Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences

The appellant, Roumen Marinov, appealed his convictions for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" the trial judge's assessment of the testifying officer's note-taking and credibility, and whether the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof for the impaired driving conviction.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" his assessment of the officer's evidence despite note-taking issues, or his application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for impaired driving, which was implicitly demonstrated throughout the judgment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge made several errors, including shifting the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application, misapprehending evidence regarding the officer's grounds for the demand, misapplying the W.(D.) test for credibility, relying on hearsay, and failing to prove he operated a vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors, properly assessed credibility, and reasonably concluded that the officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At trial, the Crown relied on a toxicologist's report that assumed the appellant had not engaged in bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The trial judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to disprove bolus drinking and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual inferences regarding the absence of bolus drinking.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a production order and search warrant obtained in connection with an investigation into child pornography downloaded via the Freenet peer-to-peer network.

The applicant argued that both investigative orders lacked reasonable grounds because there was no nexus between the downloading activity observed in December 2014 and January 2015 and the subscriber information obtained in March 2015, given that IP addresses are dynamically assigned and can change frequently.

The court found that the production order and search warrant should be set aside due to lack of reasonable grounds.

The court also identified multiple defects in the investigative orders, including erroneous information about Freenet's counter mechanism, incorrect calculations regarding file blocks and even share, and the inclusion of printed materials without evidentiary foundation.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach and the significant invasion of privacy outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and mischief, as well as a restitution order, arising from a road rage incident on a busy highway.

The trial judge found the appellant intentionally stopped his vehicle in front of the complainant's, causing a collision and subsequent altercation where the appellant damaged the complainant's vehicle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and met the legal tests for dangerous driving and mischief.

However, the court varied the restitution order, reducing it to exclude the cost of windshield repair, as the trial judge had not been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant caused that specific damage.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the roadside breath demand, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's findings that the formal breath demand at the station was valid and that the appellant's ambiguous response to the right to counsel did not constitute an invocation of that right.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breath test evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) despite the s. 8 breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of a conviction.

The appellant raised two grounds: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and an argument that the fee arrangement with his counsel constituted a prohibited contingency fee under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's evidence regarding ineffective assistance to be totally incredible and rejected the contingency fee argument as having no basis on the record.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that set aside a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found no legal or factual basis for the stay of charges based on the police's failure to lay the information within the statutory time limit or serve the summons timely.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the possibility of mitigating a driving suspension sentence constituted a credible Charter violation justifying a stay of serious criminal charges.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that dismissed his appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by confusing the distinction between a proved absence of motive to lie and the absence of evidence of a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the legal principle was well-settled and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The trial judge's statement that she did not find a motivation to fabricate was a rejection of the defence submission rather than a positive finding that no motive existed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80mg and operating a vehicle as a novice driver with a blood alcohol level greater than zero.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding a realistic risk that he would drive the vehicle after filling it with gas, and misapprehended evidence regarding his level of intoxication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusion that the appellant posed a realistic risk of driving the vehicle.

The appellant was convicted of careless storage and transportation of a firearm after the trial judge permitted the Crown to amend the Information.

The appellant appealed, arguing the amendments created new offences outside the six-month limitation period for summary conviction offences under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the amendments did not prejudice the appellant, they did create new charges that were statute-barred.

The convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The accused had been found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle but stated she only entered to listen to music and smoke.

The summary conviction appeal judge found no error in the trial judge's refusal to allow a new question on re-examination regarding identity.

The appeal court also held that the trial judge's finding that the accused rebutted the presumption of care and control and posed no realistic risk of danger was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving and the imposed sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant's driving in a parking lot, involving excessive speed, fishtailing, and loss of control, constituted a marked departure from a reasonably prudent driver's conduct.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and application of the dangerous driving test, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal against the 18-month driving prohibition was also dismissed, considering the appellant's prior drinking and driving convictions.

The applicant brought three motions seeking extensions of time to seek leave to appeal from dismissals by lower appeal courts of his convictions on three separate charges: one assault on a police officer conviction from 1993, and two provincial offences convictions from 2014-2015 under the Trespass to Property Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three motions.

For the 1993 conviction, the applicant's delay of nearly 23 years was found to be inordinate and unjustifiable, with no bona fide intention to appeal demonstrated within the prescribed time.

For the two provincial offences convictions, the applicant's delay of over three months was inadequately explained, and the proposed appeals failed to meet the high threshold for granting leave to appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, as they involved questions of fact rather than law alone.

Rehan Riaz, facing multiple charges including impaired driving and driving disqualified, sought a bail review after being denied bail.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, including new sureties and efforts to secure addiction counselling, and arguments regarding the length of pre-trial custody potentially exceeding a fit sentence.

The court found that the new supervision plan was not a material change but accepted that the potential length of pre-trial incarceration, possibly exceeding a likely sentence, constituted a material change.

The court granted judicial interim release with specific conditions, including residing with his sister, supervision, and prohibitions on alcohol, non-prescriptive drugs, and driving.

Nathan Buress appealed a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after he pleaded guilty to driving while disqualified and dangerous driving.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including multiple driving offences and was on probation and a conditional sentence at the time of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the prohibition was necessary for specific and general deterrence and public protection, given the appellant's history and the dangerous nature of his conduct.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control and over 80.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that a "realistic risk of danger" is not a required element where the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control, in unreasonably finding a realistic risk of danger in obiter, and in assessing his evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's analysis of de facto care or control and that the findings were not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment.