William M. LeMay

The plaintiff sued his former solicitors for negligence.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action due to the plaintiff's considerable delays and non-compliance with court orders, including a consent order.

The plaintiff argued that dismissal was a draconian remedy and that non-compliance resulted from solicitor inadvertence and a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that dismissal was not yet justified given the preference for deciding cases on their merits and the plaintiff's substantial, albeit late, compliance.

However, the court imposed strict terms and a timetable for the plaintiff to advance the action, emphasizing it was a "last chance."

Following a seven-day construction lien trial where the plaintiff recovered a modest amount but the defendants succeeded on the key issue of defective workmanship, the court determined costs.

Both parties had advanced unreasonable positions at times, but the plaintiff's initial intransigence and failure to acknowledge obvious deficiencies were significant factors.

The court awarded the defendants $15,000 in costs, to be set off against the plaintiff's trial judgment.

The plaintiff bank loaned the defendant funds to purchase a motorhome.

The defendant left the title in the dealership's name to obtain fleet insurance rates.

The bank failed to properly register its security interest under the PPSA due to a typographical error.

When the dealership went bankrupt, the motorhome was sold and the defendant stopped making loan payments.

The bank sued for the outstanding debt and moved for summary judgment.

The defendant counterclaimed, arguing the bank failed to mitigate its damages by not perfecting its security interest.

The court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding no obligation on the bank to register the security, and noting that mitigation does not apply to an action for a fixed debt.

The plaintiffs and defendants brought competing motions in an underlying real estate dispute regarding mould.

The plaintiffs sought to strike the defendants' statement of defence, arguing the defendants breached a prior order requiring them to seek leave before bringing further motions.

The defendants moved to set aside a notice of garnishment, which the court treated as a request to stay enforcement pending various applications for leave to appeal.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding the prior order did not apply to motions for leave to appeal.

The court also dismissed the defendants' motion, finding they failed to establish a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm to justify a stay of enforcement.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowners for the unpaid balance of a contract to build the shell of a log home, registering a construction lien against the property.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging numerous construction deficiencies, incomplete work, and Building Code violations.

After a seven-day trial involving multiple expert witnesses, the court found that the plaintiff had breached the contract through poor workmanship and unauthorized deviations from the plans.

The court reduced the plaintiff's claim by the cost of necessary repairs and awarded the defendants damages for delay, resulting in a net judgment for the plaintiff of $30,595.63.

The applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was previously dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $9,698.28 on a partial indemnity basis, arguing the applicant raised numerous complicated grounds of appeal.

The applicant argued for a lower amount based on proportionality and a purported standard maximum of $3,500 for leave applications.

The court rejected the standard maximum, finding the application was more complex than a standard leave application due to the 15 to 17 grounds of appeal raised.

Costs were fixed at $6,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The Plaintiff, Elizabeth Samuel, brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property she had previously transferred to the Defendant, Omotayo Ore Muti, which was subsequently mortgaged to Wolfson Law Professional Corporation.

The Plaintiff sought to enforce an agreement to repurchase the property.

The court granted the CPL, finding a triable issue regarding the Plaintiff's interest in the land and that the equities favored registration, despite concerns about the Plaintiff's diligence and compliance with prior orders.

The court also expressed concerns about the non-arms-length nature of the mortgage transaction between the Defendant and his former lawyers, Wolfson Law.

This endorsement fixes costs for a dismissed application for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The respondent sought costs of $9,698.28, while the applicant argued for a lower award based on proportionality and the ongoing trial merits.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the respondent entirely successful, noted the complexity introduced by the applicant's 15-17 grounds of appeal, and considered the applicant's conduct in raising irrelevant issues.

Rejecting a standard maximum for leave to appeal costs, the court awarded the respondent $6,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order made at a Trial Management Conference that imposed conditions, including costs for a supplementary report, on the late filing of his expert report.

The applicant had breached a previous order setting deadlines for expert reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the procedural order, which was within the motion judge's jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision by Snowie J. which imposed orders due to the applicant's late expert report.

The original decision imposed conditions for filing the late report, including costs and potential trial adjournment.

The applicant argued procedural unfairness, exceeding jurisdiction, and mischaracterization of costs as interim disbursements.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no procedural unfairness or bias.

The court clarified that the costs ordered were for "costs thrown away" due to non-compliance, not interim disbursements, and that Snowie J. acted within her authority under the Family Law Rules.

The Plaintiffs moved to strike the Defendants' Statement of Defence for repeated non-compliance with court orders and failure to deliver a proper Affidavit of Documents.

The court found the Defendants' explanations for delay unacceptable, particularly regarding the late production of hundreds of additional documents and their counsel's inappropriate conduct.

While acknowledging strong grounds to strike the defence, the court deemed it a draconian remedy and instead dismissed the motion on strict terms.

These terms included the Defendants paying $12,500 in substantial indemnity costs for wasted discovery, serving properly sworn and complete Affidavits of Documents, and consenting to case management.

The court also recommended the appointment of a case management judge due to the case's complexity, protracted delays, and ongoing communication issues between parties.

The parties settled a motion for the return of a financed Case Machine but could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $19,167.64, while the defendant argued for costs in his favour or that each side bear its own costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, including the importance of the issues, the conduct of the parties, and the offers to settle.

The court found the defendant's conduct unnecessarily complicated the matter but also noted the plaintiff failed to name all relevant parties.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs fixed at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following competing motions regarding the jointly owned matrimonial home, both parties sought costs.

The respondent had successfully moved to refinance the property, while the applicant's motion for immediate partition and sale was dismissed.

The court found that the applicant acted unreasonably by attempting to resile from a prior agreement regarding the refinancing.

The respondent was awarded costs fixed at $3,500.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning to Canada from Jamaica with a suitcase containing over two kilograms of cocaine hidden in a false bottom.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused knew she was importing a controlled substance.

The accused testified that she was a 'blind courier' who had been given the suitcase by her boyfriend to transport fish and fruit, unaware of the hidden drugs.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court did not believe the accused's testimony but found that the evidence as a whole, including her lack of sophistication and the circumstantial evidence, left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiff subcontractor moved for summary judgment for $166,063.92 owed by the defendant contractor on a completed construction project.

The defendant admitted the debt but refused to pay, claiming a right of set-off under section 12 of the Construction Lien Act due to an unliquidated $1.2 million counterclaim against the plaintiff arising from a separate, ongoing project.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, holding that section 12 permits a trustee to retain trust funds against unproven claims from other projects, provided the funds are segregated.

The court ordered the action consolidated with the ongoing litigation regarding the other project.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision denying summary judgment on a promissory note and ordering further documentary production.

The underlying dispute involved allegations of forgery and cash payments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the conflicting evidence required a trial.

The court also dismissed the application for leave to appeal the costs order.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing her motion for summary judgment on a promissory note and ordering further documentary production.

The underlying action involved allegations of forgery and conflicting evidence regarding repayment of a loan.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the credibility issues required a full trial.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.

The applicant father and respondent mother both sought reconsideration of the court's previous calculation of the child's hockey expenses.

The applicant also sought production of the respondent's bank and credit card statements, which the court dismissed as untimely and likely to cause undue delay.

The court set a timetable for written submissions on the recalculation of hockey expenses.

Additionally, the court ordered the respondent to produce specific documentation regarding the child's attendance at a private academy to determine whether the child remains a full-time student for the purposes of child support.

The applicant sought clarification and amendments to a previous decision regarding child support arrears and section 7 expenses.

The court adjusted the arrears calculations for 2014 and 2016 to reflect actual payments made.

The court also reviewed the respondent's claimed hockey expenses, finding them reasonably incurred, but deducted a previously undisclosed refund.

Finally, the court determined that the parties' adult child remained a child of the marriage entitled to support while attending a private academy full-time for high school academic upgrading.

In the context of a family law dispute, the applicant brought a contempt motion against the respondent's former lawyers for allegedly receiving funds in breach of a Mareva injunction.

Both the applicant and the alleged contemnors brought motions for documentary production.

The court held that because contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding, the alleged contemnors are not subject to the automatic disclosure obligations of the Rules of Civil Procedure and have a right against self-incrimination.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for an affidavit of documents but granted a preservation order against the lawyers.

The court also ordered the applicant to produce relevant communications to the alleged contemnors to allow them to make full answer and defence.