William M. LeMay

The defendants, Aragon and the Town of Mono, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff engineering firm's claims for unpaid invoices and to discharge construction liens registered against their properties.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment regarding the unpaid invoices, finding that the limitation period issue required a trial.

However, the court granted the motion to discharge the construction liens, concluding that the liens had expired because the work performed within the 45 days prior to registration was administrative and deficiency-related, which does not extend the time for preserving a lien.

The Plaintiff sought leave to bring a Rule 30.10 motion for third-party records production from other banks, which the Defendant opposed.

The court found the Plaintiff's delay in bringing the motion unreasonable due to counsel's dilatory conduct in retaining and instructing an expert.

Despite the unreasonable delay and potential for further adjournment of the summary judgment motion, the court reluctantly granted leave to the Plaintiff to bring the motion on terms, including payment of costs to the Defendant, to avoid prejudicing the Plaintiff due to counsel's failures.

The defendants in multiple related actions brought motions for summary judgment against the Pichelli plaintiffs, who were investors in a real estate development project.

The plaintiffs alleged that the developers (the Vuletics), a title holder (Kegalj), and the developers' lawyers (the Adairs) engaged in fraudulent and improper conduct.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the Adair defendants, finding that the lawyers owed no duty of care to the non-client investors.

The court also granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against Kegalj, finding no relationship or duty owed to the plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the Vuletics' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of credibility and conflicting versions of the lot purchase agreements required a trial.

The appellant paid a $2,500 retainer to a lawyer on behalf of a third party.

When the third party revoked the lawyer's authorization to speak with the appellant, the appellant sued the lawyer and his firm in Small Claims Court for the return of the funds.

The Deputy Judge dismissed the claim under Rule 12 for disclosing no cause of action.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the dismissal, finding no contract existed between the appellant and the lawyer, and that the lawyer owed no duty of care to the appellant as a non-client third party.

This decision addresses multiple motions for directions in an estate dispute between two siblings, Brian Blanks and Carol Roberts, who are co-trustees and beneficiaries of their deceased father's estate.

Ms. Roberts, as a moving party, sought a formal investigation into the 2016 sale of the estate's house, alleging impropriety, fraud, and improvidence based on a series of coincidences and transactions.

She also moved to strike portions of Mr. Blanks' affidavit on various evidentiary grounds and sought to introduce new evidence.

The court dismissed Ms. Roberts' request for an investigation, finding no factual basis for fraud or improvidence and noting the prohibitive costs.

Her motion to strike Mr. Blanks' affidavit was largely denied, with only a minor portion related to settlement privilege being struck.

The court also denied her application to re-open the hearing to introduce new evidence, finding it would not affect the outcome and was discoverable earlier.

An immediate payment of an outstanding inheritance to a grandchild was ordered by consent.

Remaining issues, including the disposition of a Rolex watch and ring and the potential removal of a trustee, were deferred for a future hearing.

The court addressed a motion by Aviva Insurance Company of Canada regarding the sufficiency of answers to undertakings, under advisements, and refusals during discovery in an action alleging fraud against Tracey Brown.

Brown counterclaimed for defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court applied principles of proportionality and relevance, ordering Aviva to provide further answers and its deponent to re-attend discovery, while refusing some questions deemed vague or seeking legal opinions.

Case management directions for an upcoming pre-trial were also issued.

The plaintiff commercial tenant and defendant condominium corporation settled an action regarding the use of common spaces via minutes of settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to have the minutes of settlement issued and entered as a Court Order due to ongoing disputes.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the minutes contained an arbitration clause intended to resolve future disputes and explicitly required the action to be dismissed without costs.

The court directed that an assessment officer assess costs if the parties could not agree, as provided in the settlement.

The accused, Kamorey Mitchell, was charged with assault and aggravated assault following an altercation in a pub where the victim, Mr. Jason John, sustained significant facial injuries.

A third charge of uttering threats was dismissed by Crown counsel.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the assailant.

The court critically assessed the reliability of witness identification evidence from both the victim and a security guard, considering factors such as observation conditions, emotional state, time elapsed, and intervening factors that could taint identification.

The victim's identification was deemed unreliable due to chaotic circumstances, a vague initial description, a significant time gap, and inconsistent accounts of how information about the accused was obtained.

The security guard's identification, made nearly two years post-incident at trial, also raised reliability concerns.

The defense evidence, including the accused's denial and a friend's testimony, further contributed to reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the identity of the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all remaining charges.

This decision addresses several mid-trial issues in a civil action where the plaintiff, James Perreault, alleged harassment by the Peel Regional Police, including an improperly obtained search warrant.

The court ruled that Perreault could use evidence regarding the warrant's improper obtainment to support his existing claims of assault, battery, and general harassment, but could not introduce new torts like fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation due to limitation periods and insufficient pleadings.

The court upheld informer privilege, confirming it would not be breached as innocence was not at stake.

Regarding inadvertently disclosed information, the court ordered redaction of documents and the production of a redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) to protect the informant's identity while ensuring trial fairness.

Costs for the motion were reserved for the end of the trial.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for partial indemnity and proportionality.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct unnecessarily complicated the proceedings and that the principle of proportionality should not override the court's concerns about the plaintiff's conduct.

Costs were also awarded to a non-party.

The applicant father brought a motion for partition and sale of the matrimonial home, while the respondent mother brought a cross-motion for exclusive possession and interim child support (the latter adjourned by consent).

The court granted the applicant's motion for partition and sale, finding no basis for the respondent's claim for exclusive possession.

The court considered the financial positions of both parties, the history of alleged violence, and the best interests of the children, concluding that the respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence to deny the partition and sale, particularly regarding the impact on her home daycare business or the children's schooling.

Conditions were imposed on the sale to minimize disruption.

The defendants, Peter Gobrail and Hardscapes Interlock Design, brought a motion to transfer their action from Barrie (Central East Region) to Brampton (Central West Region).

The plaintiff, Basil Mkalaf, opposed the transfer.

The court, applying Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from Chatterson et al. v. M&M Meat Shops Ltd., found that Brampton was a "significantly better" venue.

The decision considered factors such as where the accident occurred, the residence of parties and witnesses, and the convenience of the court, outweighing the plaintiff's concerns about potential trial delays.

The motion to transfer to Brampton was granted on terms related to pre-trial scheduling.

The accused, charged with unlawful act manslaughter, brought multiple motions during their trial.

These included a motion to exclude the testimony of a lawyer, Mr. Sodhi, on the grounds that his evidence was tainted by a breach of an exclusion of witnesses order and late disclosure by the Crown.

They also sought, in the alternative, a mistrial, a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, and permission to call Crown counsel and an officer as witnesses.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the breach of the exclusion order to be minor and technical, the evidence not unduly tainted, no Charter breach affecting fair trial rights, no abuse of process warranting a stay, and no basis to call Crown counsel or re-examine the officer.

The court emphasized that alternative remedies, such as cross-examination and limiting instructions to the jury, were sufficient to address any concerns.

The accused, Prabhjeet Singh, brought a motion to exclude post-incident statements made by himself and Abhijeet Nagra to a relative of the deceased and their employer.

The statements allegedly minimized their involvement by claiming the air hose was applied to the deceased's legs rather than his anus, following an incident resulting in the deceased's death.

The Crown argued the motion was untimely and, alternatively, that the evidence was probative as it demonstrated the accused's knowledge of danger and attempt to minimize responsibility.

The court declined to dismiss the motion as untimely due to the accused's liberty interests but dismissed it on its merits, finding that the circumstances (video evidence, statements made to employer and next of kin) provided independent evidence of fabrication, making the statements admissible and relevant to the issue of assault.

This endorsement arises from a pre-trial conference in an action and counterclaim concerning a sub-licensing agreement.

The court, having previously dissolved an injunction and set a timetable, addressed the plaintiff's non-compliance with the established schedule.

The judge modified the timetable, ordering the plaintiff to serve and file a defence to the counterclaim and an Affidavit of Documents by October 1, 2018, and complete discoveries by December 1, 2018.

The court explicitly warned that failure to meet the October 1st deadlines would entitle the defendants to move for dismissal of the action and granting of the counterclaim due to delay.

The trial date remained unchanged, and the court noted an outstanding costs award needing prompt payment.

A further pre-trial was scheduled.

The plaintiff, Sam Cosentino, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim for the fifth time to add new transactions, some of which occurred more than two years prior to the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants, particularly given a pending summary judgment motion.

The court also determined that the new claims were barred by the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expired limitation period.

Additionally, the plaintiff's refusal to provide a blacklined pleading, as directed by the court, was noted.

The offender was convicted by a jury of three counts related to importing 198 grams of cocaine: possession for the purposes of trafficking, conspiracy to import, and conspiracy to possess for the purposes of trafficking.

Counsel for the offender sought a conditional sentence and challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code that preclude conditional sentences for these offences and set a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

The Crown sought 2.5 years incarceration and opposed the constitutional challenges.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenges, finding that the exclusion of conditional sentences was a reasonable legislative choice and that the maximum sentence of life imprisonment was not unconstitutional.

Considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of two years less a day on each count, with three days credit for pre-sentence custody.

The offenders, Romario Brissett and Devar Francis, were convicted by a jury of living off the avails of juvenile prostitution and exercising control over a minor for prostitution.

The Crown sought sentences of 2.5 years concurrent with 5 years for both.

The offenders sought 5 months consecutive or time served.

The court rejected the application of new mandatory minimums not in effect at the time of the offence and declined to apply the reasoning from R. v. Jackson regarding systemic racism for African-Canadian offenders due to lack of direct connection to the offenders' circumstances.

The court also rejected the argument for reduced sentences based on immigration consequences, finding the proposed sentences disproportionate.

Romario Brissett was sentenced to four years' incarceration, and Devar Francis was sentenced to three years' incarceration, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

In the context of two related actions involving a land banking business, the parties brought several preliminary motions before a scheduled summary judgment motion.

The moving parties (defendants in the first action) sought to bring a motion for security for costs, which the case management judge deferred until after the summary judgment motion due to delay and efficiency.

The responding parties (plaintiffs in the first action) brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the second action, arguing it was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that the discoverability of the alleged unlawful act conspiracy raised factual issues that could not be resolved on a Rule 21 motion.

Finally, the court made several specific orders regarding documentary production, applying the principle of proportionality.

The appellant appealed a final order setting child support and section 7 extraordinary expenses, as well as the trial costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the imputation of income to the respondent, the reduction of the appellant's child care costs, and the trial costs award.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part regarding the proportional sharing of ongoing and retroactive section 7 expenses, finding that the trial judge erred by using earning potential rather than actual income to determine the proportionate shares.

The issue of retroactive section 7 expenses was remitted to the trial judge for recalculation.