Susan E. Lang

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of fraud under $5,000 arising from his computer business, where he accepted cash from customers for computer systems that were never delivered.

He argued the findings of guilt were unreasonable because there was no evidence of the requisite mens rea for fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence capable of supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant took the money knowing he could not or would not produce the goods.

The young person pleaded guilty to first degree murder and using a firearm during the commission of an indictable offence.

He was sentenced to an intensive rehabilitative custody sentence (IRCS) based on a joint submission, receiving only three months credit for 17.5 months of pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, he argued the youth court judge erred in deferring the weapons sentence and failing to give full credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge intended the custodial portions to be served continuously and had discretion to reduce pre-sentence credit below a one-to-one ratio in exceptional cases involving joint submissions.

The respondent was convicted at trial of prowling at night after being found hiding in a residential backyard.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown must prove the respondent intended to commit a specific evil act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, clarifying that section 177 of the Criminal Code only requires proof of intentional prowling (stealthy traversing) without lawful excuse, and does not require proof of an underlying intent to commit a further specific offence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable buy/sell agreement for shares at a pre-determined price of $500,000.

The appellants also appealed the dismissal of claims for oppression, wrongful dismissal, and an outstanding shareholder loan.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings, noting the decision was fact-driven and supported by evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice refusing to extend the time for compliance with a previous court order.

The Court of Appeal found no ground to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant sued an Assistant Crown Attorney for defamation after the respondent provided incorrect information about the appellant's criminal record to another Crown Attorney during a bail hearing.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the action was statute-barred and protected by qualified and absolute privilege, with no evidence of malice to defeat the privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial regarding malice and that absolute privilege applied to communications made in respect of court proceedings.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the identification evidence or in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the concealed weapon charge.

However, the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in applying s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Given the time already spent in custody, house arrest, and community service, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to time served and striking out the probation order.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application for spousal support and declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that leave is not required to appeal a vexatious litigant order itself.

On the merits, the Court set aside the vexatious litigant order because the appellant was not given a fair hearing on the issue.

However, the Court upheld the summary dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding no genuine issue for trial given the lack of evidence of economic disadvantage or need arising from the marriage.

The respondent obtained summary judgment against the appellant for unpaid goods.

The appellant sought a stay of the judgment pending the determination of its counterclaim for damages related to a previous delivery of allegedly defective goods.

The motion judge refused the stay, finding the claims were not closely connected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge misapprehended the evidence, as the claims were closely connected through ongoing negotiations.

A stay was granted on the condition that the appellant pay the judgment amount, interest, and estimated trial costs into court.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant at trial, appealed the dismissal of his application to vary spousal and child support.

At trial, he attempted to introduce a notarized letter regarding his income, which was rejected as hearsay.

The trial judge refused his request for an adjournment to call the author of the letter as a witness and drew an adverse inference from the failure to call the witness.

The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge should have granted a reasonable adjournment to allow the self-represented appellant to fairly present his case.

A new trial was ordered.

Following the dismissal of both the appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought $2,777.15 for the costs of transcripts.

The respondent opposed, arguing not all transcripts were necessary and that he had borne the cost of some.

The Court of Appeal ordered the parties to bear their own costs, citing divided success and the issues raised on the appeal and cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its summary judgment motion and its appeal of a land transfer tax assessment by the Minister of Finance.

The dispute involved whether a transfer of land under a power of sale constituted a transfer from a trustee to another trustee, which would reduce the tax payable.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly dismissed the summary judgment motion but erred in dismissing the appeal itself, as the factual context, beneficial ownership, and statutory interpretation required a full trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court refusing an extension of time to appeal his conviction.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to demonstrate a timely intention to appeal or provide an adequate explanation for the six-month delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in this decision, noting the appellant's affidavit lacked specific evidence of an intention to appeal within the 30-day period or an adequate explanation for the delay.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment interpreting the spousal support provisions of a marriage contract.

The contract required spousal support to be varied annually based on the greater of the proportional change in the husband's employment income or his total income from all sources.

The trial judge interpreted this to mean the greater proportional change, whether positive or negative, which could result in the wife receiving no support if the husband ceased employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the variation provision must be interpreted in the context of the entire contract and the parties' intentions, meaning the variation should provide the wife with the greater amount of support.

The appeal regarding the minimum support provision was dismissed.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision refusing to enforce its 'no pets' policy against the respondent.

The respondent had lived in her unit with her cat for over 10 years, during which time maintenance personnel had been in her unit.

The appellant only decided to step up enforcement in 2004.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it would be inequitable to grant a compliance order given the long period of non-enforcement.

The appellant, a 61-year-old middle manager with 32 years of service, appealed a trial judgment regarding his wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge had discounted his damages, finding he failed to mitigate by not seeking lower-level employment such as a crossing guard.

The Court of Appeal held this was a reversible error, as the appellant's obligation was to seek comparable employment.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in the notice period, increasing it to the high end of the range at 24 months, plus benefits.

Claims for further augmentation due to bad faith were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding no liability on the part of the respondents for personal injuries sustained when the appellant fell down stairs at a house under construction.

The appellants argued that the trial judge interfered excessively during the appellant's testimony, compromising trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's extensive and leading questions on core issues of liability and credibility crossed the line into participation in the litigation.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The wife appealed and the husband cross-appealed a variation judgment concerning child and spousal support.

The trial judge had imputed an annual income of $175,000 to the husband, varied child support retroactively to the implementation of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, fixed arrears, and dismissed the wife's application to extend spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, including the imputed income and arrears calculations.

The Court also rejected the husband's claim of judicial bias, concluding the trial judge's interventions did not usurp the role of counsel or raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding the respondents were entitled to a final payment under a Customer Agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the building was 'complete and ready for occupancy' within the required 24-month period.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that an occupancy permit was required, noting the Building Code Act does not mandate one as a condition of occupancy and the unilaterally imposed agreement terms did not explicitly require it.

The appeal regarding prejudgment interest and costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of two witnesses used to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding the fresh evidence would not have affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility.