Sherif Mohamed Foda

The accused was convicted of second-degree murder for striking and driving over the victim with his vehicle following a confrontation outside an after-hours bar in Toronto on February 5, 2023.

The Crown had alleged planned and deliberate first-degree murder, but the jury rejected this theory.

The court imposed a life sentence with a parole ineligibility period of 11 years.

The decision addresses the sentencing principles applicable to second-degree murder, the consideration of a sentencing circle request (which was dismissed), aggravating factors including the use of a vehicle as a weapon in a public space, and mitigating factors including the accused's Indigenous background, youth, lack of criminal record, and the jury's unanimous recommendation for the minimum 10-year ineligibility period.

The court sentenced Mouhamad Al Jalmoud for two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm, following a jury trial.

The jury found him not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for three related counts of failing to stop after an accident.

The court reviewed the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

Al Jalmoud was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months in custody (after credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions), with a 15-year driving prohibition to follow, and a DNA order.

The decision discusses the impact of mental illness on moral culpability, the range of sentences for similar offences, and the significance of both aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court considered an application by Kenneth Hill to stay his charges for delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, following his conviction for aggravated assault and related offences.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the pre-verdict delay was attributable to the defence, as Mr. Hill failed to appear for his trial after being inadvertently released from custody.

The post-verdict delay, related to a long-term offender application, was found to be reasonable and largely an exceptional circumstance, with only a short period of undue delay that did not breach the Charter ceiling.

The applicant, Stephane Gagnon, brought two applications seeking a stay of proceedings: one alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time, and another alleging abuse of process related to his return to Canada from Indonesia (argued as a "disguised extradition") and alleged misrepresentations at his bail hearing.

The court dismissed the s. 11(b) application, finding the delay was "Defence Delay" due to Gagnon being a fugitive.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process application, concluding there was no "disguised extradition" as Indonesia acted lawfully and Canada only provided logistical support, and that the Crown's statements at the bail hearing were not misleading.

The court found no breach of the applicant's s. 7 Charter rights and that a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The defendant, Irby Lemus, was convicted of sexual interference and making and distributing child pornography involving a 14-year-old victim who became pregnant.

The court, after independently finding facts regarding the extent of the sexual interference and the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age, proceeded to sentencing.

The Crown sought 12-15 years, while the defence sought a stay or conditional sentence.

The court determined a base sentence of five years and six months, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation, and considering aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the intimate nature of the illegal relationship, the resulting pregnancy, and the duration of the abuse.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of a criminal record, pro-social life, family support, and the collateral consequence of separation from his children.

A significant 18-month reduction was applied to the sentence due to a serious s. 7 Charter breach by the Crown, who deliberately failed to disclose material information during a bail review, misleading the court and attempting to interfere with the defendant's parental rights.

The defendant, Jean Auclair, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds obtained by crime.

The charges arose after nurses found drugs and cash in his shorts while he was in the ICU for a suspected overdose.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging unreasonable search and seizure by nurses (as state actors/agents) and police.

The court found that nurses were not state actors or police agents, and their search was reasonable for medical purposes.

The police seizure was found to engage s. 8 but was justified under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code.

Even if there were Charter breaches, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found Auclair guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, but not guilty of the included offence of simple possession due to the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act (CDSA s. 4.1(2)).

The accused, Shahabeldin Mohamed, was found guilty of dangerous operation of a conveyance, accessory after the fact to robbery, and failure to stop when pursued by police.

Prior to sentencing, the Crown and defence reached a resolution: the Crown would stay the accessory and failure to stop charges, and a joint submission for a conditional sentence would be made for the dangerous operation count.

The court addressed four issues: the Crown's power to stay charges post-conviction but pre-sentence, whether to accede to the joint submission, and the appropriateness of a DNA order and a firearms prohibition.

The court affirmed the Crown's power to stay charges, accepted the joint submission for a 16-month conditional sentence, but declined to impose a DNA order or a firearms prohibition, finding that the dangerous driving offence in this case did not involve violence against a person.

The appellant, Joshua Brown, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making available child pornography, and his three-year penitentiary sentence.

The conviction appeal grounds were unreasonable verdict and insufficient trial judge reasons.

The sentence appeal grounds included reliance on an incorrect volume of child pornography and unproven aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and reasons sufficient, and that the inference of guilt was the only reasonable one.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in considering 2,500 files instead of 500, this error did not impact the fitness of the significant sentence warranted by the large quantity of child pornography.

The Crown applied to have Jean-Claude Breton declared a dangerous offender under section 753 of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence.

Breton had been convicted of eight charges, including forcible confinement and assault.

The court considered psychiatric evidence, including reports from Dr. Treena Wilkie and testimony from Dr. Amil Joseph, as well as Breton's extensive criminal history and institutional conduct.

Despite defence arguments regarding treatability and the unreliability of some assessments, the court found that Breton met the criteria for a dangerous offender, exhibiting a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour and a high likelihood of future violent recidivism.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence would adequately protect the public.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)).

The total delay was 22 months, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found that 5.5 months of the delay were attributable to the defence's passive inaction in scheduling pre-trials and active resistance to setting trial dates while insisting on non-essential disclosure.

Deducting this period brought the net delay to 16.5 months, below the Jordan threshold.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that quashed four convictions and entered a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) infringement but declined to stay proceedings on the basis that the accused had not been prejudiced by the delay.

The Court of Appeal erred by entering a stay without re-examining the reasonableness of the delays, even though the record contained a detailed statement of admissions.

The Supreme Court held that a functional analysis of the trial judge's reasons showed he considered the relevant Morin factors and reached the correct conclusion.

The defence-caused delays, including multiple unsuccessful applications and insistence on conflicted counsel, must be subtracted, and the transitional exceptional circumstance under Jordan further supported the conclusion that s. 11(b) was not infringed.

The applicant, Mohandranjan Navaratnam, sought a mistrial and permission to re-elect to a jury trial, arguing that the Crown's delayed disclosure of an occurrence report breached his Charter rights to full answer and defence and a jury trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report was subject to third-party disclosure, not first-party, and that even if it were, the delay did not prejudice the applicant's rights given his prior knowledge of the incident and existing defence strategy.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application for extraordinary relief (prohibition and certiorari) seeking to prevent a judge from proceeding with a remote video trial and to quash a ruling for a remote trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant's request for a full in-person trial had been accommodated.

The court declined to hear the moot appeal on public interest grounds, citing an insufficient record, the issues not being evasive of review in normal appellate process, and no evidence of a systemic problem requiring immediate resolution.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge against sections 276(2), 278.92, 278.93, and 279.94 of the Criminal Code, as amended by Bill C-51.

These provisions govern the admissibility of a complainant's sexual history and private records in sexual assault cases, requiring defence disclosure of records in their possession and granting the complainant standing with counsel at admissibility hearings.

The accused argued these amendments violated his fair trial rights, right to make full answer and defence, and right to remain silent under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the amendments constitutional.

It held that the provisions appropriately balance the accused's fair trial rights with the privacy, security, and dignity interests of sexual assault complainants, and do not infringe on the right against self-incrimination or the right to surprise in cross-examination.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant was heavily intoxicated and could not recall the events.

The trial judge found the complainant incapable of consenting due to intoxication and rejected the appellant's defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding he had not taken reasonable steps to determine consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law despite some evidentiary misapprehensions that did not affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, sexual interference, three counts of sexual assault, uttering a threat, two counts of failing to comply with a recognisance, and failure to comply with probation.

The charges stemmed from allegations made by three of the appellant's children, all of whom had cognitive deficits.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of all charges except one count of assault causing bodily harm.

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material inconsistencies in witness evidence and inadequate reasons, and also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 10 years' incarceration less 34 months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the sentence appeal to provide additional credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of their right to be tried without unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was approximately 16.5 months, just below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, that no delay was attributable to the defence, and that the Crown failed to provide timely disclosure.

The court determined that approximately six months of added delay resulted from the Crown's failure to disclose materials that could have been provided within 90-120 days of arrest.

The court granted the stay of all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purposes of trafficking and possession of cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal from the trafficking conviction and substituted a conviction for simple possession of oxycodone.

The appeal from the cocaine possession conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a sentence of time served was substituted in place of the original sentence.