Susan E. Lang

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his 15-month sentence.

He argued he should have been convicted of theft, as he only handed a note to a bank teller while disguised.

The Court of Appeal upheld the robbery conviction, finding an implicit threat of violence in his disguise and conduct.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider a conditional sentence for a first-time offender with a favourable pre-sentence report, especially given a co-accused's lighter sentence.

The 15-month sentence was converted to a conditional sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearm possession offences.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a sentence of time served (11 months).

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed an additional nine months of incarceration.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to explain why the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and by not affording counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

He argued there was no evidence of the mens rea for first-degree murder adduced at the preliminary inquiry and that he should have been committed for manslaughter only.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty for first-degree murder, including evidence that the appellant continued to drive the taxicab while the victim was forcibly confined and assaulted, and later made statements implicating himself in the killing.

The appellant appealed his 15-month sentence for breach of recognizance and other offences.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments regarding pre-sentence custody credit and the acceptable range of sentence, but found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider mitigating factors, including the appellant's substance abuse problem and expressions of remorse.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 12 months' incarceration.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment after stabbing an unarmed victim eight times during a fistfight with a concealed prohibited weapon.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his remorse, characterizing the victim as vulnerable, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's remorse was not genuine, that the unarmed victim was vulnerable to a concealed weapon, and that the brutal circumstances of the attack justified a sentence at the high end of the range for aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment for simple possession.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's immigration status and place of birth as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the original sentence excessive and disproportionate for a first offender with no evidence linking him to broader immigration schemes.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to two years' imprisonment.

The husband appealed a finding of contempt and the resulting sanctions imposed for repeatedly breaching court orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding and most of the sanctions, noting the husband's repeated breaches despite warnings.

However, the Court set aside the motion judge's prohibition against the husband using a Russian court judgment regarding annulment, as this remedy was not sought by the wife and the admissibility of the foreign judgment should be left to the trial judge.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a finding of liability after the respondent tripped and fell over pipes left on the sidewalk in front of the appellant's house.

The pipes had been left for five days, contrary to the City of Toronto's by-laws for special collection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant breached the standard of care and materially contributed to the injuries was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order regarding his income and child support obligations for the year 2004, arguing the application judge failed to properly apply sections 4(b), 7, and 17 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $6,042.00.

In an addendum to its previous reasons, the Court of Appeal corrected a calculation error by the trial judge, reducing the damages owing to the respondents for building loss by $152,262.67 to account for payments made to mortgagees.

The Court also dismissed the respondents' late application for prejudgment interest on the $50,000 aggravated damages award, noting that while aggravated damages are compensatory and ordinarily attract prejudgment interest, the issue was raised too late in the proceedings.

The respondent claimed disability benefits under a group policy issued to Jet Express Canada Inc. The trial judge found the respondent eligible, treating his employer, Jet Express Canada (2000) Inc., as the same entity as the policyholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence that the two companies were related or that the respondent's employer was a participating employer under the policy.

The respondent's action was dismissed, and the appellant's counterclaim for reimbursement of benefits paid was allowed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that fees paid to the respondent bank were non-refundable valuation and processing fees, rather than refundable commitment fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the commitment letters, noting the appellants accepted the terms and paid the fees without reservation before refusing to proceed with the financing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding the sale of matrimonial properties, arguing it was granted without a case conference, despite the respondent's breach of a prior order, and without allowing her to complete her offer to purchase the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the application judge.

The urgency of outstanding offers justified dispensing with the case conference, the prior breach was addressed by dispensing with consent for transfer, and there was reason to doubt the appellant's offer was better than a pending third-party offer.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal reviewed costs submissions regarding the proceedings below.

The court ordered the respondent to pay the successful appellant $5,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, for the costs of the proceedings below.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued that the respondents lacked status as undischarged bankrupts, that the judge erred in refusing an adjournment, and that the evidence did not support the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the relief sought was personal, the procedural orders were discretionary, and there was abundant evidence of the appellant persistently instituting vexatious litigation and leaving costs orders unpaid.

The appellant insurance company denied the respondents' claims for fire loss, alleging arson.

A jury found in favour of the respondents, awarding compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages, and finding the insurer acted in bad faith.

The insurer appealed on multiple grounds, including the admissibility of settlement offers, character evidence, and the availability of punitive damages to an estate under the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and punitive damages, holding that the Trustee Act permits an estate to recover punitive damages.

However, the Court reduced the aggravated damages award from $175,000 to $50,000, finding the original amount grossly excessive.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the date he signed an agreed statement of facts admitting his children were in need of protection, and that an interim custody order was fraudulently obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the date error immaterial as the appellant signed the statement while represented by counsel and his claim of duress was rejected.

The court also found the interim custody order was made on consent while the appellant was represented by counsel, and he had knowledge of it shortly after.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 14 months' pay in lieu of notice for wrongful dismissal.

The respondent was a younger employee with 2.5 years of service in a middle management position.

The trial judge had enhanced the notice period due to the employer's failure to provide a promised reference letter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a valid employment agreement but found the 14-month notice period manifestly excessive.

The Court reduced the notice period to 7 months, finding it to be a reasonable, albeit generous, period that included a modest enhancement under Wallace principles.

The respondent was convicted at trial of prowling at night after being found hiding in a residential backyard.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown must prove the respondent intended to commit a specific evil act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, clarifying that section 177 of the Criminal Code only requires proof of intentional prowling (stealthy traversing) without lawful excuse, and does not require proof of an underlying intent to commit a further specific offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft, and attempted break and enter, committed while on parole.

He was sentenced to five years and three years concurrent imprisonment.

He appealed the sentences, arguing they were beyond the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentences were not unfit given the appellant's significant criminal record for similar offences, previous penitentiary sentences, and the fact that he broke into an occupied residential dwelling.