Brian H. Greenspan

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on a charge of sexual battery involving his daughter, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

He argued that he had already been punished in Ontario for the same conduct, and that extradition would violate his rights under sections 6 and 7 of the Charter given the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years in Florida.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the Ontario sentence did not punish him for the Florida conduct, the potential penalty did not shock the conscience of Canadians given the horrific nature of the offence, and prosecution in Canada was not a viable option.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a young female and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on previous disclosure and by admitting alleged oath-helping evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lack of a limiting instruction benefited the appellant by not diluting his defence of recent fabrication, and the oath-helping evidence was inconsequential.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the term was within the proper range.

The appellant, a Catholic priest, appealed his convictions for gross indecency and indecent assault relating to historical sexual abuse of a male complainant.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence regarding delayed recall and recovered memory to explain discrepancies in the complainant's testimony, including the appellant's arrival date and the absence of a described birthmark.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's use of the expert evidence, his assessment of the complainant's credibility, or his evaluation of the appellant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of explosive substances with intent to endanger life or cause serious damage to property, and conspiracy to commit the same offence.

The main issue at trial was whether the appellant possessed the pipe bombs.

The trial judge instructed the jury on actual possession but failed to adequately explain the elements of constructive possession, particularly the requirement of control, in response to a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this omission was a fatal error, as constructive possession was a live issue.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a former grade 4 teacher, appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against two former students.

The allegations related to events that occurred 30 years prior.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three errors: misapprehending the evidence by finding remarkable similarities between the complainants' testimonies while ignoring significant inconsistencies, failing to provide reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, and improperly discounting the appellant's character evidence on the basis that sexual misconduct occurs in private, despite the allegations involving public conduct.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, Canadian citizens, faced extradition to the United States for telemarketing fraud.

During the extradition process, an American judge and prosecutor made threatening statements indicating that uncooperative fugitives would receive maximum sentences and face sexual violence in prison.

The extradition judge stayed the proceedings, finding these threats violated the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, ruling the judge should have deferred to the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the stay, holding that the extradition judge has jurisdiction under the Charter and common law to remedy abuses of process that directly taint the committal hearing, without waiting for the executive phase.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the killing of a child, where the central trial issue was his mental state and potential exemption from criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal held that statements made by the appellant to a psychiatrist during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code and were inadmissible to prove actus reus or mens rea.

The court found the appellant's consent was limited to assessment for fitness and criminal responsibility and did not authorize substantive use of the statements to prove planning and deliberation.

Because the psychiatrist's evidence was central to the Crown's case on first degree murder, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposing a conditional sentence for a serious but isolated incident.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the trial judge, in the particular circumstances and in light of the complainant's expressed wishes, to emphasize restorative principles.

The decision to impose a conditional sentence was not unreasonable and attracted deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment arising from sexually explicit comments to a 14-year-old complainant, a subsequent sexual telephone call, and several hang-up calls after the complainant told him not to contact her again and called police.

The court applied the five-element framework for criminal harassment under s. 264 and held that the full factual context, not the hang-up calls in isolation, established harassment, knowledge, fear for safety, and the reasonableness of that fear.

The complainant's age, the sexually charged nature of the prior interactions, and the explicit warning to stop contacting her supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The requesting state appealed an order discharging fugitives at an extradition hearing on heroin conspiracy charges.

The Court of Appeal held that the extradition judge misapplied s. 18(1)(b) of the Extradition Act by focusing on proof of the foreign offences and territorial situs rather than asking whether the conduct underlying the foreign charges, wherever it occurred, would if committed in Canada establish a prima facie case of any Canadian extradition offence.

Applying the proper conduct-based double criminality analysis, the court found sufficient evidence of conspiracy to traffic in heroin and trafficking in heroin to justify committal.

The fugitives' separate application alleging a 25-month appellate delay under s. 7 of the Charter was dismissed because they took no steps to expedite the appeal and showed no real prejudice affecting fairness.

The applicant sought review of an order granting judicial interim release to a person sought for extradition on drug-related charges.

The court held that the proper standard of review under s. 18(2) of the Extradition Act, by analogy to bail review jurisprudence, required the applicant to demonstrate an error in principle.

The court found no such error, concluding that the reverse onus provisions had been applied and that the extradition request did not justify detention in light of the respondent’s existing Canadian charges, prior releases on substantial sureties, imminent trial dates, and strict bail conditions.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction and sentence, relying on fresh recantation evidence from a key civilian witness and an inmate informant, as well as new DNA testing undermining aspects of the Crown's theory.

The court rejected the civilian witness recantation as incredible, but admitted the inmate recantation and the DNA evidence under the Palmer framework.

Although the fresh evidence significantly weakened the Crown case and impaired important inculpatory evidence, the court held it was not so conclusive as to justify an acquittal and the verdict was not shown to be unreasonable under the governing standard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered on second degree murder.

Leave to appeal the counselling sentence was granted and that sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellants appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside their acquittals for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a key Crown witness on the basis of taint, because the issue went to weight rather than admissibility.

The Court further held that the subsequently released decision in Carosella did not apply, as there was no finding or evidence of deliberate police failure to create records to avoid production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Brooke J.A. in the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's extensive interventions and the admission of inadmissible opinion evidence rendered the trial unfair.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were held in custody for 22 months pending their first trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding that a 4.5-month delay caused by the Crown's unjustified request for an adjournment, combined with late disclosure, rendered the total delay unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the stay of proceedings, holding that the Crown's failure to adequately investigate the grounds for the adjournment and respond to defence counsel's inquiries justified the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter as an available verdict for the jury.

The Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's cross-appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, restoring the trial conviction.

The majority held that based on the totality of the evidence, the trial judge did not err in refusing to leave manslaughter with the jury.

The accused, a pediatrician, was charged with sexually assaulting four teenage female patients.

At trial, the defence sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence that the perpetrator of such offences would belong to a narrow class of individuals (e.g., pedophiles or sexual psychopaths) and that the accused did not possess the characteristics of this class.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, establishing a four-part test for the admission of expert evidence: relevance, necessity in assisting the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified expert.

The Court held the psychiatric evidence was inadmissible as it lacked sufficient reliability and necessity to overcome the exclusionary rule against character evidence.

The accused was charged with touching a child for a sexual purpose.

At trial, the Crown successfully requested that the 12-year-old complainant testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 486(2.1) does not infringe the Charter, as the use of a screen to protect young complainants facilitates the truth-seeking process without depriving the accused of the ability to cross-examine or the presumption of innocence.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of indecent assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that a trial judge may take into account, as a matter of common sense, that sexual misconduct involving children occurs in private and may not be reflected in the accused's community reputation for morality.

Therefore, the trial judge is entitled to find that the propensity value of character evidence is diminished in such cases.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death.

After a series of pre-trial delays, the trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, finding the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, raising issues of both pre-trial and appellate delay.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial delay was not unreasonable and that s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, which must instead be addressed under s. 7 of the Charter.