SCC 2017

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code dangerous offender provisions, arguing overbreadth under s. 7 and gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held s. 753(1) permits considering future treatment prospects at designation and that s. 753(4.1) does not create an unconstitutional presumption of indeterminate detention.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld both provisions as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down s. 753(4.1) and ordered a new sentencing hearing.

In a negligence appeal arising from an auditor’s failure to detect corporate fraud, the Court applied the Anns/Cooper framework to pure economic loss claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance of a service.

The Court held that liability must be confined to losses that fall within the purpose of the defendant’s undertaking and the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance.

It found no recoverable loss tied to services provided for investment solicitation, but upheld liability for losses flowing from a negligent statutory audit prepared for shareholder oversight.

The appeal was allowed in part, and damages were reduced to reflect only losses causally connected to the statutory audit.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and held that section 13(1)(b) of British Columbia’s Human Rights Code can apply to discriminatory conduct by a co-worker who is not the complainant’s employer or superior, if the conduct has a sufficient nexus to the employment context.

The majority adopted a contextual test focused on workplace integration, location of conduct, and workplace impact, and restored the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

Concurring reasons emphasized established human rights principles and workplace impact, while the dissent would have limited section 13(1)(b) to employer-employee or analogous relationships.

The Court allowed the appeal and held that proprietary estoppel can bind a promisor who lacked ownership at the time of the promise if the promisor later acquires a sufficient interest in the property.

The majority upheld findings that the appellant reasonably relied to his detriment on his sister’s promise regarding her eventual one-third interest in the family home.

The Court ordered relief tailored to the equity by permitting purchase of the sister’s one-third share at fair market value as of when the appellant would reasonably have expected to buy it.

The accused appealed convictions for firearms and drug trafficking offences, challenging production orders used to obtain historical text messages from a telecommunications provider.

The Court held the accused had standing under s. 8 of the Charter because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic conversation records.

The majority concluded that seizure of already sent and received messages from provider storage was lawfully authorized by the production order regime and did not require a Part VI wiretap authorization.

A dissent would have treated acquisition of those messages as requiring Part VI authorization and would have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court allowed the accused’s appeal and held that, on the totality of circumstances, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages recovered from the recipient’s phone, giving him standing to challenge the search under section 8.

With standing conceded, the warrantless search was unreasonable, and the text-message evidence was excluded under section 24(2) because admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without that evidence the convictions could not stand, and the curative proviso did not apply.

The Court held Yukon breached the Chapter 11 modern treaty land-use planning process by making major final-stage changes not properly proposed earlier and not grounded in changing circumstances.

Yukon’s approval was quashed, and the parties were returned to the s. 11.6.3.2 stage.

The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach of resetting the process to an earlier stage and emphasized judicial restraint with robust legality review in modern treaty implementation.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that an Ontario Court of Justice judge had jurisdiction to conduct a joint trial of provincial offences and summary conviction criminal offences arising from the same events.

The majority applied a functional joinder approach and found a sufficient factual nexus, no statutory prohibition, and no prejudice.

A dissent would have found no jurisdiction based on legislative intent behind the Provincial Offences Act and would have ordered new trials.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Barreau du Québec’s appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The majority held the Administrative Tribunal of Québec reasonably interpreted section 102 of the Act respecting administrative justice to permit a non-advocate chosen by the Minister to prepare and file written proceedings before the social affairs division.

It further held this interpretation was consistent with the legislative scheme, including section 129(b) of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec.

The Court allowed the appeal in part in a labour grievance over mandatory after-hour standby duties for federal immigration lawyers.

The majority held the adjudicator reasonably found the directive was not a fair and reasonable exercise of management rights under the collective agreement, so that portion of the adjudicator’s order was restored.

However, the Court agreed the directive did not infringe section 7 liberty interests, because the impacts on personal time did not engage fundamental personal choices protected by the Charter.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging provincial approval of a ski resort project in Qat’muk on freedom of religion and section 35 consultation grounds.

The majority held section 2(a) protects freedom to hold and manifest beliefs, not protection of the spiritual object itself, and found no Charter infringement.

It further held the Minister reasonably concluded deep consultation and accommodation had occurred over many years, and that section 35 guarantees a process rather than a veto over development outcomes.

In this criminal appeal, the accused challenged a perjury conviction arising from testimony given at an inquest following a conducted-energy-weapon incident at an airport.

The accused argued unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, issue estoppel, and abuse of process, including the Crown’s pursuit of an alleged collusion theory.

The Court held that no reviewable factual error or misapprehension was established and upheld the conviction substantially for the provincial appellate reasons.

A dissenting justice would have ordered a new trial on the basis that the collusion finding was unreasonable and tainted other findings.

The accused appealed his perjury conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons given by the majority in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial for substantially the reasons of the dissent below.

The conviction was upheld.

A Teva employee fraudulently requisitioned and deposited 63 cheques into accounts under names matching or resembling real customers.

The majority held the collecting banks were liable in conversion because the payees were neither fictitious nor non-existing under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The Court restored the motions judge’s decision and rejected the banks’ false-payee defence.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed a ministerial referral for an admissibility hearing under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that a conditional sentence is not a 'term of imprisonment' for the serious criminality threshold based on an imposed sentence.

It also held that the 'maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years' must be assessed based on the law at the time the offence was committed, not at the time of the admissibility determination.

The matter was remitted to a different delegate for redetermination on a correct legal interpretation.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the provincial court of appeal upheld the conviction, with one dissenting judge finding appellate intervention warranted.

The Supreme Court held there was no illogical or irrational reasoning process by the trial judge and no basis to characterize the verdict as unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction remained in force.

This appeal addressed prescription periods for a civil liability action against a municipality after a homicide.

The respondents, as indirect victims, sought moral and material damages for the death of a family member and argued that the three-year period in art. 2930 C.C.Q. applied.

The majority held that an action claiming direct and immediate consequences of interference with a person’s physical integrity is based on the obligation to make reparation for bodily injury caused to another.

As a result, the three-year period applied and the municipal six-month limitation did not bar the claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned whether records generated under the Independent Assessment Process in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement were subject to federal access, privacy, and archiving legislation, and whether they could be ordered destroyed.

The Court held the supervising judge had authority under the settlement framework to direct disposition of the records and found no palpable and overriding error in concluding the agreement contemplated confidentiality, limited retention, claimant choice, and eventual destruction.

The Court also upheld the modified order requiring a 15-year retention period with a notice program so claimants could elect archival preservation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Independent Counsel.

The Court considered whether section 27 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act removes Crown immunity from discovery when the Crown is not a party.

It held that immunity can be displaced only by clear statutory language, and section 27 applies only to proceedings against the Crown.

Because neither the Crown nor the chief investigator was a party, the investigator could refuse discovery.

The appeal was allowed and the respondents’ discovery motion was dismissed with costs throughout.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.