William M. LeMay

The applicant brought a motion to change a final order regarding custody and access.

The parties settled most issues, leaving the location of access exchanges and a proposed cap on section 7 expenses for the court to decide.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to escalating conflict and a peace bond against the respondent, ordering that access exchanges occur at a neutral location.

The court declined to cap the respondent's section 7 expenses, finding existing consent requirements provided sufficient protection.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) that granted the respondent reimbursement for non-emergency out-of-country hip surgery.

The surgery was performed before the General Manager issued a final decision denying the funding application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the HSARB unreasonably interpreted a request for further information as a denial of services.

Furthermore, the Court held that under the Health Insurance Act regulations, prior written approval from the General Manager is a mandatory prerequisite for reimbursement of non-emergency out-of-country medical services, and neither the General Manager nor the HSARB has the authority to retroactively approve such expenses.

The appellant father appealed a final order regarding child support and extraordinary expenses, including horseback riding and university tuition.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the motions judge's decisions on arrears, extraordinary expenses, university tuition, and costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent mother.

Carleton University sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Adjudicator's decision ordering the University to issue an access decision regarding records related to a survey of Jewish students and faculty.

The University argued the records were excluded from the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the 'research' exemption in s. 65(8.1)(a).

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the internal survey, aimed at assessing the campus climate, did not constitute 'research' for academic purposes or generalizable knowledge within the meaning of the exemption.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action under the Construction Lien Act after the plaintiff's lien expired.

The court considered whether it had discretion under section 46 of the Act to allow the underlying contract claim to continue despite the expiry of the lien.

Following appellate authority, the court found it had discretion to permit the contract action to proceed to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The court exercised its discretion to allow the action to continue on terms, finding no irremediable prejudice to the defendant and favouring the resolution of disputes on their merits.

In an ongoing assessment of a solicitor's costs, the client sought to introduce evidence of an allegedly improperly commissioned 2015 affidavit and the solicitor's counsel's disciplinary history in Tennessee to attack the solicitor's credibility regarding a 2008 affidavit.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, enforcing a prior agreement between the parties not to litigate the 2015 affidavit.

The court also found the evidence failed the test for similar fact evidence and its admission would be highly prejudicial as it would force the solicitor's counsel to become a witness and remove himself from the record.

The plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity basis following the resolution of two actions involving a loan for a car rental business.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a Mareva injunction and Norwich Orders after the defendants allegedly misappropriated the loaned funds.

The court found that the defendants engaged in reprehensible conduct by breaching court orders and attempting to resile from an agreement that the injunctions were properly granted.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity scale, but reduced the quantum to account for duplicative counsel, unrelated claims, and the appearance that resulted in the settlement.

Costs were apportioned between the two sets of defendants.

The applicants sought judicial review of a school board's decision to involuntarily transfer a Grade 12 student to a new school under its Fresh Start Policy following his involvement in an assault on another student.

The applicants argued the transfer was an unauthorized disciplinary measure, that they were denied procedural fairness, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the transfer was an administrative measure aimed at protecting the victim's well-being, not a disciplinary sanction.

The court also held that the procedural fairness owed was met and the superintendent's decision was reasonable.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for persistently failing to pay rent on time.

The tenant sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the Board erred in law by refusing to consider the landlord's conduct under section 82 of the Residential Tenancies Act and by denying her natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence as it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, as section 82 did not apply to a termination under section 58, and the Board had provided procedural fairness and properly exercised its discretion under section 83.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding he engaged in professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a 15-year-old patient.

The appellant argued the Panel misapprehended the evidence by failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, improperly considering post-incident conduct, and applying unequal scrutiny to the evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Panel's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The plaintiff operated a dry cleaning business under a sub-agreement with the defendants.

The defendants terminated the agreement and seized the business, prompting the plaintiff to obtain an ex parte injunction freezing the proceeds of the business sale.

On the motion to continue the injunction, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, as the claim was essentially for calculable damages and there was no evidence the defendants would dissipate assets.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The injunction was dissolved and a timetable for the action was set.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.

In a manslaughter trial involving three Punjabi Sikh accused, the defence brought a pretrial motion to determine the wording of a challenge for cause question to be put to the jury panel.

The court ruled that a general preamble was sufficient, rejecting a more detailed version proposed by the defence.

The court also held that the question should specifically identify the accused as Punjabi Sikhs, recognizing that prejudice may be triggered by outward manifestations of religious beliefs such as wearing a turban.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to not provide the question to prospective jurors in advance, preferring spontaneous answers.

The accused were charged with unlawful act manslaughter following a workplace incident where a co-worker was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose.

One of the accused brought a motion to admit expert evidence from an occupational health and safety expert regarding the hazards of compressed air and the need for workplace training.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence regarding domestic law was inadmissible, and the factual evidence lacked probative value and was unnecessary, as the objective standard for manslaughter does not require such specialized knowledge.

During a trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the defence sought to cross-examine the Crown's forensic pathology expert on a statement from a 1942 journal article regarding public perception of the dangers of compressed air.

The Crown objected.

Following a voir dire, the court ruled that the question could not be put to the expert.

The court found that public perception was outside the expert's area of expertise, the 1942 article was of limited reliability for assessing public knowledge in 2015, and the question had no probative value while carrying significant prejudicial effect.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

Family law trial following an international marriage that ended when the applicant unilaterally relocated the children from Qatar to Canada without the respondent's knowledge.

The court imputed income to both parties for support purposes, finding the applicant intentionally understated business income and the respondent was intentionally underemployed after opening a restaurant rather than pursuing her human resources career.

Retroactive child support was denied for the period when the applicant actively prevented access, but awarded from the date access resumed.

An equalization payment of approximately $412,000 was ordered after valuing multiple properties across five countries and currencies.

Spousal support was awarded on a needs basis at the low end of guidelines, given the respondent's education, skills, and support from a new partner.

Divorce was granted in Ontario despite competing proceedings in Qatar.

The applicant mother brought a motion to suspend the respondent father's access to their child and to set aside a parenting coordinator's arbitration award.

The mother had unilaterally withheld access following an alleged incident where the father pushed the child, though police and child protection services closed their investigations without action.

The parenting coordinator ordered the resumption of access and make-up time.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding no reliable evidence to justify suspending access and no reasonable apprehension of bias or procedural unfairness in the arbitration award.

The father's cross-motion to enforce the award and resume access was granted.

This decision addresses the costs for a three-day trial where the plaintiffs were largely successful.

The court considered the plaintiffs' Rule 49 offer to settle, which they argued triggered substantial indemnity costs, and the defendants' arguments against it, including the implied withdrawal of the offer by subsequent settlement discussions.

The court found that the plaintiffs' Rule 49 offer was not implicitly withdrawn by subsequent non-Rule 49 offers, distinguishing prior case law.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' claimed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing them due to excessive lawyer time, duplication of effort, and disallowing a specific disbursement for a legal opinion deemed unnecessary.

Ultimately, the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs $147,966.49 in costs.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee imposing an eight-month suspension for professional misconduct.

The appellant argued the penalty was unreasonable because the Tribunal erroneously found he admitted to touching the complainant's sensitive areas.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the admissions were not clear and unambiguous regarding sensitive areas.

The appeal was allowed, and the penalty was reduced to the four-week suspension already served.