Karen Seeley

This motion concerned the temporary care and custody of an Indigenous child, J.M. Tikinagan Child and Family Services (TCFS) sought to place the child with J.L., with access to the mother, R.M. Former caregivers S.C. and J.V. brought a cross-motion for the child's placement with them.

The court applied the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) and the An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis Children, Youth and Families (Federal Act), emphasizing the best interests of the child and the priority of placement for Indigenous children.

The court found TCFS discharged its onus, citing concerns about S.C. and J.V.'s care, their interference with access, and their lack of support for reunification and cultural continuity.

The court dismissed S.C. and J.V.'s motion and ordered the child's temporary care and custody with J.L., with supervised access to the mother, supporting reunification efforts.

The respondent, Peter Joseph Welch, sought costs after successfully obtaining a temporary order reinstating his alternating week parenting schedule for the parties' two children.

The applicant, Erinn Lindsay Catherine Gravelle, opposed the costs request.

The court awarded the respondent $4,500 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The decision considered the respondent's success on the underlying motion, his reasonable offers to settle, and the applicant's failure to make an offer and her unreasonable stance regarding the respondent's mental health treatment.

However, the court reduced the respondent's requested costs, finding some of the fees incurred to justify his unilateral contravention of a prior court order regarding schooling were unnecessary and disproportionate.

The Respondent Father sought to reinstate a previous week-on/week-off parenting schedule for the two children, which had been suspended due to his unilateral decision to homeschool one child and subsequent mental health issues.

The Applicant Mother opposed the full reinstatement but was open to variation, proposing a different temporary schedule and a modified summer schedule.

The court found the Father's mental health was stable and he acknowledged his error in unilaterally changing the child's schooling.

The court reinstated the original week-on/week-off schedule on a temporary basis, vacating the prior suspension order, but adopted the Mother's proposed two-week summer parenting schedule.

The court emphasized that any future changes to schooling must be by agreement or court order, not unilateral action.

Six band members of Pikangikum First Nation challenged the unavailability of intermittent sentences for mandatory minimum drinking and driving offences, arguing the practical impossibility of compliance due to geographic isolation violated their Charter rights to equality, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court found the provision violated section 15 of the Charter as it discriminated against on-reserve members of the First Nation based on an analogous ground.

The Crown's undertaking to finance transportation to the jail rendered the applications moot, but the court addressed the constitutional issues given their public importance and impact on future cases.

The Crown appealed with leave from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The respondent was stopped by police who were investigating a report of an impaired driver in a pickup truck.

The respondent was driving a different colored pickup truck but was stopped under the Highway Traffic Act for sobriety purposes.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the breathalyzer evidence and statements.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the stop as an investigative detention rather than a lawful traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court allowed the appeal and entered a conviction.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused following his guilty plea to possession of weapons dangerous to the public peace and three counts of uttering threats.

The accused initially opposed the application but changed his position mid-hearing and consented to being declared a dangerous offender.

The court found that the accused's conduct, which began as an apparent suicide attempt but escalated into threatening behaviour toward police officers, constituted a predicate offence under the Criminal Code.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal history including 34 prior convictions, pattern of threats, and psychiatric assessments indicating high risk of future offending.

The court declared the accused a dangerous offender and imposed a 6-year determinate sentence plus a 10-year long-term supervision order.

A custody and access dispute involving three children where the mother sought to retain sole custody with primary residence and the father sought custody or significant access.

The father had been absent from the children's lives for approximately three years following separation but sought to re-establish a relationship beginning in July 2015.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under the Children's Law Reform Act, considering factors including the children's strong bond with the mother as primary caregiver, the father's absence and subsequent re-engagement, concerns regarding alcohol consumption in the maternal grandparents' home, school attendance issues, and the inability of the parents to communicate effectively.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother with expanded access to the father.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, a 17-year-old Aboriginal woman, was hitchhiking when the accused picked her up and brought her to a house.

After providing her with alcohol, the accused kissed the complainant without her consent while she was attempting to leave.

The court found the Crown proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the accused's claim that the kiss was consensual and finding that the complainant's conduct demonstrated fear and lack of consent.

In a will validity application under the Succession Law Reform Act, the respondents moved for a non-suit alleging that the propounders had failed to prove formal execution because one attesting witness did not actually see the testator sign the will.

The court considered whether the statutory requirement that the testator sign or acknowledge the signature in the presence of two witnesses was satisfied.

Applying the civil standard of proof and principles governing suspicious circumstances, the court held that the evidence supported a finding that the signature was made in the presence of both witnesses or, alternatively, acknowledged in the presence of the second witness when he was asked to sign as a witness.

The court rejected the argument that strict non-compliance invalidated the will and concluded that the statutory requirements had been met on the evidence.