Amy J. Ohler

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (approximately 110 grams) and possession of proceeds of crime ($650), as well as his sentence of two years' less a day imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The main issue was whether the trial judge erred in relying on lay opinion evidence from a police officer to establish that untested substances found in a motel room were cocaine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence—including surveillance evidence, the presence of tested cocaine on co-occupants, the experienced officer's lay opinion, drug-related paraphernalia, and cash—it was open to the trial judge to conclude the substances were cocaine and that the appellant was in possession of them.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit fresh evidence after his guilty plea that would allegedly establish he was not the driver of the vehicle involved in the June 15, 2012 accident, and in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide affidavits from potential alibi witnesses and that his guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial judge's careful inquiry under section 606 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of five years' imprisonment less nine months' credit for restrictive bail conditions.

The appeal raised four grounds challenging the trial judge's disposition of a Garofoli application regarding the legality of a search warrant: whether the ITO established reasonable and probable grounds for a firearm offence, whether the trial judge erred in refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant, whether the conditions for a telewarrant were satisfied, and whether the CI's information was sufficiently corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 16-month global sentence imposed for trafficking in crack cocaine while on probation.

Although the sentencing judge initially misunderstood counsel's submission regarding the proposed sentence, the Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit given the nature of the offense, the quantity and type of drugs involved, and the breach of probation.

The sentencing judge appropriately declined to impose an unfit sentence to avoid adverse immigration consequences for the appellant.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and related offences arising from a jewellery store robbery, as well as his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal on conviction: that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence was equally consistent with him being a fence rather than a perpetrator; that the trial judge failed to provide a Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness; and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three grounds, finding that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported only one rational inference that the appellant was one of the two masked perpetrators, that the trial judge had properly considered the witness's credibility issues without requiring a formal caution in a judge-alone trial, and that the trial judge's factual findings were sound.

The court also found the 12-year sentence was fit.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery of a Cash in a Flash store on November 14, 2010, arguing that the jury's verdict was unreasonable because the video evidence was extremely poor and unreliable for identification purposes.

The trial judge had given strong warnings about the frailties of the video identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the video evidence had limitations, the totality of the evidence—including distinctive identifying details visible in multiple video recordings, photographic evidence, DNA evidence from a balaclava, and physical evidence recovered from the appellant's apartment building—provided a reasonable foundation for the jury's verdict.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 76 months for robbery, dangerous driving, and other offences, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his mental health issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the length of the sentence, noting the horrific circumstances of the home invasion robbery and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to recalculate pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio and to vary a non-communication order, permitting the appellant to communicate with his co-accused partner upon her written consent after her sentence expires.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained during a 'Mr. Big' undercover operation.

During the retrial, the Crown introduced highly prejudicial bad character evidence regarding a separate, severed murder charge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient, particularly regarding motive and confirmatory evidence, and failed to present the defence's position fairly.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

Representing himself, he argued through amici curiae that the trial judge erred by refusing to allow him to call three witnesses and by inadequately charging the jury on a potentially exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function regarding the witnesses, as the appellant refused to explain their relevance.

The court also held that the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on the appellant's statement that the first shot was a mistake.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant, a fuel delivery truck driver, was convicted of fraud and theft based on GPS and machine-generated delivery records suggesting he delivered fuel to a third party instead of his employer's customers.

He appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding the trial judge erred by failing to explain why potentially exculpatory signed delivery acknowledgements did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the GPS and delivery slip systems were time-synchronized, rendering the records unreliable.

The appellant was convicted of multiple fraud-related offences arising from a credit and debit card scheme.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of four former co-accused who had previously pled guilty based on agreed statements of fact implicating the appellant.

When these witnesses recanted their statements at trial, the trial judge admitted their prior statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework.

The appellant appealed, arguing the statements should not have been admitted and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statements met the test for threshold reliability, the Vetrovec warning failed to adequately explain to the jury the witnesses' strong motives to lie in their prior statements to obtain lenient sentences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a jury acquittal on a charge of second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing in a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on reflex and voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held there was no evidentiary foundation for a defence of involuntary reflex and that the impugned instruction was erroneous.

However, applying the governing standard for Crown appeals from acquittals, the court found no reasonable basis to conclude the error materially affected the verdict in light of the defence theory, the evidence, the overall charge, and the jury questions.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission dismissing his application under s. 144 of the Securities Act to set aside a settlement agreement.

The appellant argued the agreement should be set aside due to non-disclosure by Commission staff regarding an investigation into a key witness for breaching a cease trade order.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Commission's decision not to revoke the settlement was reasonable, as the undisclosed information would not likely have affected the outcome of the administrative proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.