R. Griffin

The offender was convicted of sexual interference involving a five-year-old child.

The Crown sought the maximum summary conviction sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought 12 to 15 months, citing the offender's cognitive deficits.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, finding that the offender's breach of trust and the victim's young age were significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused, charged with historical sexual assault, brought an application seeking to delay his s. 276 application regarding the complainant's prior intimate relationship with him until after the complainant's examination-in-chief.

The court dismissed the application, finding that allowing the delay based on a bare-bones notice of application would defeat the spirit and intention of s. 276, prejudice the Crown's ability to prepare, and invite the mischief Parliament sought to address in enacting the provision.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting the complainant to testify by video link from New Brunswick at the upcoming trial for gang sexual assault.

The complainant suffers from progressive Multiple Sclerosis, is immunosuppressed, and cannot be vaccinated against COVID-19.

The court found that the complainant's debilitating medical condition, combined with the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application was granted, allowing the complainant to testify via video link from a secure facility.

The accused was tried on summary conviction charges of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child.

The court focused on whether the child’s account was credible and reliable, and whether the Crown had proven the accused was the person who committed the acts.

The judge accepted the child’s adopted video statement, found her evidence trustworthy despite incremental disclosure and limited present memory, and rejected the accused’s denial.

The court concluded that the Crown proved both the sexual touching and the accused’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and convicted him on both counts.

The accused was charged with four counts relating to the unlawful possession of a .22 calibre rifle and a sawed-off shotgun.

During the execution of a search warrant at the accused's residence, police located the rifle in his closet and the shotgun outside a broken window.

Photos of the accused holding the shotgun were also found on his cellphone.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including the location of the firearms and ammunition in the accused's bedroom, established beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession of both firearms.

The accused was found guilty of two counts, with the remaining two stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant, Roumen Marinov, appealed his convictions for operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" the trial judge's assessment of the testifying officer's note-taking and credibility, and whether the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof for the impaired driving conviction.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" his assessment of the officer's evidence despite note-taking issues, or his application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for impaired driving, which was implicitly demonstrated throughout the judgment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device was made "forthwith" in accordance with section 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the officer failed to make the demand promptly upon acquiring sufficient information to give rise to reasonable suspicion, thereby breaching the accused's Charter rights.

The court found that the officer reasonably did not form the requisite reasonable suspicion until after the accused was placed in the police cruiser, at which point the demand was made promptly.

The Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was found guilty.