Brian H. Greenspan

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the Republic of Korea, sought an order for the committal for extradition of the respondent for offences corresponding to conspiracy to commit fraud and fraud.

The respondent allegedly defrauded the Korean government of approximately $12 million CAD by illegally obtaining compensation for redeemed land.

The respondent argued the Record of the Case was manifestly unreliable due to translation errors and inconsistencies.

The court found sufficient available and reliable evidence on every essential element of the offences to justify committal and ordered the respondent's committal for extradition.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking particulars requiring the Crown to specify the alleged misrepresentations, fraudulent conduct, and false accounting entries underlying charges relating to financial reporting of a public corporation.

The motion relied on s. 587 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the indictment lacked sufficient detail for the preparation of a defence.

The court reviewed the extensive investigations, disclosure, and related regulatory proceedings already known to the accused and concluded that they were aware of the case they had to meet.

The court held that the areas of dispute were sufficiently delineated and that further particulars were unnecessary for trial fairness or evidentiary rulings.

The application for particulars was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing prohibited firearms and ammunition after police discovered the weapons during a search warrant execution related to their tobacco business.

The accused had purchased the firearms for protection after receiving serious threats.

The Crown proceeded summarily and sought a one-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or intermittent custody based on the accused's exemplary backgrounds and extensive community service.

The court imposed a 60-day intermittent sentence for each accused, followed by 18 months of probation requiring 240 hours of community service, balancing the need for denunciation with the offenders' significant moral credit for past good deeds.

The appellant mother was convicted of child abduction under s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after taking her two children to Singapore for seven months, depriving the father of his court-ordered access.

The trial judge imposed a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the mother intended to deprive the father of access.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and substituted an absolute discharge, noting the hardship a criminal record would cause the appellant's professional travel and the fact she had already served her conditional sentence.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple historical sexual offences against several boys, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence witnesses, relied on material not in evidence, and thereby rendered the trial unfair.

The court held that any errors were minor, not material to the reasoning process, and did not undermine trial fairness or the convictions.

The court also rejected challenges to the dismissal of stay applications based on destroyed police records and alleged abuse of process arising from the earlier investigation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the five-year global sentence was upheld as fit notwithstanding one conceded sentencing error.

The court further ordered sex offender registration under SOIRA.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of an Order-in-Council revoking his appointment following a recommendation by a Hearing Panel of the Justices of the Peace Review Council.

The applicant argued the Panel erred in denying severance of allegations, gave inadequate reasons, imposed an unreasonable disposition, and that he was denied procedural fairness by not being allowed to make submissions to the Executive Council.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Panel's decisions reasonable and concluding that the statutory scheme provides procedural fairness during the hearing process, not before the Executive Council.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and uttering a death threat, as well as his six-year sentence for attempted murder.

The Crown conceded the aggravated assault conviction violated the Kienapple principle, and it was stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for attempted murder, finding the trial judge correctly refused to leave self-defence with the jury as there was no objective air of reality to the defence given the pre-emptive nature of the machete attack.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's subjective fear was not a mitigating factor and the six-year sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following the stabbing death of his former intimate partner.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in the final instructions to the jury, specifically regarding the 'rolled-up' instruction on the intent for murder, the assessment of the appellant's evidence, and the defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the 'rolled-up' instruction was inadequate because it failed to draw together relevant factors, such as the deceased's provoking words and conduct, and failed to instruct the jury to consider the cumulative effect of this evidence on the appellant's state of mind.

Concluding that the errors in the final instructions were not overcome by the overwhelming nature of the prosecution's proof, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following the beating death of a young man by a group of attackers.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the admission of after-the-fact conduct, the voluntariness of police statements, alleged Charter breaches, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that trial counsel provided effective representation.

L'appelant a plaidé coupable à de multiples chefs d'accusation de conduite en état d'ébriété et de conduite dangereuse causant la mort et des lésions corporelles après avoir causé un accident de la route mortel.

Le juge de première instance a imposé une peine d'emprisonnement de 8 ans.

L'appelant a interjeté appel, soutenant que la peine se situait en dehors de l'échelle établie par la jurisprudence.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté l'appel, concluant que la peine n'était pas manifestement inappropriée compte tenu des circonstances aggravantes extrêmes, notamment le taux d'alcoolémie élevé, la vitesse excessive et le dossier de conduite antérieur de l'appelant.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple counts of impaired and dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed collision that killed three people and seriously injured another.

The trial judge imposed an eight-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was outside the four- to five-year range established by previous jurisprudence for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that previous cases do not cap sentences and that the catastrophic consequences, combined with the appellant's prior driving record and ignored warnings, justified the eight-year sentence.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was sought for extradition by the United States on charges of conspiracy to import marijuana and money laundering.

The Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed for the Canadian offences of importing a controlled substance and possession of property obtained by crime.

After the applicant consented to committal, the Minister ordered his surrender on the U.S. conspiracy charges and declined to seek assurances regarding sentencing standards.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the surrender order must align with the Canadian offences in the committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, applying the Supreme Court's conduct-based approach to double criminality, which does not require alignment between the surrender order and the extradition order.

The appellant challenged both a conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident between inmates in a correctional facility and a subsequent dangerous offender designation resulting in an indeterminate sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and held there was no basis to disturb the credibility findings.

The ineffective assistance claim failed because, even assuming incompetence, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was established.

On sentence, the court held that a long-term offender determination does not displace ordinary sentencing principles for the predicate offence and upheld the finding that the appellant met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation and could not be managed in the community by less intrusive means.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats against his separated spouse.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by denying credit for strict pre-trial bail, improperly using a victim impact statement, rejecting remorse as a mitigating factor, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and concluding the sentence was fit given the egregious and horrific circumstances of the domestic assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The appellant lawyer was found guilty of professional misconduct by a Law Society Hearing Panel for sexually harassing a client and an employee.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the appellant denying all allegations.

The Hearing Panel's decision was overturned by the Appeal Panel but reinstated by the Divisional Court.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Hearing Panel's reasons were so inadequate as to foreclose meaningful appellate review.

The reasons consisted of generic generalities, unexplained conclusory observations, and failed to articulate any analysis of the appellant's evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The applicant, Y, applied under section 17 of the Securities Act for disclosure of compelled and voluntary evidence obtained by the Ontario Securities Commission during an investigation.

Y sought the evidence to make full answer and defence to criminal fraud charges.

The Commission balanced Y's right to make full answer and defence against the privacy interests of the witnesses who provided the evidence.

The Commission granted disclosure for witnesses who consented or did not object, and for those who opposed but were on the Crown's witness list, subject to strict confidentiality terms.

Disclosure was denied for opposing witnesses not on the Crown's witness list.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for a declaration that sections 7(3)(d)(i) and 7(3)(h.2) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) violate section 8 of the Charter.

The Royal Bank of Canada had obtained information from the Toronto Dominion Bank regarding fraudulent mortgage transactions involving the appellants' trust accounts, which it used to obtain a Mareva injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that PIPEDA regulates private organizations and does not transform them into state agents, thus section 8 of the Charter was not engaged.

Furthermore, the appellants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for three offences related to the sexual touching of a young child while babysitting.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize the complainant's evidence, improperly shifted the burden of proof by referencing the appellant's failure to testify, and failed to properly consider defence expert evidence regarding the appellant's psychological profile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the burden of proof.