Breana Vandebeek

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to public mischief for falsely reporting that an individual had threatened him with a firearm, which led to a police tactical response and the arrest of an innocent person.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14‑day conditional sentence followed by one year of probation.

The appellant argued that the judge overemphasized general deterrence and failed to properly consider a conditional discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the sentencing judge considered the relevant principles and the impact of the conduct on an innocent third party, making deterrence and denunciation significant factors.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit and no error in principle was established.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief and his 17-month sentence for mischief and sexual exploitation.

The mischief occurred when the appellant pulled the parking brake of a moving vehicle driven by his stepdaughter, who had refused to let him out.

The appellant argued the driver was unlawfully confining him, meaning she was not in lawful use of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown negated unlawful confinement as it requires a significant period of time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the cumulative sentence reflected no error in principle given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the sexual exploitation complainant.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent had severely beaten the victim while intoxicated, causing facial fractures and brain damage.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional discharge was manifestly unfit and failed to reflect the gravity of the offence and the principles of deterrence and denunciation.

The court allowed the appeal, entered a conviction, and imposed a sentence of six months' incarceration followed by two years' probation, along with mandatory DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The appellant was arbitrarily detained by a police officer during a pro-active policing encounter.

During the encounter, a third party intervened, causing the appellant to act nervously and 'blade' his body.

The officer conducted a warrantless pat-down search for safety reasons, discovering a firearm.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the search was unlawful and the firearm should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the initial detention was unlawful, exigent circumstances justified the safety search, and the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown applied for certiorari to review a preliminary hearing judge's decision discharging the accused on firearm charges.

The preliminary hearing judge found there was 'no evidence' the object used in the robbery was a firearm because it was not recovered or fired.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding the judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider circumstantial evidence, such as the complainant's testimony about the object's appearance and use, which could allow a reasonable jury to infer it was a firearm.

The matter was remitted with an order of mandamus directing committal for trial on the firearm offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding inconsistencies in police evidence and by refusing to allow cross-examination of a police officer about an unrelated SIU investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge on credibility was adequate and the proposed cross-examination was not relevant to the issues at trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing 800 grams of cocaine hidden in the handles of two suitcases.

The sole issue at trial was the appellant's credibility and whether she had knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and application of the W.(D.) principles, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were responsive to the defence's argument that the complainant attempted to frame the appellant.

The Court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, concluding it could not reasonably undermine the complainant's credibility on material issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a home invasion robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a recanted K.G.B. statement, relying on the witness's guilty plea, and drawing an adverse inference from the late disclosure of the recantation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the statement or using the guilty plea to assess reliability.

However, the court held the trial judge erred in law by drawing an adverse inference against the appellant for the late disclosure of the recantation, as accused persons generally have no obligation to disclose their defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery with an imitation firearm, arguing he should receive enhanced credit for his 15 months of pre-trial custody.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Summers, the Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, awarding enhanced credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis, reducing the remaining sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider that this was his first period of incarceration and by miscalculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Summers to grant 115 days of pre-sentence credit.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 12 months' imprisonment, and specific probation conditions were varied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing 1.18 kilograms of cocaine concealed in frozen fish in suitcases brought from Jamaica.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused knew about the cocaine, as he claimed he had been duped into transporting the fish.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on his false customs declaration and misapprehended evidence concerning surrounding circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held that the false declaration was conduct occurring during the commission of the offence and could properly be considered as circumstantial evidence and in assessing credibility.

The court further found no misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge’s findings and upheld the inference that the appellant knew about the cocaine.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a bank of $375,000 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, along with a restitution order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the custodial sentence and the terms of the fine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the four-year sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also upheld the imposition of the fine in lieu of forfeiture but varied the order to allow the appellant two years from his release to pay the fine and reduced the default term of imprisonment from four years to three years.

The appellant appealed sentence after the sentencing judge declined to follow a joint submission of four months' imprisonment and instead imposed a one-year sentence for break and enter of a residence and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by mischaracterizing those offences as crimes of violence.

Considering the appellant's rehabilitative potential and fresh evidence showing rehabilitation was being realized, the court concluded there was no value in re-incarceration.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to time served, equivalent to four months.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

Following the court's earlier ruling that the mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional and that the trial sentence was manifestly unfit, the remaining issue was whether the respondent should be re-incarcerated after having completed the sentence originally imposed.

The court held that a fit sentence at trial would have been two years less a day, with 12 months' credit reducing the remaining custodial term to 12 months.

However, given the lengthy appellate delay, the respondent's successful completion of the conditional sentence, and his demonstrated rehabilitation, the court permanently stayed execution of the 12-month sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The trial judge had declared the three-year mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a five-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the declaration that the mandatory minimum violates s. 12 of the Charter, relying on its companion decision in R. v. Nur.

However, the Court found that the trial judge made unsupported findings of fact that improperly mitigated the offence.

The Court concluded the original sentence was manifestly inadequate and requested further submissions to determine an appropriate sentence.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

Police officers in an unmarked van called out to the appellant on the street; he initially paused but then fled.

He was pursued, arrested, and searched, revealing a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention prior to his flight, as he did not submit to police authority.

The court further held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him based on the totality of the circumstances, and the subsequent pat-down search was justified for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences following a home invasion.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting in-dock identification evidence and in failing to adequately warn the jury about the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the in-dock identification was properly admitted and the trial judge's instructions on the frailties of the identification evidence were strong, unequivocal, and adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the police officers' evidence and failed to properly address allegations of police collusion and fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and reasonably concluded that the officers did not fabricate their evidence.