Beth A. Allen

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter to exclude a firearm discovered during a police encounter.

Police officers observed the accused walking in a neighbourhood where they were searching for armed robbery suspects and noted behaviours consistent with a person carrying a concealed weapon, including slowing his pace, performing a 'safety pat', and blading his body away from officers.

The court found the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was armed and therefore lawfully conducted an investigative detention and safety search.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence and accepted the officers’ testimony regarding the circumstances of the detention, arrest, and search.

No Charter breaches were established and the firearm was ruled admissible.

The accused applied under s. 8 and s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs, cash, ammunition, and a taser seized following the execution of search warrants and a warrantless search of his person.

The defence challenged the validity of the warrants, alleging deficiencies in the Information to Obtain and reliance on fabricated police evidence.

The court found that a key surveillance officer fabricated observations of a purported hand‑to‑hand drug transaction that had been relied upon to corroborate confidential informant information.

After excising misleading and unsupported information from the warrant materials, the court concluded the remaining evidence failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under the Debot framework.

The warrants were therefore invalid, the searches unlawful, and the evidence excluded under s. 24(2) due to serious and deliberate police misconduct.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after an undercover police drug buy at a shopping mall.

The central issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and money seized upon arrest.

Police witnesses described the controlled buy, continuous surveillance, and the seizure of cocaine, marked buy money, and additional cash and drugs from the accused and his backpack.

The accused testified that another individual committed the transaction and denied possessing the drugs, money, or backpack.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as not credible and found the police evidence reliable, concluding the Crown proved possession and proceeds beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault and criminal harassment after following a young woman from a bus late at night, pursuing her to her residence, and squeezing her buttocks before fleeing.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim’s age, the frightening circumstances of the stalking behaviour, and the offender’s prior criminal record including a previous sexual assault conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, supportive family, employment stability, compliance with strict bail conditions, and a psychological assessment indicating low to moderate risk manageable in the community.

Applying the proportionality principle under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code and emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court concluded the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.

A suspended sentence with three years’ probation and ancillary orders was imposed.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a police search of her apartment.

She argued the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the search warrants failed to properly describe the premises and were issued without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the warrants were invalid due to an inadequate and misleading description of the targeted premises in a multi‑unit mixed residential and commercial building.

Police continued searching after realizing they had entered the wrong unit and remained in the residence while obtaining a second warrant, conduct the court characterized as reckless and later approaching flagrant disregard of Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from Grant, the court held that the seriousness of the Charter breaches and the profound intrusion into the accused’s home outweighed society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The seized drugs were excluded from evidence.

Sentencing for possession of a small quantity of crack cocaine after the accused was acquitted of several firearms and assault police charges.

The court considered the proportionality principle under ss. 718 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code and weighed aggravating factors including the harmful nature of crack cocaine and the admitted intention to sell the drug.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, family support, strict compliance with bail conditions, and time spent in pre-trial custody on related matters.

Applying the criteria for a discharge under s. 730(1), the court concluded that avoiding a conviction would be in the accused’s interest and not contrary to the public interest.

A conditional discharge with one year of probation and abstention from controlled substances was imposed.

The accused was tried on multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference with a person under sixteen, assault causing bodily harm, and common assault arising from a two‑year relationship with a complainant who was between 12 and 14 years old.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony supported by circumstantial evidence from family members, caseworkers, photographs, and other witnesses describing the accused’s possessive and violent conduct.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the allegations and attacked her credibility based on inconsistencies in prior statements.

The court found the inconsistencies were explainable and did not undermine the overall credibility of the complainant.

The court concluded the Crown proved all essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt and entered convictions on all counts.

The accused sought exclusion of firearm and drug evidence alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter following a police encounter and subsequent arrest.

Police had responded to a complaint of an assault and attempted to question a group of men outside a business when the accused fled.

Officers observed suspicious behaviour while the accused ran, including holding one arm in a manner suggesting concealment of a weapon, which led to pursuit and arrest after the accused confronted an officer with a firearm.

The court held that the initial interaction did not amount to a detention and therefore did not engage Charter protections.

The accused’s flight created reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit and detention.

The arrest and subsequent strip search were lawful and the evidence was admitted.

The accused brought a Charter motion arguing his s. 8 rights were violated when police searched his residence and seized a firearm pursuant to a warrant.

The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant, and the Information to Obtain (ITO) was heavily redacted to protect the informant's identity.

The court applied the Debot criteria and the Garofoli Step 6 procedure, providing a judicial summary of the redacted information.

The court found that, despite weaknesses in the informant's credibility, the information was sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police investigation to provide reasonable grounds for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The motion was dismissed and the firearm was ruled admissible.

The accused was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm and assault arising from a violent attack on a vulnerable sex trade worker after she refused to continue a sexual act.

The assault involved choking, stomping, and dragging the complainant, causing bodily harm but no permanent injuries.

At sentencing, the court considered aggravating factors including the brutality of the assault and the complainant’s vulnerability, as well as mitigating factors including the accused’s lack of criminal record, age, disability, language barriers, and social isolation.

The court concluded that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors and that specific deterrence was not a significant concern.

A suspended sentence with probation was imposed instead of incarceration.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police approached his parked vehicle for a wellness check.

After determining there were no health or safety concerns, the police demanded the accused's driver's licence, ran checks, and subsequently arrested and searched him and the vehicle, finding crack cocaine.

The accused brought an application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of his section 8 and 9 rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the detention was arbitrary and the subsequent searches were unlawful, characterizing the police conduct as a flagrant and deliberate disregard for Charter rights.

The application was granted and the crack cocaine was excluded from evidence.

The defendant was charged with firearm offences after police executed a search warrant at his girlfriend's apartment and found a sawed-off shotgun.

The court held voir dires on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements and the validity of the search warrant.

The court excluded the defendant's confessions, finding they were induced by a police promise to release his girlfriend.

The court also found the search warrant was invalid because the Information to Obtain relied on uncorroborated and insufficient information from a confidential informant.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm and ammunition due to the serious impact of the Charter breach on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

The accused brought two pre-trial applications in a historical sexual assault prosecution.

First, he sought production of complainants’ therapeutic and medical records under s. 278 of the Criminal Code.

Second, he sought permission under s. 276 to cross‑examine the complainants regarding prior sexual assaults committed by another individual, arguing it was relevant to testing the reliability of their memories.

The court held the defence failed to demonstrate that the requested third‑party records were likely relevant or necessary in the interests of justice, emphasizing the strong privacy interests in therapeutic records and the prohibition on speculative fishing expeditions.

However, limited cross‑examination regarding the other assaults was permitted solely to test memory and reliability, not to invoke the prohibited “twin myths.”

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming unjust enrichment and seeking to enforce a guarantee against the defendants after mistakenly depositing over $230,000 into the corporate defendant's bank account.

The individual defendant used the funds to pay personal and corporate debts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the quantification of the benefit to the individual defendant and the enforceability of the guarantee and terms of the merchant agreement.

A corporation sought leave under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene in pending motions concerning enforcement and variation of a document production order involving a law firm and a related company.

The proposed intervenor asserted that certain documents in the law firm’s files were subject to solicitor-client privilege under a sole retainer and were outside the scope of the earlier consent production order.

The court held that the proposed intervenor had a direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute because the documents were claimed to be its property and potentially privileged.

Allowing intervention would not cause undue delay or prejudice.

The motion to intervene was granted and the existing sealing order was varied to permit access by the intervenor and its counsel.

A bank sought to recover approximately USD $5.4 million under guarantees related to credit facilities advanced to a UAE construction entity and alleged that settlement proceeds from unrelated international litigation were fraudulently conveyed to affiliated corporations to defeat its claim.

The plaintiff also sought to add numerous additional corporate and individual defendants, rely on the discoverability doctrine and misnomer exceptions to the Limitations Act, and pierce the corporate veil on the basis of a common enterprise among related companies.

The court held that most proposed defendants could not be added because the claims were statute‑barred and the discoverability doctrine did not apply due to the plaintiff’s lack of diligence in identifying corporate entities earlier in the litigation.

Although one entity was permitted to be added due to misnomer, the court found no fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and declined to pierce the corporate veil, emphasizing the principle of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendants.

A not‑for‑profit organization sought an interlocutory injunction preventing a bank from terminating its banking relationship pending trial or the outcome of related Federal Court of Appeal proceedings.

The bank had provided approximately four months’ notice of termination after the organization’s charitable status had been revoked by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court held that banks may terminate banking relationships without cause provided reasonable notice is given and that reasonableness should be assessed in ordinary circumstances rather than based on the plaintiff’s regulatory difficulties.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, failed to prove irreparable harm, and did not satisfy the balance of convenience.

The request for mandatory injunctive relief was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs, founders of a family-owned welding supply business, sued for wrongful dismissal after the business was sold to the manufacturer whose products they distributed.

The manufacturer argued that a term should be implied that the plaintiffs would retire upon the sale of the business given their senior age.

The court rejected this argument, finding that a term of reasonable notice is implied by law in employment contracts.

The court awarded 18 months' notice based on the plaintiffs' actual compensation, resulting in a joint and several damages award of over $1.1 million against the manufacturer and the business.

The plaintiff was injured during an altercation with another passenger on a TTC bus and subsequently required a leg amputation.

He sued the TTC and the bus driver for negligence, alleging they failed to provide a safe environment, intervene, or call for help promptly.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

Relying heavily on video surveillance from the bus, the court found no evidence that the driver or TTC breached their duty of care as common carriers.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The defendant landlord moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim seeking rectification of a lease amendment.

The tenants alleged that an early termination clause permitting the landlord to terminate the lease on 270 days’ notice had been inserted without their knowledge or agreement.

The court held that rectification requires convincing proof of a definite and ascertainable prior oral agreement, knowledge of the mistake amounting to fraud or its equivalent, and proof of the precise form of the corrected instrument.

The evidentiary record consisted largely of self‑serving assertions unsupported by documentary evidence and failed to demonstrate any prior agreement excluding the termination clause.

Summary judgment was granted, the claim for rectification dismissed, and the certificate of pending litigation vacated.