Amy J. Ohler

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The central issue was whether the appellant's violent conduct was intractable and untreatable.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by ignoring a gap in his criminal record and by failing to consider his circumstances and the potential for intensive treatment in the federal penitentiary system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered all evidence, including the appellant's history of violence, treatment resistance, and lack of motivation, and reasonably concluded that there was no realistic prospect of controlling his risk to the public through less onerous means.

The appellant, Trayvon Boreland-Goode, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and possessing a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's handling of a juror's note regarding another juror's influence during deliberations, and the reliability of a Crown witness's testimony concerning vehicle ownership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to take the verdict without explicitly responding to the juror's note, as it did not involve a legal misapprehension and the verdict indicated the jury had resolved its internal difficulties.

The court also found the second ground of appeal, regarding the witness's memory of dates, to be without merit, as the crucial evidence of vehicle resale to the appellant was uncontradicted and supported the finding of constructive possession.

The appellant, Michael John William Ball, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's jury charge on two grounds: the standard of proof regarding the cause of death and the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in handling the jury's request to review expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court concluded that the jury charge, when considered holistically, adequately equipped the jury, and the Vetrovec warning fulfilled its purpose.

Furthermore, the trial judge's decision to cease playback of expert testimony upon the jury's indication that their questions were resolved was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the reviewed evidence was uncontroversial and did not require further contextualization.

The appellant, J.S., appealed convictions for sexual offences against three step-grandchildren and the imposed global sentence of 30 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to intervene.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed, reducing a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order to 20 years with the Crown's consent, and imposing conditional stays of proceedings on three sexual assault counts, without altering the overall 30-month sentence.

The appellant, Jorge Andres Pontigo, appealed his conviction for importing cocaine.

He was found with cocaine hidden in coffee bags at Pearson International Airport.

The trial judge disbelieved his testimony that he unknowingly took the wrong bag, finding he knew about the cocaine.

The appeal raised four grounds: failure to consider exculpatory receipts, error in finding tailored evidence, reversal of burden of proof, and misapplication of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first three grounds, finding no error.

While conceding the Browne v. Dunn error, the Crown argued it was harmless.

The Court agreed, applying the curative proviso, as the circumstantial case for knowledge was strong and the error did not impact the verdict.

The appellant, Doru Vasile Robas, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He argued that the trial Crown's closing address improperly suggested the Remington shotgun used in the killing was loaded with Remington shells, thereby undermining his credibility regarding the accidental discharge and his belief that the gun was empty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's argument was supported by ample evidence, including expert testimony that the shell remnants were "most likely" from a Remington shell, the appellant's own admission of using the Remington, and circumstantial evidence regarding other ammunition found.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the sentencing judge failed to sufficiently account for harsh presentence custody conditions and made other errors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge correctly considered the harsh conditions as a mitigating factor, resulting in a sentence at the low end of the range.

However, the court agreed with the appellant that he was improperly denied enhanced R. v. Summers credit for a 32-day period due to a missed court appearance, as his explanation was unchallenged.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted an additional 16 days of presentence custody credit.

The appellant, J.R., appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the touching of the complainant's leg to be of a sexual nature.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's legally and factually sound reasons.

The appellant also raised an issue regarding the complainant's age in institutional records, but the trial judge had already found that the complainant's age (under 18) was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

A publication ban order under ss. 486.4 or 486.6 of the Criminal Code remains in effect.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the relevance and permitted use of evidence relating to the accused's mental health when charging on the element of intent for murder.

The majority found no error in the trial judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Kasirer J. dissented, finding the jury charge adequate in light of all the circumstances.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision not to designate the respondent, who pleaded guilty to child pornography offences, as a dangerous or long-term offender.

The sentencing judge erred by requiring a "direct" or "root cause" of psychological harm for Serious Personal Injury Offence (SPIO) designation and by misinterpreting the risk of re-offending for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal clarified that child pornography offences can constitute SPIOs based on a broader causation standard and that the long-term offender criteria do not necessarily require a risk of violent re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was ordered.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the nine-month imprisonment sentence and three years probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by not properly considering denunciation and deterrence, and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite being at the lower end for the offence.

The appellants, U.K. and R.P., appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding fabrication as post-offence conduct and the application of the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury on fabrication of trial evidence without independent evidence, and by providing a deficient fabrication instruction that failed to distinguish between disbelieved and fabricated evidence, explain independent evidence, or require consideration of alternative explanations.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in the W.(D.) instruction by conflating the appellants' evidence and treating defence evidence as an all-or-nothing proposition.

These errors were deemed prejudicial, going to the heart of credibility assessment and the burden of proof.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso.

The appellant, convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident resulting in death, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded two errors by the sentencing judge: an 18-month probation period imposed without reasons for exceeding the Crown's 12-month position, and the failure to credit the appellant for 20 months and 21 days of pre-sentence driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal accepted these concessions, varying the probation and crediting the driving prohibition.

However, the appellant's argument that the remaining 5-year driving prohibition was excessive was rejected, as significant aggravating factors justified the sentence.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence imposed following a joint sentencing position for numerous firearm-related offences, arguing insufficient pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had given careful attention to the Duncan issue and had used the difficult circumstances of the appellant's pre-sentence custody as a strong mitigating factor, resulting in a lenient sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose a person under fourteen, and invitation to sexual touching of a person under fourteen.

The appeal concerned errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's and appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by improperly relying on "oath-helping" evidence (information not in evidence) to resolve a material inconsistency in the complainant's testimony regarding whether she touched the appellant's penis.

This error tainted the conviction for invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the conviction for invitation to sexual touching and ordering a new trial on that count, while dismissing the appeal from the conviction for sexual interference.

The appellant, Danny Correa, appealed his convictions for attempted sexual assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the intent required for attempted sexual assault, nor were the verdicts unreasonable or inconsistent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no material misapprehension of evidence or error in accepting the psychiatric risk assessment, despite a six-year gap in the appellant's offence history.

This is a conviction appeal where the appellant died during the appeal process.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abated.

The court accepted the Crown's submission and dismissed the appeal as abated, thereby upholding the original conviction.

The appellant, Alain Joseph Boily, appealed a driving prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to criminal negligence causing death.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition under the amended s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, which no longer explicitly lists criminal negligence causing death as an offence attracting such a prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that despite the apparent legislative oversight and the resulting absurdity (where a less serious offence would attract a prohibition but a more serious one would not), the plain language of the statute did not grant the power to impose the prohibition.

The court emphasized that correcting such a legislative gap falls to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The appeal was allowed, and the driving prohibition was set aside.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant, C.J., appealed a conviction for voyeurism and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the conviction reasonable and the sentence appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the factors considered by the trial judge.