Breana Vandebeek

The appellant was observed acting suspiciously at a gas station and fled on foot when approached by police, leaving his unlocked vehicle behind.

Police searched the vehicle without a warrant, finding a Taser and a handgun.

The trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the search was authorized as an inventory search of an abandoned vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the vehicle was not 'apparently abandoned' and the search violated section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the Court of Appeal previously quashed one of his two convictions for attempted possession of a firearm.

The appellant sought a reduction of his sentence to time served and a reduction of the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown agreed to the surcharge reduction but opposed reducing the three-year probation term.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge treated the attempt to possess two guns as an aggravating feature for the entire sentence, not just the custodial portion.

Consequently, the court varied the sentence for the remaining conviction by reducing the probation period from three years to two years and the victim fine surcharge from $400 to $200.

The appellants appealed their convictions for various firearms offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in identifying them from video surveillance footage, ignoring the lack of evidence from a search warrant, rejecting exculpatory witness testimony, and finding that the objects they carried were loaded restricted firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles for video identification, adequately considered the search warrant evidence, reasonably assessed witness credibility, and drew a logical inference that the firearms were loaded given the circumstances of the altercation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs and guns found in his girlfriend's apartment.

He challenged two pre-trial Charter rulings.

First, he argued that evidence from the apartment should have been excluded under s. 24(2) after the motion judge found a s. 8 breach due to the search warrant being executed at night without proper authorization.

Second, he argued his arrest was unlawful because the police lacked reasonable grounds, making the seizure of keys during the search incident to arrest unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the s. 8 breach was inadvertent and did not impact privacy interests, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was in joint possession of firearms.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of attempting to possess a firearm without a licence.

The convictions were based entirely on text messages exchanged with a co-worker who was found smuggling firearms.

The Court of Appeal found that while one text message supported a reasonable inference of a prior agreement to obtain a firearm, the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's responses of 'Ok ok' to price quotes constituted agreements to purchase two specific firearms was unreasonable, especially since those specific firearms were not found in the co-worker's possession.

The appeal was allowed in part, and one of the two convictions was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting an unanticipated statement made to a customs officer without a voir dire, denying a mistrial application, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the officer's failure to note the statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions.

The court held that the voluntariness of pre-arrest statements had been admitted, cross-examination was sufficient to address any prejudice from the unanticipated evidence, and the jury charge was adequate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision, agreeing that the only reasonable rational conclusion arising from the circumstantial evidence was that the appellant was a party to the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge placed undue weight on the complainant's emotional state shortly after the incident to corroborate her testimony.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's credibility findings and application of the W.D. framework.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably concluded the complainant's deep distress was circumstantial evidence confirming her account of the assault.

Finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his jury conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm on three grounds: erroneous jury instructions on the fault element, improper Crown conduct during re-examination and closing address, and an erroneous Corbett ruling regarding his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions for the appellant were separate from the flawed instructions for his co-accused, the Crown's re-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act was permissible, and the trial judge's Corbett ruling was entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The court rejected the submission that intercepted drug purchase calls were inadmissible hearsay, distinguishing the governing Supreme Court authority because there were multiple calls, confirmatory evidence, and practical necessity.

The court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed on reasonable doubt and did not require a specific W.(D.) instruction concerning the defence witness.

The remaining complaints about credibility and demeanour instructions disclosed no material error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in a gang-related shooting.

At their joint trial, they advanced cut-throat defences, each blaming the other.

On appeal, they raised numerous grounds relating to the jury charge, including instructions on eyewitness description evidence, bad character evidence, party liability, and the W.D. framework.

They also challenged the admission of gang expert opinion evidence that relied on confidential informants and the trial judge's refusal to review the informant files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the application judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police had entered his apartment after a break-in and searched kitchen drawers to find identifying information, discovering drugs and a gun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the police conduct was an error in judgment rather than bad faith, and that the evidence should not be excluded under the Grant test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on firearms offences, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence of knowledge and control.

The underlying evidence included a submachine gun and ammunition concealed in a barrel in a bedroom, along with documents bearing the accused’s name and the address of the residence.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the accused on a drug trafficking charge but committed him on the firearms offences.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge properly applied the limited weighing approach required for circumstantial cases and correctly assessed whether the evidence was capable of supporting the Crown’s inferences.

There was some evidence linking the accused to the bedroom and residence sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The certiorari application was therefore dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for child luring involving prolonged sexually explicit internet communications with a 12-year-old victim, including inducement to create and transmit child pornography.

The court held the sentencing judge erred by discounting the impact on the victim and by failing to treat the production of child pornography and grooming conduct as significant aggravating factors.

Distinguishing prior authorities where conditional sentences were imposed in police sting operations, the court found denunciation and deterrence required incarceration in a case involving an actual child victim over many months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a custodial sentence of two years less a day was imposed.

The appellant called the police to report a car theft.

The responding officer smelled marijuana and saw drug paraphernalia in her apartment.

He told her he could arrest her but wanted to know what was going on, without informing her of her right to counsel.

The appellant subsequently showed the officer drugs belonging to her boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the officer threatened arrest, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) rights was a serious breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and acquittals were directed.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusal to provide a breath sample, impaired driving, and mischief under $5,000 arising from a single‑vehicle accident and subsequent conduct in a police cruiser and breath room.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s findings regarding whether the appellant intentionally refused a breath demand and whether her emotional state constituted a reasonable excuse.

The appeal court held that insufficient consideration had been given to the brevity of the officer’s questioning and the failure to warn the appellant of the legal consequences of refusal while she was crying uncontrollably.

The conviction for refusal to provide a breath sample was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The convictions for impaired driving and mischief and the sentence imposed were affirmed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for firearm and drug offences, as well as her sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in applying step six of the Garofoli procedure by preventing a sub-facial challenge to the redacted information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant, which relied on confidential informers.

The Court of Appeal held that while an accused is entitled to mount a sub-facial challenge at step six, the trial judge's procedure and the judicial summary provided sufficient information to protect the right to make full answer and defence without breaching informer privilege.

The court also upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Corbett application and found no error in the consecutive sentence imposed.