Avene Derwa

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient under the legal standards established in R. v. R.E.M. and R. v. Sheppard.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons, while brief and delivered orally, were sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge clearly explained that she was left with a reasonable doubt because, faced with conflicting versions of events from the complainant and the respondent's text messages, she could not determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that in credibility-based trials, a reasonable doubt can arise when the trial judge is unable to resolve conflicting evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Denim Henderson’s conviction and sentence appeals arising from the death of nine-month-old Kaleb McKay.

The appeal addressed whether charges for aggravated assault and failing to provide necessaries of life were properly joined with a second degree murder charge, and whether a discreditable conduct instruction was required.

The court held that the indictment was valid under s. 589 of the Criminal Code, as the charges arose from the same transaction.

The court also found no error in the trial judge’s instructions and concluded that the jury’s verdict was not tainted by improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Varinder Singh, who had been convicted after a jury trial of obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The court found that the trial judge erred by directing a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offence, rather than leaving the verdict to the jury.

The court held that, even where the evidence is overwhelming, an accused is entitled to the jury’s verdict.

A new trial was ordered on the included offence.

The appellant, Ahmed Othman, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was correct in concluding there was no air of reality to the defence, as the evidence presented diametrically opposed versions of events—consent or no consent—without a situation of ambiguity that could support the defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant, D.W., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by improperly relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to enhance credibility and by misusing a 2015 Children's Aid Society (CAS) record to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the lack of embellishment was permissible to assess motive to lie, and the CAS record was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut recent fabrication, not for the truth of its contents.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault based on a 1983 incident, with identity being the central issue.

The complainant identified the appellant by voice, not sight.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by failing to provide an adequate eye-witness identification caution and an insufficient voice identification caution.

The Court of Appeal found that both cautions were essential given the frailties in the identification evidence, including the historical nature of the allegations and the complainant's limited observation.

The court concluded that the errors were not harmless and could have affected the verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.

The appellant, Joseph Hodgkin, appealed his sentence for accessory after the fact to murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explicitly apply R. v. Gladue principles.

However, the Court concluded that despite this error, the sentence would have been the same had a specific Gladue analysis been conducted, given that the sentencing reasons adequately addressed the appellant's background and Indigeneity.

The appeal was dismissed, but a correction to the warrant of committal was ordered regarding a Long-Term Offender finding.

The appellant, S.R., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal raised two grounds: alleged misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and improper use of the appellant's confession to corroborate the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or the confirmatory use of the confession, affirming that evidence can provide confirmatory weight even if it does not directly implicate the accused, as long as it supports credibility or reliability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Corey Hurren, sought leave to appeal a six-year sentence for seven firearms offences and one count of mischief, arising from crashing his truck into Rideau Hall gates with loaded firearms to confront the Prime Minister over government policies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, this error did not impact the fitness of the sentence given the serious aggravating factors, including armed aggression against the government and ongoing risk.

The court also found no error in the weight given to the appellant's depression or suicidal ideation, as these were tempered by the concern for future risk.

This decision concerns a third motion brought by the applicant to reopen an appeal abandoned in 2003, following his 1996 convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual touching, and subsequent dangerous offender designation.

Previous motions to reopen were dismissed in 2005 and 2013, with the latter upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal, assuming without deciding jurisdiction for successive motions, found no change in circumstances or merit in the proposed appeal, emphasizing the critical need for finality in criminal proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.

This is a conviction appeal where the appellant died during the appeal process.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abated.

The court accepted the Crown's submission and dismissed the appeal as abated, thereby upholding the original conviction.

The applicant, Corey Hurren, brought a motion under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for state-funded counsel to assist with his sentence appeal, citing financial impecuniosity and mental health issues.

The Crown opposed, arguing the appeal lacked merit.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the applicant met the financial eligibility, the proposed sentence appeal was devoid of arguable merit.

The judge concluded that the sentencing judge's findings regarding the political motivation of the offences were reasonable and that any error in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor did not impact the fitness of the six-year sentence, given the egregious nature of the crimes.

The court also determined that the appeal could be effectively argued without counsel.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and other serious offences, appealed the imposition of a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The appeal was based on three grounds: the sentencing judge's assessment of substantial risk of reoffence, the length of the LTSO given the appellant's age and a Static-99R assessment, and the failure to explicitly grant "Duncan" enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly assessed the risk of reoffence, the LTSO length was justified by the appellant's non-participation in treatment and other factors, and that the "Duncan" factors were implicitly considered in determining the fit sentence.

The appellant, P.M., sought leave to appeal a three-year sentence for sexual assault, six months consecutive for assault, and four months concurrent for uttering a threat, imposed in absentia by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal raised the issue of conflicting sentencing ranges for sexual assault involving intimate partners versus non-intimate partners (R. v. Smith vs. R. v. Bradley).

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's sentence was fit and proportionate, even assuming an error in identifying the precise sentencing range, as appellate intervention is only warranted if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.

The Court declined to resolve the conflict in sentencing ranges for the purpose of this appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Christian Masci, sought leave to appeal the total five-year sentence imposed following his convictions for pointing a firearm, possessing a firearm, and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences for the separate events, particularly the firearm possession offences, emphasizing that such decisions are entitled to deference and that the total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence (a shotgun and cell phone) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

This evidence was obtained following a s. 8 Charter breach due to a one-year delay in filing a s. 489.1 Criminal Code report after a search incident to arrest.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant factors, concluding that the seriousness of the breach was lessened by officer oversight and the impact on the appellant's Charter interests was minimal, as the items would have been lawfully detained for trial regardless.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and breach of probation.

He argued that he was misled by trial counsel regarding the trial procedure, specifically by not contesting the Crown's statement of facts, and that the trial judge was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant understood the "nolo contendre" equivalent procedure followed at trial and that the trial judge was entitled to accept uncontested evidence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application, arguing his detention was unlawful due to a new information adding charges without a new arrest and the failure to hold timely detention review hearings under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the appellant despite the new information, as he was lawfully before the court.

It further affirmed that the failure to hold a s. 525 detention review hearing does not automatically render detention unlawful; the appropriate remedy is an immediate review, which the appellant was offered and eventually received.

The court also found no abuse of process justifying a stay of proceedings.