COURT FILE NO.: 18-90000210-0000
DATE: 20190118
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
YOLANDA MEECHAM
S. Egan, for the Crown
W. G. Orr, Q.C. and S. O’Neill, for Ms. Meecham
HEARD: December 4, 2018.
RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
SCHRECK J.:
[1] Yolanda Meecham is charged with possessing various controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking arising from the execution of a search warrant at a condominium unit on June 4, 2016. At her trial before a jury, Ms. Meecham does not deny that she possessed the controlled substances but maintains that she did so under duress as a result of threats from Richard Brewster, a man with whom she had been in a longstanding relationship. In support of her defence, she wishes to call a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Julian Gojer, to give expert opinion evidence about the effects of what is commonly referred to as “battered woman syndrome”. The Crown opposes the admission of the evidence. Crown counsel takes the position that the evidence is unreliable and unnecessary. She submits that in modern society, the members of the jury are likely to be aware of the potential effects of longstanding domestic violence and any concerns about them drawing improper inferences can be remedied through a judicial instruction.
[2] Similar expert evidence was held to be necessary and admissible in R. v. Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. The central issue I must determine is whether the social conditions that led to such evidence being necessary in 1990 continue to exist today. In my view, they do.
[3] At the conclusion of the voir dire, I advised the parties that the evidence would be admitted with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
I. EVIDENCE
A. The Crown’s Case
[4] On June 4, 2016, the police executed a search warrant at a condominium unit on Lakeshore Boulevard West in Toronto. They seized significant amounts of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl stored in various bags. They also seized marijuana in a box. Ms. Meecham is the only person named in the lease for the unit. Security video from various parts of the building show that earlier on June 4, 2016, Ms. Meecham removed bags matching those in which the drugs were found from a car in the parking garage and took them to the elevator.
B. Evidence on the Voir Dire
(i) Dr. Julian Gojer
[5] Dr. Julian Gojer is an experienced forensic psychiatrist who was asked to assess Ms. Meecham. He reviewed the Crown disclosure and interviewed Ms. Meecham in custody on one occasion for over two hours. He also interviewed Ms. Meecham’s mother and a close friend of hers. It is anticipated that Ms. Meecham will testify at trial and that her evidence will be the same as what she told Dr. Gojer.
(ii) Ms. Meecham’s History as Told to Dr. Gojer
[6] Ms. Meecham told Dr. Gojer that she was born in 1987 in Toronto and later moved to Hamilton. She first began dating Mr. Brewster when she was 18 years old. He was physically abusive to her throughout their relationship and made her assist him in trafficking drugs by threatening her and beating her if she refused. The relationship continued, except when Mr. Brewster was serving penitentiary sentences. During one such sentence, Ms. Meecham became involved with another man, who was also abusive to her. After that relationship ended, she began to work as an escort. She did not see Mr. Brewster for several years.
[7] In 2014, a friend of Mr. Brewster’s approached Ms. Meecham and told her that Mr. Brewster regretted how he had treated her and wished to see her. At that point, he was in custody at the Central East Correctional Centre. Ms. Meecham agreed to see him and their relationship resumed.
[8] Once Mr. Brewster was released from custody, he again became abusive. She was still involved in the escort business, so he provided her with money to rent a condominium where she could meet clients. He then began to insist that she give all of her earnings to him. If she refused his requests, he would beat her.
[9] In June 2016, Mr. Brewster told Ms. Meecham to pick up some drugs and bring them to the condominium. She initially refused, but then agreed after he threatened to kill her. On his instructions, she met with a man who provided her with a bag, which she took to the condominium and left there.
(iii) “Battered Woman Syndrome”
[10] Dr. Gojer testified that the term “battered woman syndrome” was not a term used in any psychiatric diagnostic text but was commonly understood to refer to a type of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) resulting from domestic violence. The term was initially used by a psychologist, Dr. Lenore Walker, in a text she had written on the topic. Dr. Gojer has experience treating and assessing patients who suffered from PTSD.
[11] According to Dr. Gojer, while some women leave abusive relationships, many do not for a variety of reasons, including fear of retribution. Such women will sometimes have distorted views about relationships and suffer from low self-esteem. Others will remain in the relationship out of some hope that the relationship will improve, or because of financial restraints or social isolation.
[12] Dr. Gojer testified that women suffering from the type of PTSD he described may be prone to following directions from their abusers. Again, this may be for a variety of reasons, including fear, low self-esteem, or a lack of decisiveness arising from feelings of inadequacy. According to Dr. Gojer, in some cases fear will lead to “learned helplessness” as the victim will come to conclude that there is “no way out” and gives up trying to leave her abuser.
[13] In cross-examination, Dr. Gojer agreed that Dr. Walker had outlined seven criteria for a diagnosis of battered woman syndrome, but he did not always apply them because Dr. Walker’s book is not a psychiatric text. He agreed that not all of the criteria for PTSD set out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) were met in Ms. Meecham’s case. He explained that in his opinion, diagnostic criteria should be not be “slavishly followed” and that the fact that a person does not exhibit all of the symptoms of PTSD does not mean that the presence of some features of the condition do not explain the person’s behaviour.
(iv) Dr. Gojer’s Assessment of Ms. Meecham
[14] Ms. Meecham reported to Dr. Gojer that she had a history of depression and anxiety and experienced flashbacks. In his opinion, these symptoms were consistent with PTSD.
[15] Dr. Gojer testified that in his opinion, Ms. Meecham appeared to be suffering from PTSD, although he could not confirm this without more collateral information. He testified that it was not unusual for there to be a lack of such information as victims of domestic violence are often reluctant to disclose it to anybody. He did note that Ms. Meecham exhibited some features of anxiety and depression. She did not appear to be terrified, although this may be because she was in custody and away from her abuser.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of Relevant Legal Principles
[16] In White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182, the Supreme Court of Canada recently explained the two steps a court should undertake in determining whether to admit expert evidence (at paras. 23-24):
At the first step, the proponent of the evidence must establish the threshold requirements of admissibility. These are the four Mohan [1994 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9] factors (relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule and a properly qualified expert) and in addition, in the case of an opinion based on novel or contested science or science used for a novel purpose, the reliability of the underlying science for that purpose. Relevance at this threshold stage refers to logical relevance. Evidence that does not meet these threshold requirements should be excluded. Note that I would retain necessity as a threshold requirement.
At the second discretionary gatekeeping step, the judge balances the potential risks and benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide whether the potential benefits justify the risks. The required balancing exercise has been described in various ways. In Mohan, Sopinka J. spoke of the “reliability versus effect factor” (p. 21), while in J.-L.J. [2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600], Binnie J. spoke about “relevance, reliability and necessity” being “measured against the counterweights of consumption of time, prejudice and confusion”: para. 47. Doherty J.A. summed it up well in Abbey [2009 ONCA 624, 97 O.R. (3d) 330], stating that the “trial judge must decide whether expert evidence that meets the preconditions to admissibility is sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its admission despite the potential harm to the trial process that may flow from the admission of the expert evidence”: para. 76. [Citations omitted].
See also R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 97 O.R. (3d) 330 (“Abbey #1”), at para. 76; R. v. Abbey, 2017 ONCA 640, 140 O.R. (3d) 40 (“Abbey #2”), at para. 48.
B. The Issues
[17] While Crown counsel initially suggested that Dr. Gojer was not a properly qualified expert, she later conceded that the first step in White Burgess has been satisfied and that the threshold requirements for admissibility have been met. However, she contests admissibility at the second step on the basis that the proposed evidence is not sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant its admission. According to Crown counsel, there are two reasons for this. The first is that Dr. Gojer’s evidence is unreliable because he failed to apply the proper diagnostic criteria and only met with Ms. Meecham once. The second is that the evidence is not necessary because the jury is likely to be cognizant of issues respecting domestic violence and any concerns about the jury drawing incorrect inferences can be remedied through a judicial instruction.
C. Relevance
[18] While Crown counsel concedes that the threshold requirements, including relevance, are met, some discussion of relevance is necessary. The second step in White Langille involves a weighing of the costs and benefits of the evidence and the benefits will depend in large part on the probative value of the evidence.
[19] Ms. Meecham seeks to have Dr. Gojer’s evidence admitted to support her defence of duress. That defence has several elements: (1) a threat of death or serious bodily harm to the accused or another person; (2) a belief on the accused’s part that the threat could be carried out; (3) the non-existence of a safe avenue of escape; (4) a close temporal connection between the threat and the harm threatened; (5) proportionality between the harm threatened and the harm inflicted by the accused; and (6) the accused must not be a party to a conspiracy or association which she knew would possibly result in coercion or threats: R. v. Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 14, at para. 55; R. v. Hibbert, 1995 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, at paras. 51-62. Dr. Gojer’s evidence, if admitted, would be primarily relevant to the element of whether there was a safe avenue of escape.
[20] In evaluating whether there was a safe avenue of escape, the jury will have to apply a modified objective test, that is, an objective standard that takes into account Ms. Meecham’s particular circumstances. This is similar to the element of self-defence to which the expert evidence in Lavallee was found to be relevant, as was explained in Hibbert, at paras. 59-60:
This Court has previously indicated that when assessing the reasonableness of an accused’s conduct for the purposes of determining whether he or she should be excused from criminal responsibility, it is appropriate to employ an objective standard that takes into account the particular circumstances of the accused, including his or her ability to perceive the existence of alternative courses of action. For instance, in R. v. Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, a self-defence case, Wilson J., writing for a majority of the Court, declared (at p. 889):
I think the question the jury must ask itself [in a case of self-defence] is whether, given the history, circumstances and perceptions of the appellant, her belief that she could not preserve herself from being killed by [her “common-law” spouse] that night except by killing him first was reasonable.
Similarly, in R. v. Pétel, 1994 CanLII 133 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3, at p. 12, I stated that in assessing self-defence “the jury must seek to determine how the accused perceived the relevant facts and whether that perception was reasonable”.
The defences of self-defence, duress and necessity are essentially similar, so much so that consistency demands that each defence’s “reasonableness” requirement be assessed on the same basis. Accordingly, I am of the view that while the question of whether a “safe avenue of escape” was open to an accused who pleads duress should be assessed on an objective basis, the appropriate objective standard to be employed is one that takes into account the particular circumstances and human frailties of the accused.
[21] Similarly, in this case, if the defence of duress is left with the jury, the jurors will have to determine whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Meecham had a safe avenue of escape. In doing so, they will have to take into account her particular circumstances, including her “ability to perceive the existence of alternative courses of action” as well as her “human frailties.”
D. Reliability
(i) The Relationship Between Reliability and Admissibility
[22] Although I am not the trier of fact, it is appropriate that I consider the reliability of the evidence, for the reasons explained in Abbey #2, at paras. 53-54:
First, recent case law, including White Burgess itself, has emphasized the importance of the trial judge’s gatekeeper role. No longer should expert evidence be routinely admitted with only its weight to be determined by the trier of fact. As Cromwell J. said in White Burgess, at para. 20, “[t]he unmistakable overall trend of the jurisprudence, however, has been to tighten the admissibility requirements and to enhance the judge’s gatekeeping role”. Cromwell J.’s observation echoes the point Binnie J. made in the earlier Supreme Court of Canada decision R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, at para. 28: “The admissibility of the expert evidence should be scrutinized at the time it is proffered, and not allowed too easy an entry on the basis that all of the frailties could go at the end of the day to weight rather than admissibility.”
Second, case law since Mohan has also emphasized the importance of the reliability of the evidence to its admissibility. See, for example, R. v. J.-L.J. and R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239. In Abbey #1, at para. 87, Doherty J.A. pointed out that at the gatekeeper stage of admissibility the reliability of the proposed expert evidence is central to its probative value and thus to the benefits of admitting it.
[23] At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that my role at this stage is not the same as that of the jury, as was made clear in Abbey #1, at para. 89:
In assessing the potential benefit to the trial process flowing from the admission of the evidence, the trial judge must intrude into territory customarily the exclusive domain of the jury in a criminal jury trial. The trial judge’s evaluation is not, however, the same as the jury’s ultimate assessment. The trial judge is deciding only whether the evidence is worthy of being heard by the jury and not the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be accepted and acted upon.
It therefore important that a distinction be drawn between reliability concerns that justify the exclusion of the expert evidence and those that should be considered by the jury in determining what weight, if any, to give the evidence if it is admitted. The former situation arises only if the evidence is so unreliable that any benefit that arise from admitting it is outweighed by the costs of doing so.
(ii) Dr. Gojer’s Failure to Apply Dr. Walker’s Criteria
[24] Dr. Gojer testified that he did not apply all of the criteria employed by Dr. Walker in determining whether Ms. Meecham suffered from battered woman syndrome, nor did he agree that all of the criteria set out in the DSM-5 definition of PTSD must be met before a diagnosis could be made. He explained that it was his opinion that the diagnostic criteria should not be “slavishly followed” and the importance of the presence or absence of certain criteria depends on the context in which a clinical assessment is done.
[25] Crown counsel submits that Dr. Gojer’s failure to apply the diagnostic criteria means that his conclusions are unreliable. I do not agree. In my view, Dr. Gojer’s evidence on this point makes sense. Psychiatry is not an exact science and one would not expect that diagnostic criteria would be applied in the same manner as a statute that sets out the essential elements of an offence. It appears that other psychiatrists who have testified in other cases hold similar views: R. v. Byers, 2011 ONSC 4159, at para. 129; Hossny v. Ramsoodar, [2001] O.J. No. 5018 (S.C.J.), at para. 26. In my view, the significance, if any, of Dr. Gojer’s failure to apply any diagnostic criteria is something the jury can consider in assessing his evidence but is not a basis for concluding that his evidence is so unreliable that it should be excluded.
(iii) The Sufficiency of the Assessment
[26] Dr. Gojer met with Ms. Meecham once for over two hours. During his cross-examination on the voir dire, Crown counsel suggested to him that “another psychiatrist” had said that one meeting was not sufficient because it “simply captures a moment in time”. Dr. Gojer did not agree.
[27] Crown counsel was referring to the evidence of a psychiatrist as it was summarized in the decision in R. v. Stephen, 2008 NSSC 31, 261 N.S.R. (2d) 346. That case also involved a duress defence and the evidence of a psychiatrist called by the Crown was summarized as follows (at para. 259):
Dr. Bloom outlined the following as to what he would do when performing a forensic assessment. … He would see a patient two or three times since one or two hour interviews are not sufficient. One meeting, according to Dr. Bloom, simply captures a moment in time.
[28] In essence, the Crown asks me to prefer the evidence of another psychiatrist, as summarized in a 10-year old judgment from another province and whose qualifications are unknown to me, over Dr. Gojer’s viva voce testimony. I decline to do so. The Crown did not seek to tender any evidence on the voir dire and in my view it would be inappropriate for me to rely on what is essentially hearsay evidence that the defence has had no opportunity to challenge. I note, as well, that the issue in Stephen was the weight to be given to the evidence of a psychiatrist who met the accused only once, not its admissibility, which does not appear to have been contested. The limited time that Dr. Gojer spent with Ms. Meecham is undoubtedly relevant to the weight to be given to his evidence. It does not, in my view, render the evidence so unreliable that I should exercise my gatekeeper function to exclude it.
E. Necessity
(i) The Crown’s Position
[29] Crown counsel also submits that Dr. Gojer’s evidence is not necessary. She submits that modern society is much more enlightened about issues concerning domestic violence than was the case when Lavallee was decided in 1990. Any concerns about the jury drawing the wrong inference from Ms. Meecham’s failure to leave Mr. Brewster can be addressed by a judicial instruction.
(ii) Why the Evidence Was Necessary in Lavallee
[30] The reason why expert evidence was admissible in Lavallee was explained in that judgment as follows (at pp. 871-872):
Expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners must, it seems to me, be both relevant and necessary in the context of the present case. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called “battered wife syndrome”. We need help to understand it and help is available from trained professionals.
Fortunately, there has been a growing awareness in recent years that no man has a right to abuse any woman under any circumstances. Legislative initiatives designed to educate police, judicial officers and the public, as well as more aggressive investigation and charging policies all signal a concerted effort by the criminal justice system to take spousal abuse seriously. However, a woman who comes before a judge or jury with the claim that she has been battered and suggests that this may be a relevant factor in evaluating her subsequent actions still faces the prospect of being condemned by popular mythology about domestic violence. Either she was not as badly beaten as she claims or she would have left the man long ago. Or, if she was battered that severely, she must have stayed out of some masochistic enjoyment of it.
(iii) Necessity Today
[31] Unfortunately, I am less confident than is Crown counsel that the concerns animating the decision in Lavallee no longer exist. Having been involved in the criminal law for over two decades, it is certainly not my experience that there are no longer any myths and stereotypes surrounding the behaviour of victims of domestic violence. Even judges are not immune from engaging in stereotypical thinking about how victims of violence should be expected to behave: R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6; 43 C.R. (7th) 207, aff’g 2017 ABCA 237, 55 Alta. L.R. (6th) 213, at paras. 43-44.
[32] Recent jurisprudence suggests that Lavallee-type evidence continues to be necessary. In R. v. Li, 2016 ONCA 573, 352 O.A.C. 101, a conviction was set aside because of the trial judge’s failure to adequately explain the expert evidence respecting batter woman syndrome to the jury in a duress case. The Court stated (at paras. 12-15):
In R. v. Malott, 1998 CanLII 845 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123, a case dealing with self-defence, Major J. stated, at paras. 20 and 21, that the principles of battered woman syndrome must be communicated to the jury and the jury should be informed of how the expert evidence may be of use.
The Crown conceded that even though this case involved a claim of duress rather than self-defence, the principles had to be communicated to the jury so as to assess whether the defence of duress had been made out. That said, the Crown argues that the trial judge did so.
The trial judge’s jury charge consisted of lengthy summaries of the evidence of each witness. This included a summary of the evidence of Sinclair, the defence expert.
That said, while the elements of duress were described and Sinclair’s testimony was summarized, no effort was made to relate her evidence to the legal issues and principles in a manner that would equip the jury to reach its verdict. Read as a whole, the charge did not provide the jury with the tools it needed to assess the appellant’s defence. As a result, the convictions cannot stand.
[33] In R. v. McRae, 2018 ONSC 3694, at para. 27, the Court noted that “[t]here is no question that expert evidence is necessary to present a Lavallee type of defence”. This type of evidence continues to be regularly admitted: R. v. Craig, 2011 ONCA 142, 84 C.R. (6th) 155, at paras. 26-29; R. v. Hernando, 2009 MBQB 214, 243 Man. R. (2d) 161, at paras. 56-60; R. v. Young, 2008 BCCA 393, 239 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at paras. 14-18.
[34] The fact that this case involves the defence of duress rather than self-defence does not make the expert evidence less necessary. Such evidence was admitted in relation to the defence of duress in Li and in Stephen, although the defence did not succeed on its merits in the latter case. It was also contemplated in R. v. Ruzic (1998), 1998 CanLII 5265 (ON CA), 41 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 87, aff’d 2001 SCC 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 87, where one of the reasons that s. 17 of the *Criminal Code* was found to be unconstitutional was that it would unduly restrict an accused in a Lavallee-type situation.
(iv) The Adequacy of Judicial Instructions
[35] As noted, the Crown takes the position that the expert evidence is not necessary because any concerns about the jury’s inability to properly evaluate Ms. Meecham’s defence could be addressed by a judicial instruction, as was done in R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275.
[36] The issue in D.D. was the admissibility of evidence from a psychologist who would testify that many child victims of sexual abuse do not disclose the abuse immediately and may delay doing so for various reasons, including embarrassment, fear or guilt. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not necessary. The majority stated (at para. 59):
Distilling the probative elements of Dr. Marshall’s testimony from its superfluous and prejudicial elements, one bald statement of principle emerges. In diagnosing cases of child sexual abuse, the timing of the disclosure, standing alone, signifies nothing. Not all victims of child sexual abuse will disclose the abuse immediately. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular victim. I find surprising the suggestion that a Canadian jury or judge alone would be incapable of understanding this simple fact. I cannot identify any technical quality to this evidence that necessitates expert opinion.
[37] After reviewing the law respecting the evidentiary value of a failure to disclose, the majority concluded that the basic principle arising from the expert’s testimony could be relayed to a jury through a judicial instruction (at paras. 64-65):
Given that the statement of principle expressed by Dr. Marshall reflects the current state of Canadian law, it could have and should have been included in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury. As this would have effectively dispelled the possibility that the jury might engage in stereotypical reasoning, it was not necessary to inject the dangers of expert evidence into the trial.
A trial judge should recognize and so instruct a jury that there is no inviolable rule on how people who are the victims of trauma like a sexual assault will behave. Some will make an immediate complaint, some will delay in disclosing the abuse, while some will never disclose the abuse. Reasons for delay are many and at least include embarrassment, fear, guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge. In assessing the credibility of a complainant, the timing of the complaint is simply one circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will never give rise to an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant.
[38] Like the expert in D.D., one of the purposes of Dr. Gojer’s evidence is to explain why Ms. Meecham did not disclose something that had been done to her. However, there are two significant differences. The first is that in the case of the expert in D.D., the reasons for the non-disclosure related to emotions that everybody understands, such as embarrassment, guilt or fear. In the case of Dr. Gojer’s evidence, the explanation is somewhat more complex. According to Dr. Gojer, a victim of domestic violence may not go the police because of fear, feelings of worthlessness, learned helplessness, or a combination of these. Some of these are not feelings which most people experience or understand.
[39] The second difference is that there is no “bald statement of principle” emerging from Dr. Gojer’s evidence, nor does the evidence reflect any evidentiary rule. It is an established principle of the law of evidence in Canada that the lack of recent complaint by a complainant in a sexual assault case does not, by itself, have any evidentiary value: D.D., at paras. 60-63. There is no corresponding legal principle with respect to the failure of an accused to report that she has been coerced to commit a criminal offence. There are different possible explanations for why Ms. Meecham failed to report Mr. Brewster’s violence to the police: the violence did not happen, she wished to hide her own criminal activities, or because she was unable to act because of the effects of PTSD. Dr. Gojer’s evidence may assist the jury in reaching a conclusion on this issue and that conclusion may determine the success of the duress defence.
[40] Furthermore, I am not sure what a D.D.-type instruction would look like in the circumstances of this case. D.D. requires a trial judge to instruct the jury that no adverse inference can be drawn only from the failure of a complainant to make timely disclosure. The Crown would surely not want me to instruct the jury that no adverse inference can be drawn from Ms. Meecham’s failure to report Mr. Brewster’s violence or take other steps to protect herself from it.
III. DISPOSITION
[41] For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Gojer will be permitted to give expert opinion evidence respecting the psychiatric diagnosis, features and effects of post-traumatic stress disorder arising from ongoing violence in the context of a relationship.
Justice P.A. Schreck
COURT FILE NO.: 18-90000210-0000
DATE: 20190118
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
YOLANDA MEECHAM
RULING
P.A. Schreck J.
Released: January 18, 2019.