SCC 2017

The Court considered an appeal arising during an indefinite strike by members of Les avocats et notaires de l’État québécois, where an adjournment request had been refused as part of an essential-services context.

By the hearing date, the strike had ended and a special statute had required a return to work.

The Court held the issue was moot and dismissed the appeal without costs.

It stated that dismissing the appeal did not endorse either the process used or the validity of the considerations identified by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal from Alberta, the Court held that civil contempt required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had actual knowledge of the case management orders he failed to attend.

The case management judge did not determine actual knowledge for two of the three orders, and the respondents conceded the governing rule requirements were not met for those orders.

The contempt finding therefore could not stand.

The Court also endorsed the Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons.

The appeal was allowed, the action restored, and the costs award vacated.

This appeal addressed whether acquisitive prescription of an immovable, once completed by effective possession, can be set up against a subsequent purchaser whose title is published before the possessor seeks judgment.

The majority held that Quebec's publication regime remains primarily declarative and does not displace rights already acquired by prescription.

It concluded the judicial application under art. 2918 C.C.Q. serves to recognize pre-existing ownership rather than constitutively create it for priority purposes in this context.

Because the respondent's possession was peaceful, continuous, public, and unequivocal for the required period, her prescriptive right prevailed over the appellants' later registered title.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent treating judgment as constitutive and non-retroactive.

In a criminal appeal as of right based on a dissent in the provincial appellate court, the appellant challenged convictions for historical sexual offences.

The Court held that the guilty verdict was reasonable and compatible with the evidentiary record.

A majority adopted the appellate majority's reasons, while one judge would have ordered a new trial based on the appellate dissent.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were affirmed.

The appellant challenged Law Society rules making continuing professional development mandatory and authorizing administrative suspension for non-compliance without an express hearing or appeal process.

The majority held law society rules are reviewed for reasonableness and are valid if consistent with the enabling statute’s purpose, wording, and scheme.

It concluded the Law Society’s broad public-interest mandate and rule-making powers authorized mandatory education standards enforced by temporary suspension.

The majority further held the absence of codified hearing and appeal rights in the rules did not render them unreasonable in this declaratory challenge.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent finding automatic suspension manifestly unjust.

This appeal concerned an accident insurance exclusion denying benefits if an accident occurred while the insured was participating in an indictable offence.

The insured died in a motorcycle accident while being chased by police, and the offences at issue were hybrid offences.

The Court held that art. 2402 of the Civil Code of Québec applies only to offences punishable exclusively by indictment, not hybrid offences.

The exclusion could not be invoked against the insured’s heirs, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court considered whether victims compensated under Quebec's no-fault automobile scheme could still sue third parties for subsequent medical or police faults causing aggravated or separate injuries.

The majority held the statutory causal link is sui generis and satisfied where there is a plausible, logical, and sufficiently close connection between the accident, subsequent events, and resulting injury.

On that interpretation, the claims remained within the compensation scheme and civil actions were barred by section 83.57.

A dissent would have allowed actions for truly separate injuries caused by later faults.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged pre-appeal detention after conviction for second degree murder under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, focusing on whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court clarified that the public-interest analysis balances enforceability and reviewability, with seriousness of offence, public safety, flight risk, and strength of appeal all assessed contextually from the perspective of a reasonable, informed public observer.

It further held that a reviewing panel under s. 680(1) owes deference on factual findings but may intervene for material legal or principled error, or where the decision is clearly unwarranted.

On the facts, negligible safety/flight concerns and clearly arguable grounds made detention clearly unwarranted.

The appeal was allowed, though no further order was made due to mootness.

In a criminal appeal from acquittals on assault and sexual assault charges, the Court addressed trial errors involving prior sexual activity cross-examination and exclusion of rebuttal evidence on alleged recent fabrication.

The intermediate appellate court was divided on remedy despite finding error.

The Court allowed the appeal and adopted the dissenting remedial approach from below.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appeal considered whether the confessions rule applies to accused statements used only on a Charter voir dire, whether police had exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for a warrantless home entry, and whether seized evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The majority held the confessions rule does not govern this voir dire use, found the warrantless entry violated s. 8 because obtaining a warrant was practicable, and excluded the resulting evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The Court considered whether a person charged under Alberta securities legislation carrying a maximum sentence of imprisonment of five years less a day, plus potential substantial fines, was entitled to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

The lower courts held that this penalty structure did not trigger the constitutional jury right.

The Court agreed substantially with the majority below and held that the appellant was not entitled to a trial by jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal addressed whether a provincial securities offence carrying a maximum sentence of five years less a day, together with a potential multimillion-dollar fine, engaged the right to a jury trial under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

The appellate record concerned conflicting lower-court rulings on whether the penalty scheme amounted to a more severe punishment requiring jury process.

The Court held that the accused was not entitled to a jury trial and adopted the majority reasoning of the provincial appellate court.

The statutory maximum imprisonment threshold was not transformed into a constitutionally jury-entitling punishment by adding the prospect of a financial penalty.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appeal concerned whether a drug recognition expert’s opinion under s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is automatically admissible at trial or remains governed by common law expert-evidence rules.

The majority held the provision does not create automatic admissibility, but found the statutory and regulatory framework conclusively establishes the expert’s specialized expertise for administering the 12-step evaluation.

On that basis, and with the other Mohan factors not in dispute, the opinion evidence was admissible without an additional voir dire in this case.

The dissent would have required proof of threshold reliability of the underlying science before admitting the opinion on impairment.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order was confirmed.

The appellant challenged a conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, arguing misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider the totality of evidence, and an unreasonable verdict.

Applying the appellate standard of review under s. 686(1)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Criminal Code, the Court substantially agreed with the intermediate appellate reasons on miscarriage-of-justice issues.

The Court also rejected the alleged Beaudry error, finding no illogical or irrational reasoning process by the trial judge.

The verdict was held not unreasonable, and the conviction was upheld.

In a criminal appeal concerning admissibility of fresh evidence, the Court addressed whether post-trial statements by a witness were admissible and reasonably capable of belief.

The appellate record involved convictions for second degree murder and assault with a weapon that had been set aside with a new trial ordered.

The Court held that the witness statement satisfied the admissibility criteria and could reasonably have affected the outcome.

The decision admitting fresh evidence and ordering a new trial was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

In this criminal appeal, the Court considered challenges to the trial judge’s use of alibi and prior-vandalism evidence in upholding convictions for arson and mischief.

A majority dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Willcock J.A. and declined to re-examine the governing jurisprudence in the circumstances.

The majority upheld the convictions, while one judge would have allowed the appeal based on the dissenting appellate reasons.

The appeal addressed adverse possession in British Columbia, including whether continuity was proven across an evidentiary gap and whether inconsistent use is a required element.

The court held that inconsistent use does not form part of British Columbia adverse possession law under the province’s legislative history.

However, the appellate court improperly reweighed evidence and displaced factual findings that were open to the chambers judge absent palpable and overriding error.

The claim of uninterrupted possession failed on the record accepted at first instance.

The appeal was allowed and the chambers decisions were restored.

The appeal concerned whether future Canada Pension Plan disability benefits fall within the SEF 44 Endorsement deduction for amounts recoverable under a policy of insurance providing disability benefits.

The Court held the endorsement language is unambiguous and refers to private insurance policies, not mandatory statutory schemes like the Canada Pension Plan.

It rejected reliance on collateral-benefit jurisprudence from distinct statutory and tort contexts to alter the contract’s ordinary meaning.

The appeal was allowed and CPP disability benefits were held non-deductible from amounts payable under the endorsement.

The appellant challenged a provincial election-law registration requirement as an unjustified limit on freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter when applied to sponsors spending less than $500 on election advertising.

The Court held that the statutory definition of sponsor captures persons or organizations receiving advertising services from others, not individuals engaging in solitary political self-expression such as homemade signs, bumper stickers, or T-shirts.

On that interpretation, the impugned limit was narrow and justified under s. 1 given the objective of electoral transparency, accountability, and an informed electorate.

The registration scheme was rationally connected, minimally impairing, and proportionate in effects.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a criminal appeal, the appellant challenged a manslaughter conviction entered by the appellate court after setting aside an acquittal on that count at trial.

The central issue was whether the evidence permitted a finding that the accused knew a home invasion was about to occur when driving participants to the residence.

The Court held that the appellate disposition should stand and adopted the reasons of the Chief Justice of the provincial court of appeal.

The conviction for manslaughter was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.