William M. LeMay

Ernest Groh applied for a capacity assessment of his 81-year-old mother, Gabriella Grohotolski, and for the suspension of her attorneys' authority (Doris Steele and Joan F. Wolfe) and an order for them to pass accounts, alleging mismanagement.

Gabriella and the attorneys opposed, asserting Gabriella's capacity and proper management.

The court dismissed Ernest's application, finding no reasonable grounds to believe Gabriella was incapable and no evidence of improper management by the attorneys.

The Applicant, Noshakhare Ajayi, and Respondent, Beauty O. Oziegbe, were in a common-law relationship and jointly purchased a house.

Title was registered 99% to Oziegbe and 1% to Ajayi to shield the property from Ajayi's ex-wife.

The court found a resulting trust, entitling Ajayi to a 50% beneficial interest in the property.

The court also addressed claims for improper conversion of property and damages for tortious conduct (assault and criminal harassment) by Ajayi against Oziegbe.

Oziegbe was awarded $7,500 in damages for Ajayi's misconduct, but her request for a permanent restraining order was dismissed due to lack of ongoing credible fear.

The property was ordered to be listed for sale with adjustments for carrying costs, occupation rent, converted property, and damages.

The parties, former common-law partners, sought interpretation and enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement concerning the buyout of their shared veterinary and fitness businesses.

The applicant sought interest, damages, and costs due to delayed financing, while the respondent sought reductions for alleged undisclosed debts (HST, snow clearing, advertising, bad debt) and accounting/legal fees.

The court dismissed most claims from both parties, finding that the respondent was responsible for business accounts payable and that the delay in financing was attributable to both parties' actions regarding financial records.

The applicant was granted interest as per the original consent order, but no additional damages or costs.

The respondent's claims for deductions and professional costs were dismissed.

Following the plaintiff's successful resistance of the defendants' motion to transfer the action from Toronto to Brampton, the court determined costs.

The plaintiff had offered to consent to the transfer on a without-costs basis, but the defendants aggressively sought costs regardless.

The court found the plaintiff's opposition reasonable given the defendants' stance and awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $1,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a successful motion brought by the Defendant to set aside an ex-parte injunction and Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) previously granted to the Plaintiffs.

The Defendant sought costs of $12,943.07, while the Plaintiffs argued for no costs, citing the necessity of the injunction, original harm, and a reasonable offer to settle.

The court found the Defendant was entirely successful in the underlying motion and was entitled to costs.

However, the court deemed the Defendant's requested costs excessive for a straightforward motion and awarded $7,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements, rejecting the Plaintiffs' arguments against costs and their offer to settle as insufficient to reduce the award.

The respondent fell while stepping onto a deck at the appellants' home and sued for negligence.

The trial judge found the appellants 65% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act because the deck step was higher than standard, and also noted a breach of the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, finding the trial judge erred by failing to analyze whether the deck height created an objectively unreasonable risk of harm and by failing to make any finding that the deck height actually caused the fall.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent's claim was dismissed.

This decision addresses an application by Nanaksar Satsang Sabha of Ontario (the Gurdwara) for the production of files from four law firms involved in prior litigation.

The central issue was the effect of a solicitor's lien on production requests, particularly concerning the validity of the lien when a solicitor withdraws from the record without cause or when the limitations period for fee recovery has expired.

The court ordered all four firms to produce their files.

It found that Teplitsky Colson LLP did not have a valid solicitor's lien because it initiated its removal from the record without demonstrating cause.

For Gray Whitley van der Valk, production was ordered with specific terms to preserve the value of its claimed lien until the resolution of the underlying fee dispute.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Milton, arguing that the case had no connection to Barrie other than the plaintiff's counsel being located there.

The plaintiff opposed the transfer, citing significant prejudice due to the potential loss of an imminent trial date in Barrie.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, finding that while Milton would normally be a more appropriate venue based on the location of the accident and parties, the impending trial date and the defendant's dilatory conduct in bringing the motion and completing expert reports were overriding factors.

The court also confirmed the ongoing issues with court facilities in Milton, which favour leaving the action in Barrie.

The parties, involved in family litigation for over a decade, resolved all issues except costs through minutes of settlement.

The Applicant sought full indemnity costs of $141,489.86, citing the Respondent's non-compliance with disclosure orders, delays due to frequent counsel changes, and failure to pay previous cost awards.

The Respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $18,590.76, arguing he was more successful on property valuation and income, and that his settlement offers were reasonable.

The court found the Respondent's conduct unreasonable, particularly regarding disclosure and unpaid costs, but rejected the Applicant's claim of bad faith.

Considering the mutual compromise in settlement and the excessive amount claimed by the Applicant, the court awarded the Applicant $40,000.00 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, in addition to previously unpaid awards.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Bielby J., which directed her to pay $10,221.40 to the respondent following a motion addressing access issues.

The applicant argued that the motions judge erred in assessing her offer to settle, misapplied legal principles, and made a disproportionate costs award.

Applying the two-part test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (applicable via Family Law Rules), the court found no conflicting decisions on matters of principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order.

It noted that costs awards are discretionary and should only be set aside for errors in principle or if plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The Defendant brought a motion to set aside an ex-parte injunction and a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) that the Plaintiffs had obtained against a property.

The Plaintiffs alleged an agreement to purchase the property from the Defendant, which the Defendant denied.

The court, conducting a de novo hearing, dissolved the injunction and ordered the removal of the CPL.

The court found that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the three-part test for an injunction, particularly regarding irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

For the CPL, the court determined that the Plaintiffs' claim for specific performance lacked merit, as there was insufficient evidence of a written agreement under the Statute of Frauds and no demonstration of the property's uniqueness to warrant specific performance over damages.

The defendants, Terence and Koshini Maisuria, brought a motion to transfer a motor vehicle action from Toronto to Brampton.

They argued that the accident occurred in Brampton and all individual parties resided there.

The plaintiff, Candace Powell, opposed the transfer, asserting that Toronto had sufficient connections and that the moving parties failed to demonstrate Brampton was a "significantly better" venue.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that while Brampton had some factors in its favour, it was not "significantly better" than Toronto, which the plaintiff had reasonably chosen.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a renewed motion closer to trial if circumstances changed.

This is a family law case concerning the final determination of custody, access, and financial issues for two children, Sierra and Ethan, following a ten-day trial and a review of interim orders.

The court addressed ongoing parental conflict, specific incidents involving the children and extended family, and the children's academic progress and relationships with each parent.

The judge made final orders for sole custody of Sierra to the Applicant and sole custody of Ethan to the Respondent, with adjusted access schedules and continued reunification counselling.

The court also provided directions for resolving outstanding financial issues and declined to revisit previous factual findings.

The plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order of a Master to the Divisional Court instead of a single judge of the Superior Court.

The defendant successfully moved to quash the appeal, and the plaintiff's motion to extend time to appeal was dismissed.

In this costs endorsement, the court awarded the defendant full indemnity costs for the motion to quash, noting the plaintiff pursued the wrong appellate route despite repeated warnings.

The court also awarded partial costs for the motion to extend time, fixing total costs at $7,497.49.

The defendant successfully brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's appeal of an interlocutory order and successfully resisted the plaintiff's motion to extend the time to appeal.

The court awarded the defendant full indemnity costs of $5,997.49 for the motion to quash, finding the plaintiff's pursuit of the appeal in the wrong forum was entirely unnecessary despite repeated warnings.

The court also awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $1,500.00 for the motion to extend time, noting efficiencies between the two interrelated motions.

The accused was convicted by a jury of importing 3.9 kg of opium.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, finding that the accused had actual knowledge of the opium and was a principal in the importation scheme, not merely a courier.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, distinguishing the case from others based on the accused's role and lack of significant mitigating personal circumstances.

A sentence of five years imprisonment was imposed, along with a weapons prohibition, victim surcharge, DNA order, and forfeiture order.

The Applicant sought to remove the Respondent's counsel, Mr. Salvatore Mannella, from the record, alleging he was a key witness regarding the Respondent's alleged non-disclosure in a previous separation agreement proceeding and had intimate knowledge of family businesses.

The Respondent opposed, arguing privilege, availability of evidence from other sources, and prematurity.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion, emphasizing the reluctance to interfere with choice of counsel, the privileged nature of the information sought, and the availability of alternative disclosure methods.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action, which was subsequently set aside by a Master.

The plaintiff appealed the Master's order to the Divisional Court, arguing it was a final order.

The defendant moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory and the appeal lay to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to extend the time to appeal to a single judge.

The court held that an order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, quashed the appeal, and denied the extension of time because the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the Master had no jurisdiction to vary a prior judge's peremptory order.

The Plaintiff appealed a Master's order setting aside a default judgment to the Divisional Court, believing it to be a final order.

The Defendant moved to quash this appeal, arguing the Master's order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The Plaintiff also brought a cross-motion to extend the time for appeal to a single judge, should the initial appeal be quashed.

The court determined that an order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal to the Divisional Court was improper.

The court quashed the Plaintiff's appeal and denied the cross-motion for an extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal as the Master correctly lacked jurisdiction to vary a judge's peremptory order.