Ontario Court of Justice - Summary Conviction Offences

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breath certificate evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 10(b) breach because the arresting officer failed to facilitate the appellant's request to call his girlfriend to obtain a lawyer's name.

The summary conviction appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's Grant analysis, concluding she properly assessed the seriousness of the breach and the officers' conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, failing to comply with a demand, and dangerous driving.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his speed and that the arresting officer lacked lawful grounds to make a Drug Recognition Evaluation demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that the modified objective test for dangerous driving was met.

The court also upheld the lawfulness of the demands made by the officers.

The appellant, a religious teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a 10-year-old student.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to address inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster credibility, and conflating the absence of a motive to fabricate with positive proof of no motive.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the evidence, properly used the prior consistent statement as circumstantial evidence, and correctly addressed the motive to fabricate in response to the defence's cross-examination.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

She argued her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police failed to leave a message for her counsel of choice, failed to advise her she could leave a message, and failed to provide a 'Prosper warning' when she declined duty counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge agreed, finding the police breached her s. 10(b) rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the judge excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons on a s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel.

The appellant claimed the trial judge failed to explain why he preferred the police officers' evidence over his own.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not make a negative credibility finding, but rather relied on the uncontroverted evidence that the arresting officer read the right to counsel from a card while the appellant was in the police cruiser.

The reasons were deemed sufficient for appellate review.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the judge excluded breath samples and police observations under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding a section 8 breach because the arresting officer lacked subjective grounds to arrest for impaired driving.

The trial judge also found the officer's testimony attempting to justify the arrest was misleading, which exacerbated the seriousness of the breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officer's lack of subjective grounds and misleading testimony were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the demand was made 'forthwith' and with reasonable suspicion.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, holding the 8-9 minute delay was reasonably necessary for the officer to run a query, wait for the screening device, and explain the consequences of refusal.

The court also found the objective component of reasonable suspicion was satisfied by the appellant's speed, failure to signal, departure from a licensed establishment, and odour of alcohol.

The appellant appealed his conviction for wilfully killing a dog without lawful excuse.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by placing the burden on the accused to prove lawful excuse on a balance of probabilities.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the error engaged fundamental principles of criminal law and that the case against the accused was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would have inevitably convicted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) were breached and that the admission of breath samples tainted the trial judge's finding of impairment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the impaired driving charge was amply supported by overwhelming civilian and paramedic evidence, independent of the breath samples.

The court held it was unnecessary to address the alleged Charter breaches given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made in the breath room, that the trial judge was biased, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation regarding the breath room statements, no evidence of judicial bias, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court preferred the evidence of trial counsel over the appellant regarding the circumstances surrounding the agreed statement of facts and trial strategy.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The trial judge had excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the accused's rights regarding a delayed roadside screening demand and a privacy breach involving video surveillance in her cell.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's findings on the Charter breaches but found errors in principle in the s. 24(2) analysis, specifically regarding the assessment of the seriousness of the breaches and the application of the law concerning post-discovery Charter breaches.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding sufficient grounds for the roadside test, accepting the breathalyzer results despite an unreliable breath technician, and finding the delay caused by a forced consultation with duty counsel was reasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the first two grounds but found the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police acted reasonably in requiring the appellant to consult with duty counsel after she had waived her right to counsel.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm against his father and sister.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's erroneous application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and an impermissible adverse inference drawn from the appellant's exercise of his right to silence when questioned by police about his injuries.

The Crown conceded the Browne v. Dunn errors but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the errors were not harmless or trivial and the evidence was not so overwhelming as to make a conviction inevitable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month conditional sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel and misapprehended evidence in finding the complainant was unconscious and incapable of consenting.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant waived his right to counsel was supported by the evidence.

The court also held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including the appellant's statement to police and witness testimony, to reasonably conclude the complainant was unconscious.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her Charter applications under s. 10(b), alleging police failed to assist her in contacting her counsel of choice and failed to provide adequate privacy during her consultation with duty counsel.

She also argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence regarding her impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the law, concluding the appellant's belief that she lacked privacy was not reasonably held.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the officer testified that the appellant initially refused the demand, then made several attempts to blow into the Approved Screening Device but only blew lightly, resulting in no reading.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by using her initial refusal to infer her subsequent attempts were feigned, and by unreasonably finding the mouthpiece was not obstructed.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the initial refusal was part of the actus reus and the trial judge's factual findings regarding the mouthpiece were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant, Mohamed El Boury, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol level in excess of 80mg.

The primary ground of appeal was the admissibility of the certificate of a qualified technician, specifically whether a copy had been properly served on the appellant as required by s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the certificate had been served on a balance of probabilities, a finding upheld on appeal.

The appeal court agreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal's reasoning in R. v. Redford that physical retention of the certificate is not required for valid service.

Additionally, the court found that even if the certificate was inadmissible, the Crown had proven the offence through viva voce evidence from the breath technician.

The appeal was dismissed.