Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for a claim against their home insurance provider following extensive water damage to their property.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the damage fell under policy exclusions.

The court reviewed expert reports which unanimously concluded the water entry was caused by continuous seepage through the foundation and wear and tear, rather than a sudden and accidental escape of water.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, held that the damage was excluded under the policy, and granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) was infringed.

The total delay from charge to the third trial date was 43 months.

The court analyzed the delay periods, attributing significant portions to inherent time requirements, including the illness of Crown counsel and the unavailability of co-accused's counsel.

The court found the institutional delay was 15 months and 18 days, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no significant prejudice caused by the delay itself, the court dismissed the application.

The applicant purchased the assets of the respondent but failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements under the Bulk Sales Act.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file the required affidavit under s. 11(3) of the Act.

The intervenor opposed the application, arguing that the applicant wilfully disregarded its statutory obligations.

The court established a five-factor test for granting an extension and, due to a lack of prior guiding case law, granted the extension.

However, the court ordered that the extension be without prejudice to the intervenor's separate action to void the sale.

Following a motion where a defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's claim but failed to dismiss a co-defendant's cross-claim, the court determined the costs payable.

The successful defendant sought costs against the plaintiff, which were fixed at $16,000 after considering the complexity added by the plaintiff's arguments regarding the threshold condition.

The co-defendant sought costs against the moving defendant for successfully defending the cross-claim, which were fixed at $5,155.82 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants sought costs of $22,806.35 on a partial indemnity basis after successfully dismissing the plaintiff's action on a summary judgment motion based on an expired limitation period.

The plaintiff, now self-represented, argued she could not pay due to financial hardship.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, including the defendants' prior offer to settle for $5,000, and awarded the defendants costs fixed at $18,000 all-inclusive.

Following dismissal of an employee’s action alleging multiple breaches of an employment agreement, the employer sought costs of the action.

The employer relied on earlier offers to settle and argued it should receive substantial indemnity costs after the first refused offer.

The court held that elevated costs outside Rule 49.10 require reprehensible or egregious conduct by the opposing party.

Finding no such conduct and noting the action was hard fought but not frivolous, the court declined substantial indemnity costs and instead awarded a reduced amount under Rule 57.01.

The plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from soliciting clients and employees was previously dismissed.

The defendants sought costs of $15,082.12 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued costs should be in the cause or fixed at a lower amount, and that the defendants unnecessarily complicated the motion.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, noting the presumption that costs of a motion are payable forthwith, especially for interlocutory injunctions.

The court found the defendants' requested costs reasonable, particularly given the plaintiff's own costs outline was significantly higher.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $15,082.12 forthwith.

The plaintiff sought costs following a successful trial in which the court found the defendants had fraudulently conveyed a property to defeat the plaintiff's family law claims.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $297,946.04, arguing the defendants maintained a fraudulent defence throughout the litigation and failed to accept a reasonable offer to settle.

The court agreed, finding the defendants' conduct abusive and dishonest.

The court awarded the plaintiff the full amount claimed on a substantial indemnity basis, divided equally between the two defendants.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board concluded that although the appellant understood the information relevant to treatment decisions, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant argued that the Board misapprehended evidence, lacked proof of treatment benefits, and failed to properly address risks and benefits of the medication.

The court held that the Board’s findings were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the appellant’s persistent denial of mental illness and inability to appreciate the purpose and consequences of treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The applicant employer sought a determination that it was entitled to deduct withholding tax and employer statutory contributions from a settlement payment resolving an employment dispute.

The respondent employee brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce the minutes of settlement, arguing that legal costs payable to counsel were expressly to be paid without deductions.

The court held that the minutes clearly distinguished between legal costs payable directly to counsel and employment income payments subject to withholding tax.

The employer was not entitled to deduct withholding tax from the legal fee payment or subtract CPP, EI, and Employer Health Tax contributions from the settlement amount.

However, the court declined to enforce the default penalty clause because the deductions resulted from a mistaken interpretation of tax obligations rather than deliberate default.

The defendant plumbing contractor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a negligence action arising from residential flooding allegedly caused by a defective toilet supply hose installed during construction.

The moving party argued there was no evidence that any breach of the Ontario Building Code or absence of CSA certification caused the loss.

The court held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence of negligence, including expert evidence regarding a defective component and discovery evidence suggesting inadequate selection and oversight of plumbing parts.

Applying the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin and the causation framework from Clements v. Clements, the court found that a trier of fact could reasonably infer a substantial connection between the contractor’s conduct and the damage.

A genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

After the dismissal of an employee’s wrongful dismissal action seeking unpaid salary and bonus compensation, the defendant sought elevated costs relying on a rejected pre-trial settlement offer.

The court considered Rules 49.13 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the appellate guidance restricting elevated costs awards against unsuccessful plaintiffs absent reprehensible conduct.

The court held that although the defendant had made a settlement offer, the plaintiff’s claim was not frivolous and the litigation had been conducted efficiently.

As there was no egregious conduct warranting substantial indemnity costs, the court declined to award elevated costs.

Costs were fixed at $35,000 payable by the plaintiff.

Following settlement of a contempt motion relating to alleged breach of a prior court order governing shared use of a laneway between neighbouring commercial properties, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving parties argued they were the successful party because the settlement resulted in variations to the earlier order consistent with their requested relief.

The responding parties contended that no contempt finding was made and that costs should either be in the cause or not awarded.

The court held the moving parties were successful because the relief obtained reflected the purpose of the motion and addressed the alleged non‑compliance with the prior order.

However, the court found the bill of costs excessive and fixed costs at $11,000 all‑inclusive, payable forthwith.

The applicant sought a declaration that a personal guarantee was void and unenforceable after the creditor postponed a mortgage securing the underlying debt without the guarantor’s knowledge or consent.

The applicant argued that a guarantor is discharged when a creditor materially alters the contract governing the debt.

The court held that guarantors may contract out of common law protections and that the wording of the guarantee expressly permitted the creditor to vary or modify security without releasing the guarantor.

Interpreting the guarantee’s broad language, the court found the parties intended the guarantor’s liability to remain despite alterations to the security arrangements.

The application to void the guarantee and set aside the prior judgment was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement arising from a defamation action where the plaintiff alleged damages after being called “ridiculous” during a Small Claims Court settlement conference.

The plaintiff had sent an email offering to withdraw the claim without costs if the defendants did the same.

The defendants accepted the offer, but the plaintiff later asserted the offer had been rescinded and added a new requirement for an apology.

The court held that the original offer was clear, contained no apology requirement, and had not been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 49.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before acceptance.

The acceptance created a binding settlement agreement which the court ordered enforced.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an investment-related civil claim on the basis that it was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and deceit arising from a leveraged investment arrangement arranged through financial advisors.

The court held that the plaintiff knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the material facts giving rise to the claim by May 2009 at the latest.

Because the statement of claim was not issued until January 2012, the action was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff, a successful retail stockbroker, sued his former employer for breach of contract, alleging he was owed a 10% finder's fee on several large corporate finance transactions under an April 11, 2006 agreement.

The court found that the agreement was exclusively a retail document and did not apply to transactions involving the employer's Capital Markets group.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligent overpayment of his assistant, unjust enrichment, bad faith, and entitlement to unvested deferred stock units.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The defendants sought a stay of an action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 based on an arbitration clause in a shareholders’ agreement relating to a restaurant venture.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent misrepresentation inducing him to enter the agreement, breach of fiduciary duties, and oppressive conduct.

The court held that the misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims were tort-based and did not rely on the shareholders’ agreement, placing them outside the arbitration clause.

Although the oppression allegations relied on contractual obligations and fell within the clause, the court declined to order a partial stay because most claims were non-arbitrable and separation would create duplicative proceedings.

The motion for a stay was therefore dismissed.