to our law in Ontario. I will discuss the particulars of the legal principles relied upon for that aspect of the Defendants’ motion during my discussion of the individual paragraphs.
Clause by Clause Discussion
[10] This nature of this motion did not lend itself to the usual judgment format whereby the court sets out the respective positions of the parties and then disposes of all the issues on their merits. Instead it seems to me most efficient to deal with the disputed paragraphs on a clause by clause basis. I will endeavour to set out the respective positions of the parties on each of these paragraphs and then set out my disposition on the particular paragraph.
The Claims Against Emilio
[11] For the first three sub paragraphs at issue it is important to remember they are part of the paragraph that begins:
20.1 the Plaintiffs claim that they have suffered losses and damages caused or contributed to by the negligence of the Defendant Emilio that, in addition to the foregoing, consisted of the following acts or omissions to the cumulative effect of any combination thereof:
[12] For ease of reference I took out the portions of paragraph 20.1 that have previously agreed to be struck and added “of” which I believe was simply a typo.
Paragraph 20.1(o) claim against Emilio
“failing to complete the SPIS despite being an owner of the House at the time the SPIS was completed to the detriment of the Plaintiffs”
[13] The Defendants point to this clause as a plea of a cause of action unknown to our law. The Defendants argue that Emilio as contractor does not owe a subsequent purchaser a duty to take positive action to avert pure economic loss. In oral argument, the Plaintiffs conceded that there was not a cause of action known at law regarding the duty of a contractor to complete a SPIS.
[14] This paragraph will be ordered struck with leave to amend.
20.1(p) claim against Emilio
“misrepresenting that the House was free of latent defects to the detriment of the Plaintiffs”
[15] The Defendants argue this a plea of negligent misrepresentation that is not supported by any specific material facts elsewhere in the pleading to the effect that Emilio make any such misrepresentations.
[16] The Plaintiffs argue they have plead all material facts concerning the manner in which the house was built and as such there is no need to strike this particular sub claim.
[17] I agree with the position of the Defendants that this particular plea is not supported by any specific material facts elsewhere in the pleading to the effect that Emilio made a specific misrepresentation.
[18] This paragraph is struck with leave to amend.
20.1(q) claim against Emilio
“failing in his duty of care owed under the OBC”
[19] The Defendants point to this clause as a plea of a cause of action unknown to our law. They rely on the line of authority which commenced with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1983 CanLII 21 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205 that holds there is no private law tort for breach of a statute. The Plaintiffs fully acknowledge that breach of a statutory duty is not a stand-alone tort. However, they argue that breach of a statute, where it has an effect on civil liability, should be considered in the context of a party’s negligence.
[20] Counsel for the Plaintiffs in oral argument referred to “section 1.1” of the Code as the basis for this alleged statutory duty. The relevant provisions of the Ontario Building Code Act S.O. 1992 c. 23 that were in effect from June 1, 2011 to July 23, 2014 provides:
- (1) In this Act,
Role of various persons
1.1 (1) It is the role of every person who causes a building to be constructed,
(a) to cause the building to be constructed in accordance with this Act and the building code and with any permit issued under this Act for the building;
(b) to ensure that construction does not proceed unless any permit required under this Act has been issued by the chief building official; and
(c) to ensure that construction is carried out only by persons with the qualifications and insurance, if any, required by this Act and the building code. 2002, c. 9, s. 3.
Role of Builder
(3) It is the role of a builder,
(a) to ensure that construction does not proceed unless any permit required under this Act has been issued by the chief building official;
(b) to construct the building in accordance with the permit;
(c) to use appropriate building techniques to achieve compliance with this Act and the building code; and
(d) when site conditions affect compliance with the building code, to notify the designer and an inspector or the registered code agency, as appropriate. 2002, c. 9, s. 3.
[21] It is important to note this exact language remains in the current version of the Act.
[22] I agree with position of the Plaintiffs in respect of this sub paragraph. It is not plain and obvious to me that a court could not ultimately find a duty upon Emilio to have constructed the building in a certain manner and thus be liable in negligence for his actions. After all, this is a sub paragraph which contains a particular of the claim for negligence against Emilio. I was not provided any authority concerning the scope of any duty created by the Building Code Act in effect at the time. However, given the words of the statute, I can see how a Court could deal with any duties as an aspect of a negligence claim against Emilio without the necessity of considering a breach of the Building Code Act as a stand alone tort, which would be impermissible as the law now stands. That result is a conclusion I could see a Court ultimately making following a trial upon the proper evidence. On that basis, I say it is not plain and obvious that the facts alleged by this particular paragraph would fail at trial. I am reading the pleading as a whole. Giving the pleadings a generous reading, I am not convinced that the particular wording of paragraph 20.1(q) is in the nature of a plea that asserts a breach of a stand alone tort on the part of Emilio.
[23] This particular sub paragraph is allowed to stand.
The Claims Against Kristi
[24] This aspect of the motion deals with paragraph 20.2 of the Amended Statement of Claim. That paragraph reads as follows:
20.2 The Plaintiffs claim that they have suffered losses and damages caused or contributed by the negligence, breach of contract and negligent misrepresentations by the Defendant Kristi that, in addition to the foregoing, consisted of the following acts or omissions to the cumulative effect of any combination thereof:
[25] The Defendants move to have the word “negligence” in the above paragraph struck. They do so on the assertion that the essence of the Plaintiffs’ claim is for economic loss. The Defendants argue that as the Plaintiffs are seeking damages for repair of a defective building, their claim is solely in the nature of what the courts have traditionally called a claim for economic loss. The Defendants state it is settled law that a party cannot recover damages in tort for economic loss except in five specific cases which were set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Winnipeg Condominium Corp. No. 36 v. Bird Construction, 1995 CanLII 146 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 at para. 12 where La Forest J. stated:
This case gives this Court the opportunity once again to address the question of recoverability in tort for economic loss. In Norsk, supra, at p. 1049, I made reference to an article by Professor Feldthusen in which he outlined five different categories of cases where the question of recoverability in tort for economic loss has arisen ("Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow" (1990-91), 17 Can. Bus. L.J. 356, at pp. 357-58), namely:
The Independent Liability of Statutory Public Authorities;
Negligent Misrepresentation;
Negligent Performance of a Service;
Negligent Supply of Shoddy Goods or Structures;
Relational Economic Loss.
I stressed in Norsk that the question of recoverability for economic loss must be approached with reference to the unique and distinct policy issues raised in each of these categories. That is because ultimately the issues concerning recovery for economic loss are concerned with determining the proper ambit of the law of tort, an exercise that must take account of the various situations where that question may arise. This case raises issues different from that in Norsk, which fell within the fifth category. The present case, which involves the alleged negligent construction of a building, falls partially within the fourth category, although subject to an important caveat. The negligently supplied structure in this case was not merely shoddy; it was dangerous. In my view, this is important because the degree of danger to persons and other property created by the negligent construction of a building is a cornerstone of the policy analysis that must take place in determining whether the cost of repair of the building is recoverable in tort. As I will attempt to show, a distinction can be drawn on a policy level between "dangerous" defects in buildings and merely "shoddy" construction in buildings and that, at least with respect to dangerous defects, compelling policy reasons exist for the imposition upon contractors of tortious liability for the cost of repair of these defects.
[26] The Defendants argue that as allegations of pure negligence fall outside the traditional ambit of economic loss, the claim for negligence should be struck out.
[27] The Plaintiffs argue that the claim for negligence incorporates a broader claim than pure economic loss and in fact has a much larger ambit that includes the claim arising from the execution of the SPIS. As the Plaintiffs argue the state of their building is not just shoddy, it is indeed dangerous, the direction from the Supreme Court of Canada in Winnipeg Condominium would not preclude the claim as drafted.
[28] I am persuaded by the arguments of the Plaintiffs with respect to this particular aspect of the Defendants’ motion. In my view, the attempt to forestall a claim in negligence against Kristi, in the face of everything else that is contained in the pleading, would represent a far too narrow and restrictive approach and one that is not contemplated by the procedure provided in Rule 21. Not only is it not plain and obvious that a claim in negligence will fail in this case, it seems to me the approach taken by the Defendants assumes far too much about the state of the law of tort. While it is clear that a traditional claim for a deficiency in a building has been characterized as “economic loss”, the scope of the pleading in my view is much more broad than that, as the Plaintiffs assert the building is dangerous as it has a foundation that has been allegedly constructed in a deficient manner. The way that Kristi was or was not involved in the construction of the building and her corresponding knowledge and how that translated to how she filled out the SPIS, all could create legal duties on her part, the breach of which the Plaintiffs allege have led to them experiencing damages which, from the pleading, have apparently not completely crystalized or can be quantified exactly at this point in time. The comments of La Forest J. in the above cited paragraph 12 from Winnipeg Condominium about recovery in cases of economic loss citing the need to be concerned about the proper ambit of tort law and the taking account of various situations where that question may arise, are instructive to me. I take that to mean that where such issues are engaged, a full record is required to deal with such important policy concerns. In my view, this militates against deciding such an issue in a summary manner particularly on a pleadings motion under the procedure contemplated by Rule 21. A claim for negligence is a common, basic and frequent claim made in our courts. I can understand how it could proceed based on the pleading as presently drafted.
[29] I decline to strike the word “negligence” from paragraph 20.02.
[30] The Defendants move to have the words “breach of contract” struck from paragraph 20.2. They do so on the assertion that there are no material facts plead in respect of this claim.
[31] The Plaintiffs respond that indeed the pleading is full of references and particulars to the breach of contract. The claim is about a sale of a house that was completed using an agreement of purchase and sale. The pleading refers to Kristi executing an SPIS which the Plaintiffs allege they relied upon. The Plaintiffs allege the house was significantly deficient.
[32] I agree with the Defendants’ argument that the pleading does not specifically set out actual provisions of the contract at issue that are alleged to have been breached. However, the claim is clear that what was in play was an agreement of purchase and sale and an SPIS. In my view, the complaint of the Defendants on this particular aspect of the claim is not persuasive that Rule 21 relief is warranted, and the issue could have been resolved by way of a demand for particulars. It is not plain and obvious a breach of contract claim will fail in this case. It would unnecessarily complicate matters to have these particular words struck out while reading the pleading as a whole.
[33] I decline to strike the words “breach of contract” from paragraph 20.2.
[34] The next sections of this judgment deal with seven distinct sub paragraphs or groups of subparagraphs of paragraph 20. 2.
20.2(a) claim against Kristi
“failing to monitor, oversee or supervise the construction of the House”
20.2(b) claim against Kristi
“failing to instruct, adequately of otherwise, the Defendant Emilio, her servants or agents, or employing as agents, servants or employees, individuals that she knew or ought to have known were not properly trained or qualified to design, construct or give instruction with respect to the building of the House”
20.2(c) claim against Kristi
“failing to engage agents or employees with appropriate knowledge, skill and judgment and employing incompetent employees, servants or agents lacking reasonable care, skill and training and ability for the work performed with respect to the House build”
[35] The Defendants make a common complaint against all three of these subparagraphs. They argue that a homeowner does not have a positive obligation to supervise or otherwise control contractors for the benefit of a subsequent purchaser. In addition, they rely on the arguments they have made in respect of the inability to claim damages for economic loss from a claim framed in negligence.
[36] In support of the argument of the lack of a positive duty, the Defendants rely on an American treatise written in 1908 by Francis H. Bohlen entitled The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability and published in the University of Pennsylvania Law review. In addition, the Defendants rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18 at paras 31, 35, 36 and 37.
[37] The Plaintiffs submit these sub paragraphs are proper particulars of the claim for negligence and, as well, are aspects of the scope of the duty Kristi owed them as a “person” under section 1.1 of the OBCA referred to above. The breaches are particulars that go to the issue of context of the allegation that Kristi was negligent vis a vis the Plaintiffs.
[38] I accept the position of the Plaintiffs with regard to these particular sub paragraphs. The scope of any duties owed by Kristi to these plaintiffs will require a full record. It is not plain and obvious to me that Kristi did not have any duties to future purchasers in her capacity as homeowner. I also do not accept the Defendants arguments that these particular paragraphs are necessarily only tied to the claim for negligence or that in fact the Plaintiffs’ claim would be untenable on the traditional approach to economic loss. The pleading in general gives me, and therefore I assume the Defendants, a good understanding of what is being alleged. The pleading is entitled to be taken as all provable at this stage under the jurisprudence developed under Rule 21. I also think the Defendants arguments betray a far too narrow and overly technical approach to the matter which is not to be encouraged on motions of this type. The plain and obvious test has been developed and accepted for good reason. Pleadings motions are not like trials. They are useful tools but should not be elevated to the field upon which contests are ultimately decided unless the claim is so badly drafted and the claims so patently devoid of merit as to lead a court to stop the matter then and there.
[39] The principles of law related to positive duties articulated in the Childs case are clearly good law, but in the end, the case was about host liability. I note the words in paragraph 31 of Childs where McLachlin C.J.C. was commenting on the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance in the context of a discussion of a failure to act where she states, “However where conduct against the defendant is a failure to act, foreseeability alone may not establish a duty of care. In the absence of an overt act on the part of the defendant, the nature of the relationship must be examined to determine whether there is a nexus between the parties.” Also in Childs at paragraph 34 McLachlin C.J.C. wrote:
- A positive duty of care may exist if foreseeability of harm is present and if other aspects of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant establish a special link or proximity. Three such situations have been identified by the courts. They function not as strict legal categories, but rather to elucidate factors that can lead to positive duties to act. These factors, or features of the relationship, bring parties who would otherwise be legal strangers into proximity and impose positive duties on defendants that would not otherwise exist. (underlining added)
[40] The Defendants argue the Chief Justice has provided an authoritative classification of the types of relationships that may give rise to a positive duty to act. The Defendants argue a seller of residential property does not fit in to any of these categories.
[41] I disagree with this assertion. A plain reading of paragraph 34 of Childs indicates the lists of cases set out at paragraph 35, 36 and 37 of the judgment is not meant to be exhaustive. They are but examples. It seems to me the Defendants have approached this pleading by taking general statements of law, overlaid them with their own conclusions about how the facts of the case will be found and then urged this Court not to allow the Plaintiffs to proceed on particular claims based on their view of what will be a foregone conclusion. This is not how a Rule 21 motion is to proceed or be determined.
[42] I was also not persuaded of the usefulness of statements of law set out in the 1908 American treatise relied upon by the Defendants.
[43] The Plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to prove negligence, breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation on the part of Kristi based on evidence. The arguments made by the Defendants may in fact win the day if the matter proceeds to adjudication following proper disclosure and discovery. However, at this point, there is no basis to strike out these subparagraphs.
[44] I decline to order subparagraphs 20.2(a), (b) and (c) struck out.
20.2(d) claim against Kristi
“failing to take steps, adequate or otherwise, to warm [sic] the Plaintiffs of the improper and inadequate construction of the House”
20.2(e) claim against Kristi
“failing to disclose the defects and deficiencies caused during the construction of the House which were known (or ought to have been known) to the Defendant Kristi as the owner of the House and not readily apparent to an ordinary and prudent purchaser utilizing due diligence after construction was complete”
20.2(f) claim against Kristi
“inducing the Plaintiffs to enter into the Agreement and, by doing so, breached her obligation to make disclosure of all defects and deficiencies in the said Agreement”
[45] The Defendants attack these subparagraphs along the same lines as other subparagraphs previously dealt with. They argue that none of these subparagraphs disclose a cause of action known to law, albeit for slightly different reasons for each subparagraph. All are alleged to be pleas of a positive duty to warn or disclose that the Defendants assert does not exist in law.
[46] The Plaintiffs counter that all these subparagraphs are particulars of the claims about Kristi’s knowledge and failure to disclose. The Plaintiffs argue these facts, considered to be provable at this stage, support both claims in negligence and breach of contract.
[47] I agree with the position of the Plaintiffs. I have set out my views about the Defendants’ “no positive duty” argument in the paragraphs above concerning subparagraphs 20.2(a), (b) and (c). I do not accept it in respect of these paragraphs either. It is not plain and obvious to me that this aspect of the Plaintiffs claim will fail. Kristi executed a SPIS. Caveat emptor is no longer strictly applicable. The pleas about disclosure and failure to warn are proper at this stage in the proceeding based on a broad and generous reading of the pleading.
[48] I decline to order subparagraphs 20.2(d), (e) and (f) struck out.
20.2(h) claim against Kristi
“misrepresenting that the House was free of latent defects to the detriment of the Plaintiffs”
[49] The Defendants submit there are no material facts pleaded about any representations made by Kristi that the house was free of latent defects. The Plaintiffs rely on the same arguments that were made regarding subparagraphs 20.2(d),(e) and (f).
[50] In oral argument, counsel for the Defendants conceded this plea was sustainable if particular facts were included.
[51] In my view, the answer to this particular problem is to allow the Plaintiffs to make an amendment to the pleading to more fully particularize how Kristi made these misrepresentations. There is no need to strike out the particular words of the pleading. Leave is granted to make necessary amendments.
20.2(i) claim against Kristi
“failing in her duty of care owed under the OBC”
[52] The arguments of both parties were the same for this subparagraph as they were for subparagraph 20.1(q). For the same reasons I declined to order that subparagraph struck for Emilio, I adopt and rely on those reasons to decline to order this subparagraph struck as well.
[53] To be clear, it is not plain and obvious to me that this plea will fail.
20.2(i) claim against Kristi
“failing in her duty of care owed during the real estate sale to the Plaintiffs”
[54] In my view, this is a kind of “roll up” plea that encompasses a number of others made against Kristi. As I was not prepared to strike those, it seems to me to serve little purpose to strike this one. The scope of a duty of care owed by a vendor to a purchaser is an issue that would be appropriate to be pursued in this case based on the pleading as presented. It may not be the Plaintiffs’ best case scenario for ultimate success. However, it is not plain and obvious this plea will fail at trial.
[55] Accordingly, I decline to strike paragraph 20.2(i)
[56] Overall, I see the Plaintiffs as being successful on this motion. At the opening of the hearing I invited counsel to give me their perspectives on what an appropriate costs award should be, in the event they were successful. In my view the estimates of both counsel were fair and reasonable.
[57] I comment that overall I viewed the Defendants’ approach to this entire motion as being premised on an exceedingly narrow and microscopic view of the law and the pleading at issue. I just do not see these types of pleadings motions as being the appropriate place for a party to try to zero in on very narrow passages in a pleading in an attempt to not have to deal with matters, which, when looked at from a very broad perspective, clearly and easily fit in to a cause of action that ultimately a party may have to answer to. This is not to say the Plaintiffs will be successful on any of the particular pleas challenged on this motion. The pleadings stage is just not the time in the proceeding to be making the kind of detailed and narrow attempts to slice and dice a pleading on the premise that it will serve to narrow issues and more efficiently deal with the matter and ultimately a trial. This motion ultimately did not accomplish a great deal as far as the moving Defendants are concerned. While there is no question a party should not have to deal with a pleading that discloses no reasonable cause of action, the generous and liberal approach to the review of pleadings on a Rule 21 motion makes it difficult to achieve success on these motions, particularly where the pleading under attack has been drafted by experienced counsel.
[58] This motion has already taken up more than the share of time it deserves in this litigation. It would be disproportionate to require the parties to waste more time arguing about costs. Accordingly, I am awarding costs of this motion based on the estimates given at the opening of the motion, at a partial indemnity rate. They shall be fixed in the amount of $2,500.00 inclusive of disbursements, plus HST. The Defendants Emilio and Kristi shall pay the Plaintiffs this amount within 30 days.
[59] Order to go accordingly.
[60] In the event there are any further disputes about the pleadings in this matter they shall be returned before Fitzpatrick J. for resolution. I do this in the interests of judicial efficiency and hopefully economy to the clients as I have now had the benefit of the fulsome and effective advocacy of counsel for both sides engaged in this matter who have given me a detailed and thorough picture of the issues as regards to the pleadings as they stand to date.
_______”original signed by”
The Hon. Mr. Justice F. Bruce Fitzpatrick
Released: December 4, 2017
CITATION: Smith et al. v. Feletto et al., 2017 ONSC 7250
COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-0129
DATE: 2017-12-04
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
JONATHAN SMITH and LINDSAY SMITH
Plaintiffs
- and -
EMILIO FELETTO, KRISTI LYNNE FELETTO, THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF THUNDER BAY, GLEN FERLAND, PILLAR TO POST HOME INSPECTIONS, and FCT INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
Defendants
JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS MOTION
Fitzpatrick J.
Released: December 4, 2017
/sab