Civil Litigation - Defendant

This costs endorsement follows the Court of Appeal’s decision allowing the appellants’ appeal in part.

The court found that the trial judge erred in requiring Mak Mera Limited to repay US$405,000 and in awarding $200,000 in defamation damages to James Bay Resources Limited.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal and, after submissions on trial costs, the court awarded the appellants $400,000 in trial costs, payable by James Bay, as a fair and proportionate amount in light of the appeal outcome and the parties’ relative success.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a defamation action brought by the respondent.

They also appealed the motion judge's award of costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the impugned Facebook post did not relate to a matter of public interest, concluding it was a private business dispute despite references to masks and a potential class action.

The court also affirmed the costs award, finding no error in the motion judge's discretion to award costs given the perceived misuse of the anti-SLAPP provision.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its claims against two corporate and individual respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for lack of contractual privity and other deficiencies.

The motion judge had denied leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondents were not parties to the alleged contract (Mandate) and that other claims were unsustainable.

The court affirmed that reviewing a document expressly pleaded and incorporated into the statement of claim does not constitute considering evidence on a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion and upheld the discretionary refusal to grant further leave to amend.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondents sought full indemnity costs, citing contractual language in mortgage actions and the appellants' "reprehensible conduct" and "scurrilous accusations." The appellants argued the claim was excessive and duplicative.

The court, while acknowledging contractual full indemnity, exercised its overriding discretion due to the complex and overly litigious nature of the case, finding both parties contributed to procedural skirmishes.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellants to the respondents at $170,000, all-inclusive, a reduction from the $190,372 claimed.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their action for delay.

Despite the brief delay in filing the motion for leave being due to counsel's inadvertence, the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion.

The court found the proposed appeal lacked merit and emphasized the moving party's long history of procedural misconduct, which caused significant prejudice to the responding parties, particularly due to the death of a critical witness whose evidence was never preserved.

The court concluded that the "justice of the case" demanded the dismissal of the motion to protect the integrity of the civil justice process and prevent an unfair adjudication on the merits.

The appellants sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to dismiss their action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The underlying action concerned a mortgage whose validity had been previously decided.

The Court of Appeal found the action, which included 40 causes of action in a 300-page statement of claim, to be plainly vexatious and an abuse of process, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order allowing a medical negligence claim to proceed in the Superior Court, despite the plaintiff being a professional football player subject to a collective agreement with an arbitration clause.

The appellant, a radiologist, argued the claim fell under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the "essential character" of the dispute was medical negligence by an independent third-party physician, not a dispute arising from the collective agreement.

Furthermore, the arbitration process under the collective agreement would not provide effective redress for a medical malpractice claim, particularly regarding costs and expert fees.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal previously rejected the appellants' claim to overturn the setting aside of a default foreclosure judgment but set aside the application judge's order for sale, directing a trial on whether one appellant (2670082 Ontario Corp.) was protected by the Land Titles Act.

In this costs decision, the Court found the respondent (Kelly Martin) wholly successful against one appellant (11037315 Canada Inc.) and awarded her partial indemnity costs.

The other appellant (2670082 Ontario Corp.) achieved partial success on appeal, and costs between 2670082 Ontario Corp. and the respondent were fixed but made payable in the cause of the future trial.

The appellants' overall request for substantial costs was rejected as excessive.

The appellant, Glassdoor Inc., appealed a motion judge's order denying its anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action.

The action stemmed from an anonymous critical employee review posted on Glassdoor's website about the respondent, Echelon Environmental Inc. The appellant argued the review related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the review, concerning private complaints about a company providing specialized services to a small number of customers, did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was also dismissed.

This grouped appeal concerned four applications seeking declarations that the appellant insurers had a duty to defend the respondent corporations against claims of property damage arising from condominium construction deficiencies.

The application judge found a duty to defend based on the "mere possibility" test and refused ex ante allocation of defence costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurers' appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the "mere possibility" test applies to exclusions and that courts should not conduct a "trial within a trial" on duty to defend applications.

The court also upheld the order for pre-notification defence costs and dismissed a cross-appeal regarding the assessment of past defence costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, alleging historic sexual and physical abuse from 1966-1974, was filed in 2015 but had seen little progress by 2020.

The motion judge found no acceptable explanation for the delay, including an 18-month period where former counsel explored a class action.

The appellants argued the judge failed to contextualize the delay given the absence of limitation periods for their claims and erred in characterizing counsel's decision to suspend the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the contextual approach to delay but finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the delay was egregious and unexplained, despite the nature of the claims.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded the respondents costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The decision was made after considering submissions from counsel.

The appellant, Myriam Michail, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her anti-SLAPP motion against the London District Catholic School Board's application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The motion judge found that Michail had not established that the Board's application related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the determination that vexatious proceedings do not relate to a matter of public interest and that the Board's application aimed to prevent vexatious litigation, not to suppress expression.

The Court also upheld the costs award against Michail and declined to consider new constitutional questions raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellants, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company, sought an order staying a lower court judgment pending appeal.

They argued that the application judge's amendments to his reasons for judgment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge, Lauwers J.A., dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a real likelihood or probability of bias.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and the overarching interests of justice, concluding that a stay was not warranted.

Leave was granted to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a motion to change regarding spousal support.

The Respondent was deemed the successful party in the underlying motion, as the court ordered indefinite support of $1,000 per month, contrary to the Applicant's position that no support was payable.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, finding the Respondent's offer more aligned with the final order.

The Applicant's self-representation and unreasonable position at trial contributed to increased costs for the Respondent.

Considering proportionality, reasonableness, and the Applicant's financial circumstances, the court awarded the Respondent $15,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable as support.

The applicant sought disclosure for claims of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, tracing, and spousal support.

The respondent moved for summary judgment to dismiss these claims based on limitation periods and to strike or stay the application due to unpaid costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's disclosure motion, granted the respondent's summary judgment motion, dismissing the property claims due to expired limitation periods and laches, and stayed the application until the applicant complies with all outstanding costs orders.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion to recover alleged debt from the defendants based on a debt settlement agreement.

The defendants denied the contract or alleged breach by the plaintiff for failing to leave the ESL industry, and sought to amend their counterclaim to include this breach.

The court granted the defendants' motion to amend their counterclaim, finding it was not prejudicial and disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff's summary judgment motion was dismissed, as the issues in the main action and the amended counterclaim were inextricably intertwined, creating a genuine issue requiring a trial and raising the risk of inconsistent findings and inefficient use of judicial resources if heard separately.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment dismissing the action against a corporate affiliate and a corporate officer in a construction dispute relating to a condominium development project.

The plaintiff alleged that the officer induced breach of contract, made misrepresentations, conspired with lenders, and that the corporate affiliate was effectively the alter ego of the contractor.

The court reviewed the amended Rule 20 summary judgment framework and the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, particularly the limits on a master’s authority and the requirement to determine whether a full appreciation of the evidence is possible without a trial.

Although the evidentiary record against the moving defendants was weak and the legal theories faced significant obstacles, the court held that the complex factual matrix and unresolved issues relating to the main breach of contract claim prevented a proper assessment on the record.

Summary judgment was therefore refused.