Amy J. Ohler

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge improperly considered his propensity for violence during a Gardner hearing and mistakenly considered a previous conviction for assaulting his spouse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessment and confirming that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant was on probation for an offence related to the complainant, which was a valid aggravating factor.

The court found the sentence fit given the significant assault and substantial bodily harm.

The appellants, Salvatore Raia and Michael Vitello, appealed their convictions for conspiring to kidnap, sexually assault, and murder Mr. Vitello’s spouse.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of a key witness's credibility and reliability, and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was supported by extensive corroborative evidence.

Minor errors in the trial judge's reasons were deemed peripheral and without impact on the credibility assessment.

An appeal from a committal order for extradition to the United States.

The appellant challenged the committal judge's dismissal of a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of electronic devices.

The searches were authorized by warrants based on information from an iPhone examined and seized during U.S. Customs preclearance at Pearson Airport.

The Court of Appeal found that the examination of the iPhone violated section 8 of the Charter because it occurred after the appellant was detained.

The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new extradition hearing to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter and whether sufficient evidence remains for committal.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of a five-and-a-half-month-old child.

He appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the Crown and defence evidence.

The appellant did not dispute that the child died from intentionally applied significant force causing a fatal brain injury, nor that the child's body was covered in extensive bruising.

Only the appellant and the child's mother had the opportunity to cause the fatal injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny and was entitled to make the credibility findings and reach the decision she did.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping his friend after a judge and jury trial.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in her instructions on the actus reus of aiding and abetting by not emphasizing the need for actual assistance when reviewing the evidence; (2) the trial judge erred in failing to leave with the jury the included offence of "attempt to aid" a kidnapping; (3) the trial judge erred in not linking her W.(D.) instruction to the defence of duress; and (4) the trial judge erred in failing to correct Crown counsel's improper reference to hearsay evidence in closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and breaking and entering in the context of a home invasion.

He received seven and a half years: four and a half years for robbery, four and a half years concurrent for break and enter, and three years consecutive for use of an imitation firearm, which was also consecutive to four remaining years from a prior bank robbery conviction.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that sentences should be concurrent, that mitigating factors were not credited, that the parity principle was not applied with co-accused, and a constitutional challenge that was not pursued.

The court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning or sentencing.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years imposed for robbery and dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge should have imposed concurrent rather than consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach, which balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation prospects.

The court dismissed the appeal but set aside the $400 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and sexual assault of a police officer, as well as his sentence of time served.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to address the appellant's apparent intoxication in the context of the specific intent offence of break and enter.

Both counsel agreed to substitute a conviction for forcible entry contrary to s. 72(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's conviction for sexual assault was upheld as the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The victim fine surcharge was set aside on consent.

The appellant was convicted of internet luring of a person he believed to be under 16 years of age contrary to s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and transmitting sexually explicit material to a person he believed to be under 16 years contrary to s. 171.1(1)(b).

The latter count was conditionally stayed on the basis of R. v. Kienapple.

The appellant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and three years' probation, along with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly analyzed the evidence and rejected the appellant's testimony as unworthy of belief.

On the sentence appeal, the Court set aside the victim surcharge but upheld the weapons prohibition as mandatory under s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a jury on June 17, 2016.

The grounds of appeal raised only questions of fact as found by the jury, with no questions of law raised.

The appellate court found that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict and identified no grounds that would justify appellate intervention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault perpetrated over a lengthy period against his seven-year-old nephew and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as there was no basis in the record for the appellant's contentions that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant or that the complainant's testimony was coerced.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity and did not give appropriate weight to mitigating factors including the appellant's youth, absence of prior criminal record, prior victimization, and intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge had properly considered all relevant factors.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sentenced to 36 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on Charter grounds and contested the trial judge's findings regarding his status as a person in authority, the sexual purpose of the conduct, and alleged collusion among complainants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the custodial sentence.

However, the sentence appeal was partially allowed, with the court setting aside a ten-year weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge that were inconsistent with the trial judge's findings.

A lifetime SOIRA order was upheld as appropriate.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The appeal was granted on consent.

The court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $321,945.79 and increased the restitution order to the same amount.

The court further ordered that if the fine is not paid within ten years of the respondent's release from serving all current sentences, the respondent will be subject to a term of imprisonment of three years.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant was found in possession of 21.91 grams of heroin divided into four packages and pleaded guilty to possession but claimed it was for personal use.

The trial judge rejected this claim, finding that given the appellant's limited financial resources and addiction, he must have been trafficking to support his habit.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge made errors in principle by treating the absence of pro-social life factors as aggravating, considering outstanding domestic violence charges as aggravating, and failing to exercise restraint.

The appellate court agreed with two of the three errors but found the sentence was nonetheless fit and within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The appellant and victim, both in their mid-30s, engaged in a consensual fight with long-standing animosity between them.

During the altercation, the appellant struck the victim multiple times with a beer bottle, causing serious injuries to the victim's left hand requiring surgery.

The sentencing judge found the assault was not unprovoked and that the appellant caused all injuries.

The appellant had a difficult background with post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health issues, but the trial judge found these did not contribute to the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's approach and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following guilty pleas to several counts including robbery.

The original joint submission between Crown and defence was for 18 months, but defence counsel requested the sentencing judge impose two years to enable the appellant to access addiction assistance in a penitentiary.

The Crown consented to this request.

However, the appellant was not placed in a penitentiary but rather remained in a detention facility awaiting trial on another matter.

The Crown subsequently sought to have the original 18-month joint submission imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month sentence, while increasing the probation period to two years to further rehabilitation goals.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

The respondent, a legal assistant, admitted to providing non-public, confidential information regarding merger and acquisition transactions to another respondent over a four-year period, in breach of the Securities Act.

Staff and the respondent entered into a settlement agreement, which included significant credit for the respondent's cooperation with Staff's investigation against the non-settling respondents.

The Commission approved the settlement agreement, finding the reduced sanctions, which included a reprimand and market bans but no financial penalties, to be reasonable and in the public interest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and touching a minor for sexual purpose, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility and should have acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing witness evidence and credibility.

The appellant did not pursue the sentence appeal in oral argument.

The appeal was dismissed.