Brian H. Greenspan

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to sign the warrant of surrender.

The appellant conceded that the facts underlying the American charges involved a licensed distributor and would have been illegal in Canada, abandoning the first issue.

The appellant also conceded that the court was bound by the precedent in Ferris for the remaining issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder after assisting his cousin in disposing of the bodies of two hitchhikers.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted under duress due to an implied threat from his cousin, who had just committed the murders in his presence.

The trial judge rejected the defence, finding no air of reality to the claim of an implied threat.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to appreciate the significance of witnessing an execution and by focusing incorrectly on the absence of a specific act or gesture.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant operated a website containing audiovisual material and written stories depicting violence against women.

He was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that adult nudity alone could amount to explicit sex for the purposes of obscenity.

The court ordered a new trial for the audiovisual counts but upheld the conviction for the written stories, which clearly depicted explicit sex and violence.

The sentence was varied to a $2,000 fine.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and sexual assault against his stepdaughter.

At trial, the judge refused to allow the appellant to cross-examine the complainant on extracts from her diary that were in his possession, and refused to order the production of the entire diary for inspection under s. 278.5 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings.

The complainant's privacy interest was diminished because she knew the appellant read her diary, and the extracts were relevant to her credibility.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and attempted murder.

The appeal raised numerous issues, including the validity of his warrantless arrest, the legality of a gunshot residue test and the seizure of his clothing, and the admissibility of similar fact evidence and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the gunshot residue test was a valid search incident to arrest.

However, the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial similar fact evidence of a subsequent shooting, as it lacked the requisite degree of similarity to prove identity.

The trial judge also failed to properly resolve factual issues regarding an alleged violation of the appellant's right to counsel.

Due to the erroneous admission of the similar fact evidence, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting post-hypnosis identification evidence, failed to properly instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence, and delivered an unbalanced charge that favoured the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the post-hypnosis evidence was properly admitted, the trial judge committed serious errors in his jury instructions regarding the frailties of the identification evidence and the requirements for finding a fabricated alibi.

Furthermore, the jury charge lacked fairness and balance, compromising the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault against his wife.

During deliberations, the jury asked to review the testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge permitted the jury to watch an unofficial video recording of the trial proceedings in the jury room without counsel present and without controlling which portions were viewed.

The Court of Appeal held this was a fatal error, as responses to jury questions must occur in open court to ensure the accused's right to be present and the judge's control over the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning, his rolled-up charge on intent, his dismissal of a Corbett application, and the length of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions, the Corbett ruling, or the sentence imposed.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence for the first respondent based on his degree of complicity and personal circumstances.

For the second respondent, the Court noted the sentence should have been custodial, but declined to interfere given the passage of time, completion of an extensive community service order, and personal circumstances.

The Court also declined to set out sentencing principles for the criminal organization charge due to the unique circumstances and joint submission of the parties.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended appraisal evidence, failed to consider his honest belief in the property's value, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the appraisals, correctly applied the elements of fraud, and imposed a demonstrably fit sentence given the breach of fiduciary duty and deliberate deception.

Following his criminal conviction for insider trading, the Ontario Securities Commission held a hearing to determine whether to impose public interest sanctions against the respondent under s. 127 of the Securities Act.

The respondent, while an officer and director of a reporting issuer, had sold shares with knowledge of undisclosed material negative assay results, avoiding significant losses.

The Commission found his conduct egregious and a breach of fiduciary duty.

To protect the capital markets, the Commission ordered a 15-year cease trade order and a 15-year ban on acting as a director or officer of any reporting issuer, with limited carve-outs for personal trading.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was committed for extradition to the United States on charges of securities fraud and money laundering.

He appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the relaxed evidentiary standards in sections 32 and 33 of the Extradition Act violated his rights under sections 6 and 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, holding that the evidentiary regime accords with the principles of fundamental justice and applies equally to Canadian citizens and non-citizens.

The prosecution appealed the dismissal of its application for prohibition and certiorari to halt a securities prosecution.

The prosecution alleged the trial judge lost jurisdiction by interfering with its case presentation, failing to rule on evidence admissibility, and failing to restrain uncivil attacks by defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge has inherent trial management power to direct the order of evidence and defer evidentiary rulings.

While defence counsel's conduct was uncivil and improper, the trial judge's response did not deprive him of jurisdiction or prevent a fair trial.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's reduction of a fine imposed on the respondent for insider trading.

The respondent had traded shares of a junior mining company while possessing undisclosed material facts, avoiding significant losses.

The Court of Appeal held that the phrase 'by reason of the contravention' in s. 122(4) of the Securities Act does not require the Crown to prove the direct effect of the non-disclosure on the market price, but simply means the loss was avoided by virtue of the insider engaging in the impugned trading.

The Court also held that shares not beneficially owned by the respondent should not be included in the loss avoided calculation.

Despite correcting the legal interpretation, the Court upheld the $2,000,000 fine imposed by the appeal judge.

The corporate appellants appealed their convictions and sentence for offences related to a scheme selling shares of tickets in a Spanish lottery to American consumers.

The trial judge convicted them under sections 206(1) and 202(1) of the Criminal Code, entering conditional stays on all but one count based on the Kienapple principle, and imposed a $100,000 fine.

On appeal, the appellants raised issues regarding the requirement of an additional element of chance, acting as agents for buyers, the definition of betting or wagering, and the exemption under section 207(1)(h).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's rejection of these arguments and upheld both the convictions and the sentence.

The Crown brought an application to remove the appellant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The counsel had previously provided an opinion letter for a third party, whom the appellant now sought to implicate in the murder of the victim via fresh evidence on appeal.

The parties reached a resolution wherein independent counsel would handle the fresh evidence application and related grounds of appeal, ensuring no breach of duty to the former client while preserving the appellant's right to counsel of choice for the remainder of the appeal.

The Crown's application was withdrawn.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud arising from the operation of a food bank.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended accomplice evidence, failed to apply a Vetrovec warning, and erred in drawing inferences from fraudulent non-profit receipts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, sufficient caution applied to the accomplice's testimony, and that the trial judge's inferences regarding the receipts were reasonably supported by the record.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions and 12-year sentence for robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy.

He had used the confidential police CPIC system to obtain vehicle registration information of bank employees, which he provided to a co-accused to facilitate bank robberies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were logically based on the circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in principle and held that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose against the nine-year-old son of his former girlfriend.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied an unfairly rigorous standard of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and found ample reason to disbelieve the appellant, noting multiple inconsistencies, exaggerations, and fabrications in his testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.