SCC 2017

This appeal addressed judicial review of surrender orders in extradition proceedings and the reasonableness standard under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held it was reasonable for the Minister to rely on diplomatic assurances and consular access commitments in concluding there was no substantial risk of torture or mistreatment contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized a contextual assessment of assurance reliability and rejected a requirement to eliminate all possible risk.

It further held the surrender decisions were not otherwise unjust or oppressive in light of the full circumstances, including treaty obligations and offence gravity.

The appeal was allowed and the surrender orders restored.

The Court dismissed an appeal about renewal and term clauses in a Quebec affiliation contract between a banner company and member pharmacists.

The majority held the renewal clause granted unilateral renewal control to the member pharmacists and could lawfully produce potentially perpetual effects.

The Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s interpretation and held the contract was not indeterminate on the majority’s analysis.

Dissenting judges would have characterized the contract as indeterminate and allowed termination on reasonable notice.

This appeal considered judicial review of an arbitration award under Quebec's specialized health insurance collective bargaining scheme.

The majority held the arbitrator reasonably concluded the dispute was not arbitrable under the Framework Agreement and that only the federation had standing to submit this type of dispute.

Concurring reasons agreed in the result while treating jurisdiction and standing analysis differently on standard of review.

Dissenting reasons would have found jurisdiction and standing errors and would have dismissed the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the arbitration award was restored.

This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.

The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.

On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.

The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a personal oppression order against a corporate director under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

It reaffirmed a two-pronged framework requiring that oppressive conduct be attributable to the director and that personal liability be fit in all the circumstances.

The Court identified fairness, narrow tailoring to rectify oppression, vindication of reasonable stakeholder expectations, and consistency with the broader corporate law context as guiding principles.

On the facts, the director’s lead role in the non-conversion decision and personal benefit through increased corporate control supported personal liability, and the pleadings were sufficient to ground that remedy.

The Court allowed a criminal appeal from a Crown appeal against acquittals on sexual interference and sexual assault charges involving the mistake-of-age defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

It held the trial judge made no legal error in assessing whether the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain age, and that the appellate majority improperly recast disagreements with factual inferences as legal errors.

The Court clarified that evidence arising after the sexual activity may still be relevant where used to assess credibility or the reasonableness of pre-contact age perception, while post-contact steps themselves remain irrelevant to the statutory requirement.

It further confirmed that Crown appeals from acquittal require legal error and materiality meeting a reasonable degree of certainty.

This criminal appeal addressed whether the Crown must prove a lawful breath demand before relying on the Criminal Code evidentiary shortcuts for proving blood-alcohol concentration in an ‘over 80’ prosecution.

The majority held that lawful demand is not a precondition to ss. 258(1)(c) and (g), emphasizing the shortcuts’ purpose of efficiency and their focus on reliability conditions tied to breath sampling and analysis.

The dissent would have overruled prior authority and required compliance with s. 254(3) reasonable grounds as a precondition.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The Court allowed AstraZeneca’s appeal and held the patent ‘promise doctrine’ is not the correct approach to utility under s. 2 of the Patent Act.

It found the doctrine improperly imports disclosure obligations into the utility requirement and wrongly invalidates patents when one of multiple promised uses is unproven.

The correct test asks whether the claimed subject-matter has at least one practical use related to that subject-matter, demonstrated or soundly predicted at filing.

Applying that test, the ‘653 patent had sufficient utility and was not invalid.

In this criminal appeal, the Court considered when corroborative evidence can establish the threshold reliability required to admit hearsay under the principled exception.

The Crown sought admission of a co-accused’s video re-enactment implicating the respondent in two murders after the declarant refused to testify.

A majority held the trial judge relied on corroborative evidence that did not sufficiently answer the specific hearsay danger of fabrication, and concluded threshold reliability was not met.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial remained in place, with a dissent that would have restored the convictions.

The Court dismissed Google’s appeal and upheld a worldwide interlocutory injunction requiring de-indexing of websites used to sell products in breach of court orders.

The majority held courts may grant global injunctive relief against a non-party where necessary to prevent ongoing irreparable harm and where balance of convenience favours relief.

The dissent agreed jurisdiction existed but would have refused the order as effectively final, insufficiently proven effective, and available alternatives remained.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in a proposed privacy class proceeding against Facebook arising from Sponsored Stories.

A majority held the forum selection clause requiring litigation in California should not be enforced in this consumer context, emphasizing gross inequality of bargaining power and the quasi-constitutional significance of privacy rights under British Columbia legislation.

The Court restored the chambers judge’s order refusing a stay so the action could proceed in British Columbia.

The Court considered the scope of appellate review of a commercial arbitration award under British Columbia's Arbitration Act in a forestry compensation dispute.

A majority held that courts had jurisdiction only over the legal component of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation or statutory application issues characterized as mixed questions, and that reasonableness was the applicable standard.

Applying that framework, the majority found the arbitrator's chosen valuation approach reasonable and restored key parts of the arbitral award.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs throughout.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The Court dismissed an appeal from Alberta human rights proceedings concerning termination under a safety policy requiring pre-incident disclosure of drug dependence or addiction issues.

A majority held the tribunal reasonably found the employee was terminated for breaching the policy rather than because of addiction, so prima facie discrimination was not established.

Concurring judges would have found prima facie discrimination but still upheld the outcome on accommodation to undue hardship.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding both prima facie discrimination and inadequate accommodation.

In an appeal about extinctive prescription for lawyers’ unpaid professional fees under Quebec civil law, the Court considered when the right of action arises under art. 2880 para. 2 C.C.Q. The fee agreement required invoices to be payable within 30 days, so exigibility and prescription began on the 31st day after each invoice was sent.

The Court rejected a categorical rule that prescription runs only from termination of the mandate or completion of work, emphasizing a fact-specific analysis grounded in contract terms and circumstances.

It also rejected suspension for impossibility in fact based on lawyers’ ethical obligations while acting for clients.

The appeal was dismissed, with prescription barring all but the final invoice.

The Court held that negligence claims for mental injury do not require proof of a recognized psychiatric illness or expert diagnosis as a legal precondition.

A claimant must still prove serious and prolonged disturbance beyond ordinary distress under general negligence principles, including duty, breach, causation, and remoteness.

On the record, the trial judge’s factual findings of compensable mental injury based on lay evidence were entitled to deference.

The Court allowed the appeal, restored the trial award, and declined to remand issues of indivisibility and quantum.

The Supreme Court clarified bail principles under s. 515 of the Criminal Code, including strict adherence to the ladder principle and the limited role of cash bail.

It held the bail review judge erred by insisting on a combined cash-plus-surety release and by relying on speculation rather than evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, reversed the constitutional declaration against s. 515(2)(e), and replaced the release order with a cash-only release on the same terms.

The appeal addressed when a court may award costs personally against defence counsel in criminal proceedings for abusive litigation conduct.

The Court held that personal costs orders are available in criminal matters but only exceptionally, where deliberate conduct seriously undermines court authority or the administration of justice.

It emphasized procedural safeguards, including notice and an opportunity for separate submissions, and cautioned against deterring robust defence advocacy.

Applying that framework, the majority restored the trial-level personal costs award after finding a calculated, bad-faith use of prohibition motions to delay proceedings.

In this criminal appeal, multiple accused sought to uphold a stay of proceedings granted for alleged pre-charge delay said to infringe security of the person under the Charter.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, and a majority in the provincial appellate court upheld that remedy.

The Supreme Court majority allowed the Crown’s appeal substantially for the dissenting appellate reasons, concluding a stay was not warranted on the record.

A dissenting justice at the Supreme Court would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the appellate majority’s reasons.