Sarah Egan

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000 following a trial by judge and jury, and was sentenced to five and one-half years' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction on four grounds: that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that character could not be considered; that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to consider smaller quantities of a different drug; that the trial judge failed to provide a corrective instruction after the Crown's closing address; and that the trial judge erred in his instruction regarding the mistake of fact defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and also dismissed the leave to appeal sentence application.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Wesley James’s appeal in part, setting aside his convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and crack cocaine due to Charter breaches and police misconduct, and entering acquittals on those charges.

The court found that the trial judge erred in the Grant analysis by failing to properly consider the seriousness and cumulative effect of the Charter breaches and police dishonesty, and by not conducting a final balancing of the Grant factors.

The conviction for trafficking crack cocaine was upheld as the verdict was not unreasonable on the evidence.

The applicant, Phi Ho, challenged the lawfulness of searches conducted at a StorageMart locker, a residential address (Moody Drive), and a Mercedes vehicle, as well as the issuance of five production warrants and three tracking warrants.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained from these searches, arguing that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained flaws, including insufficient detail in redacted portions and inaccuracies or carelessness by the affiant.

The court reviewed the unredacted ITOs and the judicial summary, finding that the applicant was sufficiently informed to challenge the material.

The court addressed specific alleged errors, such as mischaracterizations of ownership and discrepancies in GPS data, ordering some excisions and amplifications to the ITOs.

Ultimately, the court found that even with the amended record, there were reasonable grounds to support the issuance of all judicial authorizations.

The court also considered whether the affiant's conduct amounted to "blatant dishonesty" subverting the judicial process, concluding that while some errors were concerning, they did not rise to that level, nor did they undermine the integrity of the pre-authorization process.

The application to exclude evidence and invalidate the warrants was dismissed.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, specifically contesting the Crown's assertion of informant privilege over redacted materials related to a source.

The court conducted a *Basi* hearing, including *viva voce* evidence, to assess the privilege claim.

The application for further disclosure was dismissed, with the court upholding the Crown's claim of privilege for Source #1.

This ruling addresses an application for leave to cross-examine an affiant and sub-affiants concerning a search warrant.

The court granted limited cross-examination on specific factual assertions within the Information to Obtain (ITO), including the association between parties, discrepancies in surveillance observations (e.g., backpack possession), and potential confusion in identification due to similar appearances between individuals.

However, leave was denied for cross-examination on the affiant's characterization of observations as drug trafficking and on the overall reliability of confidential information or the non-charging of other targets, deeming these matters more appropriate for legal argument.

The applicant, Phi Ho, sought leave to cross-examine two affiants, DC Deston and DC Seville, regarding Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for a tracking warrant and a general warrant.

The applicant challenged assertions in the ITOs, including the necessity of a tracking warrant, the characterization of observed meetings, and alleged inaccuracies regarding property ownership and confidential informant information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no basis to grant leave for cross-examination on the challenged issues, as they related to facial validity or were speculative, and additional judicial summaries clarified apparent inconsistencies.

Cory Trunks applied under the Criminal Code for access to $167,000 in seized cash to cover his legal expenses for defence against charges including drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that Trunks had other available means.

The court found that while Trunks had an interest in the funds, he failed to demonstrate that he had no other assets or means, specifically noting that he had been granted Legal Aid.

The application was dismissed, as the availability of state-funded legal assistance meant Trunks was not in the narrow category of accused persons needing access to potentially forfeited funds.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence obtained from a general warrant and a subsequent search warrant.

The general warrant authorized covert entries into a condominium unit suspected to be a fentanyl stash house.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained unconstitutionally obtained video surveillance evidence and misleading exaggerations about the accused's pattern of behaviour.

After excising the problematic portions, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the general warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the police conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's privacy was high, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence imposed on the respondent for various drug offences, including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge made fundamental errors in sentencing.

These errors included misidentifying the sentencing range for mid-level cocaine traffickers, erroneously comparing it to fentanyl, misapprehending the gravity of the offence, and overemphasizing the mitigating effect of the guilty plea.

The appellate court emphasized that fentanyl is a more dangerous drug requiring higher penalties and that the weight of a guilty plea varies by case circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to six years.

The applicant, Jamal Daye, sought re-release pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new firearms and breach charges.

He had previously been convicted of narcotics trafficking and sentenced to 5.5 years.

The Crown opposed his re-release on tertiary grounds, arguing that his detention was necessary to preserve public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, its strength did not outweigh the public interest concerns, particularly given the seriousness of the new alleged offences and the breach of bail conditions.

The application for re-release was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and search.

The appeal raised issues regarding the reliability of an officer's smell evidence, the interpretation of "neutral" observed behaviours, and the consideration of a neighbourhood's character in establishing grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge was entitled to accept the officer's evidence and that the cumulative behaviours, combined with the smell of marijuana, provided objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and search.

The court also clarified that while presence in a high-crime area alone is insufficient for grounds, it did not undermine the arrest in this case given other factors.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking offences, had previously obtained a judicial order returning seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, having demonstrated no other assets or means.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a fine instead of forfeiture under s. 462.37(3) equal to the returned amount.

The majority held that, as a general rule, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture on funds judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal expenses, as doing so would undermine Parliament's secondary purposes of providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence.

The discretion to impose a fine may be exercised only where the offender lacked a real financial need or did not use the funds to alleviate that need.

The dissent would have imposed the fine in lieu unless the offender could demonstrate a constitutional entitlement to state-funded counsel under the Rowbotham test.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance observations and items seized from vehicles.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in finding the only reasonable inference was guilt; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons; and (3) the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Villaroman standard for circumstantial evidence and that the verdict was supportable on a reasonable view of the evidence.

The court also allowed an appeal of sentence and set aside the victim surcharge.

Two accused were sentenced for trafficking in dangerous controlled substances, including Carfentanil, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine.

The offences were discovered through Project Variance, a wiretap investigation by Waterloo Regional Police Service.

Substantial quantities of drugs and cash were seized from both their residence and a trailer.

Both accused entered guilty pleas to multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that a sentence of 10 to 13 years was appropriate.

The court imposed sentences reflecting the serious nature of trafficking in highly potent opioids, the commercial scale of the operation, and the devastating community impact of the opioid crisis, while recognizing the significant mitigating value of early guilty pleas.

Yolanda Meecham sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, arguing a violation of her s. 8 Charter rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the R. v. Garofoli "step six" procedure for redacted ITOs and the R. v. Debot "three Cs" criteria (credibility, compelling, corroboration) for confidential informant information.

Despite acknowledging the ITO's poor drafting and inaccuracies, including a withdrawn charge, the court found that, after excisions and amplification, the ITO met the low threshold for reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

Appeal from conviction for drug-related offences and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence seized during a search warrant execution at his residence.

The trial judge dismissed the s. 8 Charter motion based on a redacted information to obtain (ITO).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the redacted ITO contained sufficient grounds to support the search warrant.

The court determined that the confidential informant information was insufficiently reliable, with weak credibility assessment, inadequate corroboration, and non-compelling information regarding whether the firearm would be at the searched location.

The court also found the ITO contained misleading language suggesting the target lived at the residence when he did not.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The accused attacked military personnel at a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with a knife.

He was charged with nine counts of committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the accused, acting as a 'lone wolf', constituted a terrorist group himself.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that s. 83.2 requires the terrorist group to have an identity separate from the person committing the offence.

The accused was therefore acquitted of the terrorism charges.

On the included offences of attempted murder, assault causing bodily harm, and weapons offences, the court accepted joint psychiatric evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Following conviction on charges of Attempt to Commit Mischief to Data and Unauthorized Use of a Computer, the defendant, a former Chief of Staff to the Premier of Ontario, was sentenced to four months imprisonment followed by twelve months probation with 100 hours of community service.

The defendant had directed the wiping of computer hard drives in the Office of the Premier to destroy records responsive to Freedom of Information requests and anticipated legislative committee production orders regarding the gas plant controversy.

The court found the offence struck at the heart of democratic accountability and transparency, warranting incarceration despite the defendant's otherwise exemplary character and community contributions.

The appellant challenged a conviction for importing cocaine under s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction over a dissent.

The central issue was whether the trial reasons adequately disclosed the factual basis for finding the required mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held that, read in context and as a whole, the trial reasons did not permit effective appellate review of the mens rea finding.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

David Livingston, Chief of Staff to the Premier of Ontario, and Laura Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Strategy, were charged with Breach of Trust by a Public Official, Commit Mischief to Data, and Unauthorized Use of a Computer.

The Crown abandoned the Breach of Trust charge.

The defendants were accused of directing the wiping of twenty computers in the Office of the Premier during the transition from Premier McGuinty to Premier Wynne in early 2013, allegedly to destroy records responsive to Freedom of Information requests and potential Legislative Standing Committee Production Orders related to the controversial cancellation and relocation of the Oakville and Mississauga gas plants.

The Crown alleged the defendants obtained administrative rights through deception and hired an outside IT consultant to indiscriminately wipe hard drives.

The defendants claimed they sought only to delete personal information and Liberal Party documents from departing staff computers.

Justice Lipson found Livingston guilty on both remaining counts (Attempt to Commit Mischief to Data and Unauthorized Use of a Computer) but acquitted Miller due to insufficient evidence of her knowledge of Livingston's deceptive means in obtaining administrative rights.