Brian H. Greenspan

The respondents pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death after driving at excessive speeds and colliding with a taxi, killing the driver.

At a pre-trial conference, the Crown undertook not to appeal if conditional sentences were imposed.

The trial judge imposed conditional sentences of two years less a day with house arrest for the first year, plus a four-year driving prohibition.

The Attorney General appealed the sentences.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's undertaking did not bar the Attorney General's statutory right to appeal and did not constitute an abuse of process.

While the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing conditional sentences, the sentences were demonstrably unfit as they lacked sufficient punitive conditions to address denunciation and general deterrence.

The Court allowed the appeal, extending the house arrest to the full term of the sentences and increasing the driving prohibitions to seven years.

The respondents brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging that Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission failed to conduct a fair investigation, misrepresented facts to obtain a section 11 order, and failed to protect confidential information.

The Commission dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the serious allegations against Staff could not be properly assessed on the limited affidavit evidence available on a preliminary motion.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the respondents renewing their request at the hearing on the merits.

The Commission ordered Staff to produce a written itemized inventory of relevant documents it did not intend to disclose, along with the basis for withholding them.

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for accepting a secret benefit under s. 426(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the offence is established by proof that an agent accepted a secret benefit and placed themselves in a conflict of interest without alerting their principal, regardless of whether the benefit actually influenced their conduct.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the offence as a well-planned fraud upon the public purse.

The Court set aside the term of imprisonment and imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's lack of prior record, full restitution, loss of career, junior role, and cooperation with authorities.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury at the conclusion of the Crown's case, which relied entirely on circumstantial evidence including motive, opportunity, forensic evidence, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by weighing the evidence piecemeal and usurping the function of the jury rather than taking the Crown's case at its highest.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicants (accused) brought a motion for directions seeking a disclosure order regarding an in-chambers pre-sentence meeting before the trial judge, relevant to the Crown's sentence appeal.

The Crown confirmed it possessed no written records of the meeting and conceded it could not contradict the applicants' version of the essential facts.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal found no purpose would be served by a disclosure order and directed the applicants to prepare a draft statement of agreed facts based on their version of events.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address collusion among similar act and confirmatory witnesses, and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge expressly ruled there was no collusion sufficient to exclude the evidence, and the inconsistencies were minor.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was deemed entirely fit.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a previous decision to surrender the applicant for extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Minister's decision was entitled to significant deference.

The court found the Minister reasonably concluded that the applicant raised no new substantive issues and appropriately prioritized the need for finality in the extradition context.

The respondents brought a motion for particulars regarding allegations of illegal trading and distributions under the Securities Act.

They argued that the Statement of Allegations and the voluminous disclosure provided by Staff were insufficient to allow them to know the case to meet.

The Commission held that while Staff is not required to meet the strict standard of a criminal proceeding, the duty of procedural fairness requires sufficient particularization of the material facts.

The Commission directed Staff to provide additional specific particulars regarding the alleged illegal distributions, solicitation meetings, and representations, but dismissed the motion to enforce an alleged undertaking by Staff.

The respondent sought costs following the dismissal of the Ontario Securities Commission's motion for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs on the dismissal of such a motion.

Furthermore, the court noted that even if jurisdiction existed, the general rule in proceedings under the Act is that no costs are awarded against either party, and there were no circumstances justifying a departure from that rule.

The request for costs was denied.

The applicant appealed a committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to surrender.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision refusing to rescind an order surrendering him to Germany for trial.

The applicant argued that comments made to the media by a German prosecutor and judicial spokesperson demonstrated he would not receive a fair trial, violating his rights under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister did not err in concluding that the German justice system could be trusted to address any potential prejudice and ensure a fair trial.

The Law Society appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's finding that the respondent lawyer committed professional misconduct through sexual harassment.

The Appeal Panel had ordered a new hearing, finding the Hearing Panel erred by failing to strictly apply the credibility assessment test from R. v. W. (D.).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that strict application of W. (D.) is not required in administrative disciplinary proceedings provided the correct civil standard of proof is applied.

The court restored the finding of professional misconduct but upheld the Appeal Panel's conclusion that the penalty of disbarment was unreasonable, substituting a 12-month suspension.

The Ontario Securities Commission sought leave to appeal a Superior Court judgment that overturned the respondent's convictions for ten counts of tipping under the Securities Act.

The Superior Court had ordered a new trial based on the trial judge's inadequate assessment of the key witness's credibility and failure to consider each count independently.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal involved the application of well-established legal principles and did not raise questions of law essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice as required by s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed an extradition committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order to the United States for charges including fraud and theft.

The appellant argued the extradition judge erred by not staying the proceedings due to the requesting state's non-disclosure regarding a witness interview, and by applying the wrong test for committal under the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the extradition judge properly excised the tainted witness evidence rather than staying the proceedings.

Furthermore, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Ferras, the Court confirmed that an extradition judge cannot refuse committal merely because the case is weak, provided there is some available and reliable evidence on each element of the offence.

The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

He argued there was no evidence of the mens rea for first-degree murder adduced at the preliminary inquiry and that he should have been committed for manslaughter only.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty for first-degree murder, including evidence that the appellant continued to drive the taxicab while the victim was forcibly confined and assaulted, and later made statements implicating himself in the killing.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under the Discriminatory Business Practices Act, which sought an order allowing him to play in the Greater Toronto Hockey League despite not meeting residency requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had subsequently moved and played in the league for two seasons.

The court declined to hear the appeal on the broader issue of whether the residency requirements generally contravened the Act, as this was not the focus of the original application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from R. v. Handy and R. v. Blake, finding that the similarities between the prior incident and the current allegations were merely generic and lacked distinctive unifying features.

The court concluded the probative value of the evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and improperly assessed witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons were conclusory, failed to properly scrutinize the unconfirmed evidence of the main Crown witness, misapprehended evidence regarding an exchange, and improperly drew an adverse inference from a neutral fact.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.