Avene Derwa

The appellant, A.R., appealed convictions on 30 counts, including serious sexual offences and physical abuse of her children, and cruelty to pets.

The appeal raised two arguments: first, that the trial judge misapplied R. v. W.(D.) by requiring corroboration of the appellant's evidence; and second, that the trial judge erred by conflating "proven absence of motive" with "absence of evidence of motive" regarding the children's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapplication of W.(D.) and that the trial judge properly considered the absence of evidence of motive as one factor in assessing credibility.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a young female relative and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and sought a reduction to four to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the length of the sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge's balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors.

However, on joint agreement of the parties, the court amended the ancillary prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code to accurately reflect the trial judge's original order.

The appellant appealed his sentence on two grounds: the sentencing judge's alleged failure to consider Gladue factors and an error in calculating Duncan credits.

The Court of Appeal found that the Gladue factors were expressly waived by the appellant, and even if considered, would not have impacted the sentence given his lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary calculation of Duncan credits for harsh conditions of incarceration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but appealed his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the court should have relied on an expert opinion that expressed reservations about the designation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge's decision, noting that trial counsel had conceded the designation's appropriateness and no fresh evidence of ineffective assistance was presented.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's discretion to accept the opinion of another expert who found the appellant met the dangerous offender criteria.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He abandoned the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the usual 1.5 to 1 credit rate for the appellant's 152 days of pretrial custody.

The sentence appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by 76 days.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 6-year sentence for aggravated assault, which included credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions of confinement.

The conviction stemmed from a violent knife attack on his former partner's husband.

The sentencing judge emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, noting the victim's severe injuries, the appellant's use of two knives, his related criminal record, and the attack occurring partly in front of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the appellant's limited insight into the gravity of the offence, which restricted the weight given to his rehabilitative potential.

The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault against a 13-month-old child, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing conflicting expert medical evidence on the causation of the child's head injury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly preferred the Crown's expert opinion in isolation before considering the totality of the evidence, thereby misapplying the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

This led to a flawed assessment of the defence's alternative theories and a failure to properly consider whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 20-year custodial sentence for 18 counts of home invasion sexual assaults and related offences committed between 1985 and 1987.

The appeal argued two errors by the sentencing judge: improper application of the totality principle and failure to adequately consider the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age as mitigating factors.

The majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to totality or the consideration of mitigating factors.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 14 years, arguing that the trial judge erred in her consideration of the "laying low" factor and the appellant's life expectancy, leading to a disproportionate and "crushing" sentence.

The appellant, convicted of firearms offences and breach of recognizance following a shooting incident, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the admission or assessment of witness evidence, that the verdict was reasonable given the strong circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge properly rejected the self-defence argument.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but ultimately dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the eight-year custodial sentence was fit, balancing mitigating factors with the appellant's prior firearms offence and the dangerous nature of discharging a weapon in a populated area.

The appellant, Alexander Rose, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's post-event demeanour and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge was entitled to rely on video surveillance footage of the complainant's distraught emotional state as powerful corroboration of non-consent.

The court affirmed the principles of appellate deference to credibility findings and the functional review of trial judge reasons, dismissing arguments that the verdict was unreasonable or that the evidence was improperly assessed.

The appellant, Taylor Griffith, appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a loaded semi-automatic handgun and cocaine for trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The main issue was the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The Court of Appeal found that while the police had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and search incident to arrest, and were justified in delaying counsel access during warrant execution due to officer safety concerns, an unexplained 80-minute delay after warrants were executed did constitute a s. 10(b) breach.

However, applying the Grant test, the court determined that admitting the reliable and crucial evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the unintentional and situation-specific nature of the breach and its moderate impact on the appellant's Charter interests.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's decision not to reduce the sentence based on the s. 10(b) breach, as it did not relate to the circumstances of the offence or offender.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction where the Crown filed an affidavit attesting to the appellant's death.

The court dismissed the appeal as abated due to the appellant's demise.

The appellant was convicted of firearm possession offences following a search warrant execution at an apartment in Hamilton.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application challenging the warrant's validity on the basis that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search, finding he had no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to rely on the Crown's theory that the apartment was his residence to establish standing under the principles established in R v. Jones.

The court found the trial judge erred by not permitting the appellant to rely on the Crown's own allegations to establish facts necessary for his s. 8 claim, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of eleven human-trafficking, sexual and violent offences including robbery, assault causing bodily harm, procuring prostitution, financial benefit from prostitution, proceeds of indictable offence, sexual assault causing bodily harm, assault, transport to a bawdy house, trafficking a person, financial benefit from trafficking a person, and withholding a travel document.

The appellant received a sentence of five and one-half years' incarceration, less three months for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

On appeal, the appellant raised three main arguments: (1) that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Marakah fundamentally changed the law of search and seizure and entitled him to a new trial to challenge the admissibility of text messages; (2) that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof; and (3) that the verdicts on counts 1 (robbery) and 11 (withholding a travel document) were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three arguments and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed a December 13, 2017 disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a general forensic unit of St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton.

However, while under that order, the appellant escaped and was subsequently ordered detained in a secure unit by a Board disposition dated September 18, 2018.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal from the 2017 disposition to be moot, as it had been replaced by the more restrictive 2018 disposition based on changed circumstances.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of eight years (less credit for pre-sentence custody) imposed for five offences related to human trafficking.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by: (1) failing to grant qualitative credit under R. v. Duncan for conditions of pre-sentence incarceration including triple bunking and lockdowns; (2) admitting and misusing voluntary videotaped jail-house interviews; and (3) imposing an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's discretionary decisions and confirming that the sentence was fit given the gravity of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellants appealed a decision of Justice MacDonnell of the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed their application for mandamus relating to a ruling by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the analysis provided by MacDonnell J. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The Crown brought a motion to strike affidavits filed by the appellant in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The Crown raised concerns that the fresh evidence materials were prepared by a lawyer found to be in a conflict of interest and sought to put the appellant on notice that it would challenge the admissibility or weight of evidence tainted by that conflict.

The court held that the appellant was now on notice of the Crown's position and that the Crown could raise these concerns before the appeal panel.

An appeal date was set for December 10, 2018, with provisions for the Crown to request an adjournment if necessary.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR (not criminally responsible) accused who had been under the Board's supervision since 2005 following a nonviolent offence committed during a psychotic episode.

The Board concluded the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety and ordered his transfer from CAMH to St. Joseph's Mental Health Care.

The appellant challenged both the finding of significant threat and the Board's failure to consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant threat but found the Board erred in failing to consider whether a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available.