Susan E. Lang

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences for acting as the getaway driver in an armed jewellery store robbery.

At trial, the Crown introduced hearsay evidence from the deceased store owner, who had previously testified at a co-accused's sentencing hearing and identified the appellant as having visited the store the day before the robbery.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting this hearsay evidence and failing to properly instruct the jury on its frailties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence met the principled exception tests of necessity and reliability, and the jury instructions were adequate.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder.

They argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, pointing to an intervening act where the victim's colleague opened fire on them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that evidence of prior communication, arriving in a convoy, rushing the victim while armed, and the nature of the attack provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, disguise with intent, and possession of an imitation firearm, and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine his mother, an alibi witness, on a prior false police report, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination was generally permissible but the jury instructions were inadequate.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day to reflect the youthful offender's excellent prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in denying the enhanced credit, noting the appellant served his pre-trial custody in segregation at his own request and had not engaged in rehabilitative programs.

The court upheld the sentence length given the offender's extensive record and high risk of re-offending.

However, based on a concession by the Crown, the court varied the parole eligibility period to half of the balance of the sentence imposed.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder and her thirteen-year parole ineligibility period for shooting and killing her former husband during a child custody dispute.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence because the appellant's actions were not sudden and she had time for her passion to cool.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The respondent was convicted of sexual assault against a child and received a conditional sentence.

The trial judge refused the Crown's request for a DNA databank order and a sex offender registry order, reasoning that the respondent did not present an ongoing risk to the community.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the 'grossly disproportionate' test required by the Criminal Code and by minimizing the public interest in registration.

The Court set aside the trial judge's refusal and made the requested orders.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application regarding a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the accused on charges of aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The charges related to injuries suffered by the accused's infant children.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence and impermissibly weighed competing inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the certiorari judge's conclusion that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence and engaged only in the limited weighing permissible for circumstantial evidence at a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The applicant brought a motion to compel a proposed witness, a former Crown attorney who had since been appointed to the bench, to be examined orally before a special examiner regarding his affidavit.

The Crown and the proposed witness argued for written interrogatories.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that oral examination was in the interests of justice to effectively test the reliability of the witness's memory without impairing his current judicial role.

The Crown moved for an order permitting it to file an extended factum and appointing amicus curiae in an appeal.

The respondent opposed the appointment of amicus and argued he had been deprived of his trial files.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, allowing an extended factum of 42 pages for both parties, and appointed amicus curiae due to the complexity of the record.

The Court also directed that the respondent be provided with his files and scheduled a case management hearing to set timelines for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption under s. 348(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to find the requisite intent, as the appellant broke into an apartment but left after thirty seconds without committing an offence.

The appellant argued that leaving without committing an offence constituted 'evidence to the contrary' to displace the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the intent is ascertained at the point of entry and that merely failing to commit an offence inside does not constitute evidence to the contrary, as this would render the statutory presumption meaningless.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he merely held his hand over the complainant's face in response to a racial slur and that she did not suffer bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that evidence of swelling, cuts, bleeding, and headaches was sufficient to constitute bodily harm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the two-year sentence was at the high end of the range, it was justified by the appellant's egregious record for assaulting women.

Following an appeal in which the respondent was largely successful, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent.

The costs were fixed at $3,500, inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.

The appellant was pulled over for driving without illuminated tail lights and subsequently arrested for attempting to mislead police about his identity.

Upon arrest, police discovered he was wearing two bulletproof vests and searched his vehicle, finding a semi-automatic pistol and a revolver.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the firearms under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach, concluding the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the conviction, including the appellant's admission of drinking and blacking out, the odour of alcohol, and the circumstances of the collision with a bus.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

She argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that he improperly rejected her evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review.

The court held that the surveillance evidence corroborated the Crown's evidence, supporting the conclusion that the appellant was selling cocaine from her apartment and possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and applying the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient for appellate review.

The trial judge properly rejected the appellant's evidence that he was invited to a stranger's apartment for consensual sex, and correctly applied the framework from R. v. W.D. without reversing the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing the application judge erred in declining to address his constitutional arguments and in finding he had not shown an inability to pay support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not collaterally attack the constitutionality of the law applied to strike his pleadings in prior proceedings or the support order itself, which had already been unsuccessfully appealed.

The Court also found the record supported the application judge's conclusion regarding the appellant's ability to pay.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal, having reviewed a full Gladue report, granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence to time served (approximately 5 months) followed by probation.

The appellant, a senior labour relations employee for the City of Hamilton, appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action.

The trial judge found that the appellant engaged in personal and sexual harassment of a colleague, as well as retaliation, conflicts of interest, abuse of authority, and insubordination.

The Court of Appeal applied the contextual approach from McKinley v. BC Tel and upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the cumulative effect of the appellant's misconduct, particularly given his senior role and responsibility for workplace policies, justified his termination without notice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.