Ariel Herscovitch

The appellant appealed his conviction for contempt of court and his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly compelled the appellant's attendance and that his refusal to testify constituted contempt.

The appellant was afforded ample opportunity to consult counsel and declined further time to consider his position.

The Court found the conviction unassailable and dismissed the appeal.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a fellow inmate at the Don Jail.

The Crown's case was that the appellant was part of a group that assaulted the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately relate evidence to the mens rea element of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were proper and that the evidence was fairly presented to the jury.

Les requérants, accusés de fraude et de parjure, ont présenté une motion en vertu de l'alinéa 11(b) de la Charte pour obtenir un arrêt des procédures en raison de délais déraisonnables.

Le délai total anticipé entre le dépôt des accusations et la fin du procès était de plus de 50 mois.

Après avoir déduit les délais imputables à la défense, le délai net dépassait le plafond de 30 mois établi par l'arrêt Jordan.

La Cour a conclu que le dossier était d'une complexité particulière justifiant les délais excédentaires, compte tenu du volume de la preuve, du nombre de témoins, de la tenue d'un procès conjoint et bilingue devant jury, et de la nature des accusations.

La motion a été rejetée.

The applicant, Akeem Bailey, sought to quash his committal for trial on five counts of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application for certiorari argued that the preliminary inquiry judge erred in finding sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, particularly concerning the applicant's role as a getaway driver and the probative value of post-offence conduct.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's vehicle positioning for a quick getaway and his awareness of the shooting.

The court concluded that there was evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict the applicant of attempted murder, and therefore, the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error.

The application was dismissed.

Jan Goro, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to admit details of incidents involving a third-party suspect, Jack Laforge, where charges were initiated but no convictions resulted.

The Crown brought a similar cross-application to admit details of incidents involving Mr. Goro where police investigated but no charges were laid.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the unproven allegations had minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect, especially given that both parties' criminal convictions would already be admitted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit a statement made by the accused, Jan Goro, to police in 2003, in a second-degree murder case.

The statement was given after Goro was arrested on a foot impression warrant.

The court found that the police failed to inform Goro that he was free to leave after the warrant was executed, thereby undermining his free will and right to choose whether to speak to police.

Consequently, the statement was deemed involuntary and inadmissible at trial for any purpose, including cross-examination.

The United States sought the extradition of Jianghong Wang for prosecution of sexual assault.

The respondent conceded identification and the sufficiency of evidence for the Canadian equivalent offence but argued the identification evidence was unreliable and insufficient for committal.

The court, applying the limited screening function of an extradition judge, found that the identification evidence, including multiple complainants identifying the respondent from news reports and consistent assault patterns, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for committal.

The application for extradition was granted.

The applicant, charged in 2013 with a 1976 murder, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence.

The lost evidence included the notes of thirteen police officers, an audiotaped confession by a third-party suspect, a videotaped recantation by that suspect, and various occurrence reports.

The court found that the deliberate destruction of police notes and the unexplained loss of the recordings constituted unacceptable negligence, breaching the applicant's section 7 Charter rights.

Concluding that the cumulative prejudice irreparably harmed the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The offenders pleaded guilty to manslaughter and indecent interference with human remains following a joint submission.

Originally charged with first-degree murder, the Crown accepted lesser pleas due to evidentiary frailties.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a 10-year sentence for manslaughter and 3 years concurrent for indecent interference, with credit for pre-trial custody and Gladue factors for Aboriginal offenders.

The appellants appealed their convictions for various firearms offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in identifying them from video surveillance footage, ignoring the lack of evidence from a search warrant, rejecting exculpatory witness testimony, and finding that the objects they carried were loaded restricted firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles for video identification, adequately considered the search warrant evidence, reasonably assessed witness credibility, and drew a logical inference that the firearms were loaded given the circumstances of the altercation.

The Crown appealed a reviewing judge's decision to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder and substitute a committal for second degree murder.

The accused was charged with first degree murder based on the allegation that he caused the victim's death while committing a sexual assault.

The reviewing judge found no evidence of lack of consent to the sexual act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the first degree murder committal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not exceed his jurisdiction.

The Court held that the nature of the injuries, the position of the body, and the short timeframe supported a reasonable inference that the sexual contact was not consensual.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery, aggravated assault, and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence arising from a home invasion on February 18, 2014.

Five masked men invaded the home of Stanley and Kathleen Benson in Richmond Hill, Ontario, tasering Kathleen and severely beating Stanley, who suffered a broken ankle, collapsed lung, and other injuries.

The defendant was arrested in October 2014 after 561 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown sought 8 years imprisonment; the defence sought 4 years and 4 months.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, considering the defendant's youth, remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation potential, while balancing the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in relation to charges of first-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

They argued that extensive pre‑trial publicity, community hostility, and alleged inadequacies in the Sault Ste.

Marie courthouse facilities created a reasonable likelihood of juror prejudice and an unfair trial.

The court reviewed the governing jurisprudence on venue changes and the safeguards inherent in the jury selection and trial process.

It concluded that the applicants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that community bias or prejudice could not be mitigated through those safeguards.

The court also found that the courthouse facilities were capable of accommodating the trial and that logistical concerns did not justify relocation.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder on the basis that the Crown had not led evidence capable of supporting the predicate offence of sexual assault required under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence established that the accused’s semen was found in the deceased’s mouth and that the deceased died from neck compression during a violent encounter in her apartment.

The court held that while there was evidence of both a sexual act and a homicide, there was no evidence linking the sexual act to non-consensual activity or establishing that the death occurred while committing or attempting to commit sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry judge’s inference that the sexual activity was non-consensual improperly conflated the violent killing with the earlier sexual act and relied on speculation rather than evidence.

The committal for first degree murder was therefore quashed, but the accused was ordered to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, voyeurism, and breach of probation, as well as his six-year sentence.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant choked the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her while she was unconscious, and videotaped the activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence or error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing the pre-sentence custody credit to a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 25.5 months of credit.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed from an order refusing to quash his committal to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Crown alleged that after the appellant and others assaulted the deceased, the appellant provided a rope which the deceased used to hang himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence and that there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation upon which a reasonable jury could infer guilt.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant and a nine‑year custodial sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing an application under the Criminal Code for production of the complainant’s Children’s Aid Society and counselling records, asserting the records were needed to challenge credibility due to inconsistencies between statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the accused failed to establish the statutory threshold of “likely relevance,” emphasizing that speculative assertions or hopes of finding prior inconsistent statements do not justify production of confidential therapeutic records.

The court also rejected the argument that the sentencing judge made factual findings inconsistent with the jury’s acquittals on related charges.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the breach of trust, the complainant’s young age, and the prolonged and intrusive nature of the offences.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and breach of probation, as well as his 10-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to put self-defence to the jury, admitting evidence of prior disreputable conduct, and finding his police statement voluntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim and no errors in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence fell within the established range for serious firearm offences.

The accused applied to exclude firearms evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, alleging the warrant was invalid and violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The challenge relied on the Garofoli framework and argued that the Information to Obtain relied on insufficiently credible and corroborated confidential source information and that redactions impaired full answer and defence.

After considering the redacted ITO, a judicial summary of confidential information, and cross‑examination of the affiant, the court held the issuing justice could reasonably have authorized the warrant.

The court found the confidential source information sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police investigation.

In the alternative, even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under the s. 24(2) Grant analysis.