Amy J. Ohler

The appellant, Alain Joseph Boily, appealed a driving prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to criminal negligence causing death.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition under the amended s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, which no longer explicitly lists criminal negligence causing death as an offence attracting such a prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that despite the apparent legislative oversight and the resulting absurdity (where a less serious offence would attract a prohibition but a more serious one would not), the plain language of the statute did not grant the power to impose the prohibition.

The court emphasized that correcting such a legislative gap falls to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The appeal was allowed, and the driving prohibition was set aside.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant, C.J., appealed a conviction for voyeurism and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the conviction reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the factors considered by the trial judge.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to attempted murder, appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The original sentencing judge provided very brief and conclusory reasons for the designation, despite the appellant's consent.

The Court of Appeal found these reasons insufficient as they failed to explain why the criteria for the designation and indeterminate sentence were met, thus preventing proper appellate review.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for gross indecency and sexual assault, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Crown conceded several areas of counsel's incompetence, including failures to thoroughly investigate collusion among complainants, explore opportunity, challenge inconsistencies in testimony, and adequately prepare the appellant for trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the cumulative impact of these failures undermined the reliability of the verdict, particularly concerning the credibility of a key complainant and the application of similar fact evidence.

The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different with effective counsel.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but appealed his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the court should have relied on an expert opinion that expressed reservations about the designation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge's decision, noting that trial counsel had conceded the designation's appropriateness and no fresh evidence of ineffective assistance was presented.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's discretion to accept the opinion of another expert who found the appellant met the dangerous offender criteria.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought leave to appeal a 30-month sentence for aggravated assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered Gladue principles, even without a formal Gladue report, by relying on a s. 21 Mental Health Act report.

The court concluded the sentence was fit given the gravity and escalating nature of the offences and the appellant's history of failed rehabilitation and terrorizing the complainant.

The appellant, Courtney Foster, appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He was convicted of attempted murder of his wife and sentenced to a global term of 10 years, less 4 years pre-sentence custody, for a net sentence of 6 years.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not consider all arguments and the verdict was unreasonable, claiming he lacked the requisite intent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's finding of intent was amply supported by the record and the verdict was not unreasonable.

Regarding the sentence, the appellant argued it was too harsh and that the trial judge failed to apply appropriate "Duncan credit." The Court found no error in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and applied the correct Duncan credit.

The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed two appeals concerning the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) jurisdiction to conduct disposition review hearings by videoconference without the accused's consent during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant, found not criminally responsible (NCR), objected to a virtual hearing.

The ORB proceeded without consent and subsequently ordered her detention.

The Superior Court quashed the ORB's jurisdictional ruling via certiorari.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal of the certiorari order, affirming that the ORB lacked statutory authority under the Criminal Code to compel virtual attendance without consent.

It also allowed the applicant's appeal of the detention order, finding it void due to the ORB's violation of procedural rules (Rule 43.03(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules) by proceeding while a certiorari application was pending.

The court emphasized that the Criminal Code implies a right to physical presence unless consent is given for virtual attendance, and that the pandemic does not justify exceeding statutory jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery where a co-perpetrator shot and killed the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, circumstantial evidence, and by failing to answer a withdrawn jury question regarding the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge appropriately accepted the jury's decision to withdraw their question after they resolved it themselves.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to bank robbery, appealed the four-year sentence imposed by the trial judge, seeking a three-year sentence.

The appellant argued the sentencing hearing was fundamentally unfair due to the lack of an adjournment for a presentence report, despite his strong objection to any delay.

The Court of Appeal found no unfairness, noting the appellant's desire for immediate sentencing, his criminal record including prior bank robberies, and the trial judge's consideration of mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea and mental health issues.

The court concluded the four-year sentence was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence.

At trial, the judge rejected the testimony of a defence witness who claimed ownership of the firearm found in the car driven by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The sentencing judge erred by refusing to grant credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (lockdowns) despite agreement between the parties that such credit was warranted.

The Court granted 75 days of additional credit.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5000, fraud under $5000, and uttering a forged document after misappropriating over $350,000 from clients of her payroll services company.

She appealed her convictions and three-year custodial sentence, alleging errors in credibility findings, unauthorized changes to her mode of trial, unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, improper non-disclosure, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his three-year global sentence for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and breach of probation.

The appellant had sent hundreds of threatening messages of a sexually violent nature to his former domestic partner over two years, despite police warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for like offences and reflected the serious and aggravating features of the crimes.

On a pretrial application, the accused sought severance of counts relating to two complainants on a single indictment alleging sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual interference.

The court applied the interests of justice severance framework and held that, despite some moral prejudice concerns arising from one complainant's age and surrounding circumstances, the allegations were sufficiently connected in factual context and legal issues to support a joint trial.

The court further held that the Crown had a viable similar fact application because the allegations disclosed a strong and specific nexus, including unusual and distinctive features.

Balancing prejudice, trial fairness, efficiency, and the truth-seeking function of the process, the severance application was dismissed, with leave to renew if circumstances changed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation of a young person and sentenced to ten months' incarceration after sexually assaulting his partner's child during a massage.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's statements, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no significant inconsistencies, and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's position of trust.

The appellant, Christopher Dockery, appealed his five-year sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting enhanced credit for pre-trial custody spent in lockdown and by failing to assist him as a self-represented party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding enhanced credit, finding the sentencing judge properly exercised discretion under R. v. Duncan.

However, the appeal was allowed by consent of the Crown regarding the victim surcharge.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to ten years' incarceration, appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on claims of ineffective trial counsel, including failures in cross-examination, calling witnesses, eliciting expert opinion, and exploring photo tampering, as well as suggestions of improper discussions and conflict of interest.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and in identifying primary sentencing objectives inconsistent with Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis for incompetence and noting the strong Crown case supported by forensic evidence.

It also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred regarding remorse, it had no impact given other serious aggravating factors, and that deterrence and denunciation were appropriate objectives.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found that the complainant was incapable of consenting to sexual activity and that the appellant knew, was reckless, or was wilfully blind to the absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal held that the elements of the offence were made out on the evidence and that the sentence was fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.