Sarah Shaikh

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to his defence of duress.

The appellant claimed he was forced to transport drugs to pay off a $40,000 debt to an unsavoury character who threatened him and his family.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant had safe avenues of escape, such as going to the police or liquidating his RRSPs, and therefore failed to establish an air of reality to the defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, a media company and a journalist, sought to quash or vary a production order requiring them to produce communications with a suspected terrorist, and to unseal the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the applications to quash or vary the production order, finding that the authorizing justice properly balanced the state's interest in investigating serious crimes with the media's right to privacy under the Lessard principles.

The court allowed the application to vary the sealing order in part, permitting access to a redacted version of the ITO, but imposed a temporary publication ban on certain details to protect the fair trial rights of the accused and the integrity of the ongoing investigation.

The court released Reasons for Judgment subject to a temporary publication ban to allow parties to consider redactions.

As counsel for the applicants and respondent advised that no redactions were requested, the court rescinded the temporary publication ban.

The appellant was convicted of possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment after police found nearly 100,000 Ecstasy tabs in his vehicle.

On appeal, he argued that his arrest, based on a confidential informant's tip, lacked reasonable and probable grounds, rendering the subsequent search unlawful under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot factors, finding the tip compelling, the informant credible, and the information corroborated.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The accused, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, were convicted by a jury of multiple terrorism offences, including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

The offences involved a plot to derail a VIA passenger train and discussions of a sniper plot to assassinate prominent individuals.

At sentencing, Jaser argued for a reduced sentence based on alleged entrapment, drug addiction, and insincere religious beliefs, relying on expert psychological evidence.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the expert evidence inadmissible and contrary to the jury's verdicts.

For Esseghaier, who was self-represented, amicus curiae raised issues of fitness and mental illness.

The court found Esseghaier fit to be sentenced and concluded that any present mental illness was not causally linked to the offences committed in 2012.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for terrorism offences designed to cause indiscriminate killing, the court sentenced both accused to life imprisonment for the murder conspiracy, with concurrent determinate sentences for the other offences, and ordered a 10-year period of parole ineligibility.

During the sentencing hearing for two accused convicted of terrorism offences, amicus and the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment of one of the accused to determine his fitness.

The court held that there is no jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order a fitness assessment after a verdict has been rendered.

However, the court found reasonable grounds to order a further psychiatric assessment under s. 21 of the Ontario Mental Health Act, noting flaws in a previous psychiatric report that had improperly modified the legal test for fitness.

In advance of a high‑profile terrorism prosecution, the court determined several issues concerning jury selection.

The Crown and defence jointly sought rulings regarding the appointment of additional jurors under s. 631(2.2) of the Criminal Code, the scope of challenge for cause based on pre‑trial publicity and racial or religious prejudice, and the procedure for determining those challenges.

The court held that the anticipated length and complexity of the trial justified appointing two additional jurors to minimize the risk of mistrial.

It permitted challenge for cause using six structured questions addressing exposure to publicity and potential bias relating to visible minority status and religion.

The court also ordered the exclusion of all jurors during the challenge process under s. 640(2.1) and directed that challenges be decided by static triers pursuant to s. 640(2.2) to preserve juror impartiality.

Pre‑trial evidentiary motion concerning proposed redactions to intercepted wiretap conversations in a terrorism prosecution.

Defence counsel sought editing of eight passages on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the common law exclusionary discretion.

The court applied the probative‑value versus prejudice balancing analysis and concluded that certain passages referencing derogatory comments about Jews, references to Osama bin Laden, and discussions of adultery punishments should be edited because they were minimally probative and risked inflammatory jury prejudice.

However, proposed edits relating to references to bombs and bomb‑making were refused because they were relevant to the alleged conspiracies and the relationship between participants.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

In a terrorism prosecution involving allegations of conspiracy to derail a passenger train, the Crown moved for the appointment of amicus curiae because one accused insisted on representing himself while rejecting the legitimacy of Canadian law.

The court reviewed the law governing amicus appointments following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario v. C.L.A. of Ontario, emphasizing that amicus must not function as defence counsel or undermine the accused’s right to self‑representation.

Given the seriousness and complexity of the terrorism charges, the anticipated evidentiary issues (including wiretap admissibility and editing), and the likelihood that the self‑represented accused would refuse to participate meaningfully in proceedings governed by Canadian law, the court found exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment.

Amicus was appointed with a limited role to assist the court on complex legal and evidentiary issues while respecting the accused’s autonomy.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the eyewitness identification evidence of undercover police officers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was not required to explicitly mention the frailties of eyewitness identification and properly relied on the officers' close-proximity observations of the appellant's distinctive facial scar and voice pattern.

Multiple media organizations applied under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code to vary sealing orders relating to search warrants, general warrants, and production orders obtained during a terrorism investigation.

The court considered the open court principle and the Dagenais‑Mentuck framework governing restrictions on publication and access to court records.

While recognizing the strong presumption of openness once search warrants are executed, the court found that publication of certain highly incriminating and potentially inadmissible material in the Informations to Obtain posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice and to the accused persons’ fair trial rights given the extensive publicity surrounding the terrorism allegations.

The court therefore permitted access to the materials but imposed time‑limited publication bans on evidence supporting the charges and maintained sealing for portions relating to ongoing investigations and identifying information of innocent third parties.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for his involvement in a conspiracy.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity in relation to the others involved.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had considered the principle of parity and did not err in the sentence imposed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, challenging the admissibility of certificates and the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the certificates were not unreasonable and that the reasons thoroughly and correctly applied the W.(D.) principles to the facts.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police lacked articulable cause for an investigative detention and that evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was a basis for the trial judge's conclusion on articulable cause and deferring to the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking based on his trial counsel's advice that police surveillance recordings confirmed reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest.

Prior to sentencing, the appellant retained new counsel and moved to set aside the plea, arguing it was uninformed because trial counsel had misheard the recordings.

The trial judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal listened to the recordings and found no evidence supporting the observations trial counsel claimed to have heard.

The Court held that the guilty plea was uninformed because it was grounded on a critical misapprehension of information regarding the viability of the appellant's only defence.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 4 months' imprisonment and 2 years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and a reduction based on time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence would not provide sufficient deterrence, and noting no evidence of undue hardship or rehabilitation while on bail.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had excluded the cocaine evidence, finding the arresting officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent, who was fleeing the scene of a reported robbery, due to a discrepancy in the suspect's weight description.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that in the totality of the circumstances, including the timing and the respondent fleeing the scene, the single discrepancy was not enough to render the arrest objectively unreasonable.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant applied for a review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing that the Minister should have sought a formal assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no basis upon which the death penalty could be imposed, as the appellant was not charged with a capital offence, New Jersey had a moratorium on the death penalty, and the prosecutor confirmed the appellant was ineligible for the death penalty.

The Minister's refusal to insist on a formal assurance did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.