Scott C. Norton

The applicant, Sabrina Scott-Wolf, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 19.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive Jordan ceiling.

The court calculated the net delay by subtracting periods of defence-attributable delay, including delays in scheduling a Crown Pretrial, a Judicial Pretrial, and a Trial Scheduling Conference.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that late notice of the s.11(b) application constituted defence delay, finding the May 25, 2024 email sufficient notice.

The net delay was determined to be 14.8 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, thus not meeting the criteria for a below-ceiling stay.

While acknowledging the Crown's inexcusable complacency in providing disclosure, the motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and trial dates were confirmed.

The appeal concerned whether future Canada Pension Plan disability benefits fall within the SEF 44 Endorsement deduction for amounts recoverable under a policy of insurance providing disability benefits.

The Court held the endorsement language is unambiguous and refers to private insurance policies, not mandatory statutory schemes like the Canada Pension Plan.

It rejected reliance on collateral-benefit jurisprudence from distinct statutory and tort contexts to alter the contract’s ordinary meaning.

The appeal was allowed and CPP disability benefits were held non-deductible from amounts payable under the endorsement.

A four-year-old child suffered catastrophic injuries after running into the path of an empty school bus.

A jury found no negligence by the driver, but the provincial appellate court ordered a new trial based on concerns that jury instructions on right-of-way rules improperly suggested fault by the child.

The Court held the instructions were legally proper when read as a whole and were directed to the driver's standard of care, not the child's liability.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and the original trial judgment was restored.

The insured appellants left their property vacant for a period before a tenant moved in.

The property was later destroyed by fire.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on the basis that the earlier vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of the Insurance Act, which the insured failed to report.

The trial judge granted relief under s. 171 of the Act, finding the condition unjust or unreasonable in these circumstances since the vacancy was rectified before the fire.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding s. 171 did not apply to statutory conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, concluding that s. 171 applies to statutory conditions that are unjust or unreasonable in their application, and restored the trial judge's decision.