Self-represented

The Crown brought applications for the return and forfeiture of hundreds of paintings and objects of art seized during the Voss, Lamont, Cowan, White, and Bremner investigations into forged art.

At a case conference, the court set out the evidentiary basis for the applications and directed that the parties must sign an undertaking restricting the use and dissemination of the disclosure material before the Crown provides it.

The court scheduled a further case conference to review the status of disclosure and set a schedule for the delivery of application records and responding materials.

The appellants, who provided negligent legal services to the respondent despite not being licensed to do so, appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $41,000 in damages.

The appellants argued the motion judge decided the case on a novel theory of liability—failure to advise—that was not pleaded, denying them a fair opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the issue was clearly raised in the pleadings and motion materials.

The court also dismissed the appeal of the costs award, noting leave to appeal costs had not been sought.

The appellants, who provided negligent legal services to the respondent despite not being licensed to do so, appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $41,000 in damages.

The appellants argued the motion judge decided the case on a novel theory of liability—failure to advise—that was not pleaded, denying them a fair opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the issue was clearly raised in the pleadings and motion materials.

The court also dismissed the appeal of the costs award, noting leave to appeal costs had not been sought.

The applicant mother brought a motion for interim child support, spousal support, proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses, and interim disbursements.

The respondent father, a high-income earner, argued that income should be imputed to the mother and that spousal support should be minimized to equalize net disposable incomes due to high carrying costs and private school expenses.

The court declined to impute income at the interim stage, ordered table child support, and awarded spousal support at the low end of the SSAG range.

The court also authorized a partial release of funds from a joint line of credit for the mother's interim disbursements.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision summarily dismissing her complaints of discrimination against a canoe club.

The HRTO had found most complaints were out of time and all had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO adequately accommodated the applicant's disability-related needs, the hearing was procedurally fair, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, and the summary dismissal was reasonable.

In a second addendum to an appeal decision regarding a partnership dispute, the court considered the appellants' payment of income taxes for a corporation.

Based on affidavit evidence and notices of assessment confirming a remittance of $8,348.36 to the Canada Revenue Agency, the court ordered that this amount be deducted from the corporation's net income figure to arrive at an after-tax income figure for the purpose of recalculating the damages owing to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against an investigator appointed by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The motion judge had found the lawsuit was a collateral attack on the Discipline Committee's decision to revoke the appellant's designation, and was an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions or in his discretionary decision to deny an adjournment.

The applicant, a member of the respondent not-for-profit corporation, submitted a proposal to amend the corporation's articles to make the decisions of the Nominations and Elections Committee final and binding on the board of directors.

The respondent refused to include the proposal in the notice of its annual general meeting.

The applicant brought an application to compel its inclusion.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the proposal was illegal because it sought to restrict the core management powers of the directors.

Under the Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, such a restriction can only be achieved through a unanimous member agreement, not a special resolution to amend the articles.

The moving party, who defaulted on a residential mortgage, sought to stay the enforcement of a summary judgment and writ of possession pending her appeal.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the respondent lender after finding no evidence to support the moving party's allegations of fraud.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-Macdonald test and dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm since loss of possession was a bargained-for consequence of default, and that the balance of convenience favoured the lender who had been deprived of its security for two years.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a personal guarantee signed by the individual defendant for the debts of his corporate vehicle export business.

The defendant had previously obtained an order setting aside a default judgment against him personally, limited to the defence of unconscionability.

At trial, the court applied the Uber framework and found no inequality of bargaining power or improvident bargain, noting the defendant was a sophisticated commercial actor who understood the terms and used the guarantee to continue operating on credit.

The court held the personal guarantee was not unconscionable and restored the default judgment of $243,313.97.

The parties made a joint application under s. 83.1 of the Provincial Offences Act for the trial to proceed by electronic method.

The self-represented accused, facing serious securities fraud charges, had relocated to the United Kingdom and sought to attend remotely to avoid financial strain and continue working.

The court denied the application, finding that the interests of justice and the requirements for a fair trial necessitated an in-person hearing due to the complexity of the charges, the volume of documentary evidence, and the need to assist the self-represented accused.

The moving party law firm sought an order requiring the self-represented appellant to post security for costs of his appeal regarding a settlement enforcement order.

The appellant had previously agreed to settle a fee dispute but later refused to sign the release, prompting a case conference judge to enforce the settlement.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious, noting that a settlement is binding even if the form of release is disputed.

As the appellant resided in Nevada and failed to demonstrate any assets in Ontario, the court ordered him to post $26,375.32 as security for costs and stayed the appeal pending compliance.

The moving party law firm sought an order requiring the self-represented appellant to post security for costs of his appeal regarding a settlement enforcement order.

The appellant had previously agreed to settle a fee dispute but later refused to sign the release, prompting a case conference judge to enforce the settlement.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious, noting that a settlement is binding even if the form of release is disputed.

As the appellant resided in Nevada and failed to demonstrate any assets in Ontario, the court ordered him to post $26,375.32 as security for costs and stayed the appeal pending compliance.

The moving party, a former paralegal, sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his application as abandoned.

The moving party filed his notice of application nine months after the HRTO decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish apparent grounds for relief because he provided insufficient evidence to show the HRTO's decision was unreasonable.

The court also noted the nine-month delay was unexplained.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory parenting order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as the responding party did not make submissions on costs.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order enforcing a settlement agreement in a construction lien dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 71(1) of the Construction Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The Court declined to traverse the appeal to the Divisional Court because the responding parties had failed to oppose the confirmation of the associate judge's report, meaning they must first seek leave in the Superior Court to extend the time to file a motion in opposition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant, who had four grouped appeals pending in the inmate appeal stream, brought a motion for leave to add a new ground of appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The proposed new claim targeted a different trial counsel than the one subject to an existing ineffective assistance claim that had already caused significant delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable explanation for the appellant's delay in raising the new claim and noting that allowing it would cause substantial further delay to the resolution of the already dated appeals.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs of $6,037.59 following a motion for interim spousal support where success was divided.

The applicant argued the respondent's litigation conduct was unreasonable, including making uncorroborated allegations of abuse.

The court noted the respondent's lack of corroborating evidence but also found the applicant's claim for 7.5 years of retroactive spousal support on a temporary motion to be unreasonable.

Given the divided success favouring the respondent and the conduct of both parties, the court dismissed the applicant's claim for costs.

The applicant sought property, support, and parenting orders following the breakdown of a nine-year common-law relationship.

The court found the applicant held a 50 percent beneficial interest in a home titled solely in the respondent's name, as she had contributed to the down payment and carrying costs from a joint account.

The court declined to impute a one-time capital gain to the respondent's income for child support purposes.

Retroactive child support was awarded from the date the respondent ceased paying the children's private school tuition, but the court declined to order retroactive contribution to the tuition itself, finding the private school expenses were neither necessary nor extraordinary given the post-separation financial circumstances.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a secure forensic psychiatric unit.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and that the detention order was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence from a psychological risk assessment and the treating psychiatrist, which indicated a continued moderate-to-high risk of violent recidivism and a need for a gradual transition into the community.