Amy J. Ohler

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sentenced to 36 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on Charter grounds and contested the trial judge's findings regarding his status as a person in authority, the sexual purpose of the conduct, and alleged collusion among complainants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and the custodial sentence.

However, the sentence appeal was partially allowed, with the court setting aside a ten-year weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge that were inconsistent with the trial judge's findings.

A lifetime SOIRA order was upheld as appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault perpetrated over a lengthy period against his seven-year-old nephew and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as there was no basis in the record for the appellant's contentions that the trial judge erred in believing the complainant or that the complainant's testimony was coerced.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity and did not give appropriate weight to mitigating factors including the appellant's youth, absence of prior criminal record, prior victimization, and intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge had properly considered all relevant factors.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the victim fine surcharge.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The appeal was granted on consent.

The court imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $321,945.79 and increased the restitution order to the same amount.

The court further ordered that if the fine is not paid within ten years of the respondent's release from serving all current sentences, the respondent will be subject to a term of imprisonment of three years.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant was found in possession of 21.91 grams of heroin divided into four packages and pleaded guilty to possession but claimed it was for personal use.

The trial judge rejected this claim, finding that given the appellant's limited financial resources and addiction, he must have been trafficking to support his habit.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge made errors in principle by treating the absence of pro-social life factors as aggravating, considering outstanding domestic violence charges as aggravating, and failing to exercise restraint.

The appellate court agreed with two of the three errors but found the sentence was nonetheless fit and within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The appellant and victim, both in their mid-30s, engaged in a consensual fight with long-standing animosity between them.

During the altercation, the appellant struck the victim multiple times with a beer bottle, causing serious injuries to the victim's left hand requiring surgery.

The sentencing judge found the assault was not unprovoked and that the appellant caused all injuries.

The appellant had a difficult background with post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health issues, but the trial judge found these did not contribute to the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's approach and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following guilty pleas to several counts including robbery.

The original joint submission between Crown and defence was for 18 months, but defence counsel requested the sentencing judge impose two years to enable the appellant to access addiction assistance in a penitentiary.

The Crown consented to this request.

However, the appellant was not placed in a penitentiary but rather remained in a detention facility awaiting trial on another matter.

The Crown subsequently sought to have the original 18-month joint submission imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month sentence, while increasing the probation period to two years to further rehabilitation goals.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and touching a minor for sexual purpose, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility and should have acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing witness evidence and credibility.

The appellant did not pursue the sentence appeal in oral argument.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He brought two applications for a stay of proceedings based on infringement of his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The first application was dismissed on September 25, 2015, and the second was brought following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Jordan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of both applications and dismissed the appeal against conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (approximately 110 grams) and possession of proceeds of crime ($650), as well as his sentence of two years' less a day imprisonment plus three years' probation.

The main issue was whether the trial judge erred in relying on lay opinion evidence from a police officer to establish that untested substances found in a motel room were cocaine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence—including surveillance evidence, the presence of tested cocaine on co-occupants, the experienced officer's lay opinion, drug-related paraphernalia, and cash—it was open to the trial judge to conclude the substances were cocaine and that the appellant was in possession of them.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit fresh evidence after his guilty plea that would allegedly establish he was not the driver of the vehicle involved in the June 15, 2012 accident, and in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide affidavits from potential alibi witnesses and that his guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial judge's careful inquiry under section 606 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of five years' imprisonment less nine months' credit for restrictive bail conditions.

The appeal raised four grounds challenging the trial judge's disposition of a Garofoli application regarding the legality of a search warrant: whether the ITO established reasonable and probable grounds for a firearm offence, whether the trial judge erred in refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant, whether the conditions for a telewarrant were satisfied, and whether the CI's information was sufficiently corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 16-month global sentence imposed for trafficking in crack cocaine while on probation.

Although the sentencing judge initially misunderstood counsel's submission regarding the proposed sentence, the Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit given the nature of the offense, the quantity and type of drugs involved, and the breach of probation.

The sentencing judge appropriately declined to impose an unfit sentence to avoid adverse immigration consequences for the appellant.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and related offences arising from a jewellery store robbery, as well as his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal on conviction: that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence was equally consistent with him being a fence rather than a perpetrator; that the trial judge failed to provide a Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness; and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three grounds, finding that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported only one rational inference that the appellant was one of the two masked perpetrators, that the trial judge had properly considered the witness's credibility issues without requiring a formal caution in a judge-alone trial, and that the trial judge's factual findings were sound.

The court also found the 12-year sentence was fit.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery of a Cash in a Flash store on November 14, 2010, arguing that the jury's verdict was unreasonable because the video evidence was extremely poor and unreliable for identification purposes.

The trial judge had given strong warnings about the frailties of the video identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the video evidence had limitations, the totality of the evidence—including distinctive identifying details visible in multiple video recordings, photographic evidence, DNA evidence from a balaclava, and physical evidence recovered from the appellant's apartment building—provided a reasonable foundation for the jury's verdict.