Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination after approximately ten years of employment within a family-run corporate group.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had been employed by two separate companies and that the earlier employer had terminated his employment prior to the transition.

The court held that the related corporations constituted a common employer due to common control, overlapping leadership, and integrated operations.

The court further found that the plaintiff had adequately mitigated his damages and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding damages for nine months’ notice plus out‑of‑pocket benefits losses.

The defendant law firm moved under Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a professional negligence and conflict of interest action for delay.

The action had been commenced in 1993 concerning legal advice provided in a 1987 building code appeal and alleged conflict arising from representation of another developer in 1990.

Over more than two decades the plaintiff repeatedly failed to move the case forward, delayed discoveries, postponed expert evidence for many years, and allowed significant periods of inactivity.

The court found the delay both inordinate and inexcusable and concluded that the presumption of prejudice to the defendant had not been rebutted.

The court also held the delay constituted an abuse of process under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The moving party sought summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period began either when a police report disclosed the identity of the moving party or when a medical expert later confirmed that the plaintiff’s injuries met the statutory threshold for non‑pecuniary damages under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the identity of the moving party at the time of the accident and failed to act with due diligence in pursuing the claim.

The court also rejected the argument that discovery occurred only upon a later medical diagnosis, finding the plaintiff had sufficient information earlier to investigate and pursue the claim.

The action against the moving party was therefore statute‑barred, while a co‑defendant’s crossclaim for contribution and indemnity was found to be timely.

Following a successful summary judgment motion in a professional negligence action against a lawyer, the plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the discretionary framework for awarding costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the principles of fairness, indemnity, and access to justice.

The court rejected arguments for both full and substantial indemnity costs, finding no vexatious litigation conduct or reprehensible behaviour by the defendant despite breaches of professional obligations in the underlying transaction.

Given the straightforward nature of the proceeding and the plaintiff’s partial success, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a dental malpractice claim.

The plaintiff alleged negligent dental treatment involving implants and extractions but failed to provide proper expert evidence supporting breach of the standard of care or causation.

The court held that professional negligence claims require admissible expert opinion evidence from a qualified professional and that such evidence must comply with Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The document relied upon by the plaintiff was not sworn, did not meet expert report requirements, and was therefore inadmissible.

Without admissible expert evidence, the plaintiff’s claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant lawyer brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim in professional negligence arising from the drafting of an affidavit used in mortgage transactions allegedly connected to a fraud.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyer failed to investigate the truth of statements made by the affiant and thereby facilitated fraudulent mortgages.

The court held the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the lawyer owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, had no retainer with the plaintiff, and had no obligation to verify the truth of affidavit contents.

The court further held that commissioning or drafting an affidavit does not constitute a representation by the lawyer that its contents are true.

As the plaintiff conceded no other viable cause of action existed, the claim against the lawyer was struck without leave to amend.

Following a jury trial determining apportionment of liability between two defendants in a motor vehicle accident, the successful defendant sought costs relying on an offer to contribute made under Rule 49.

The jury had apportioned liability 85% against the responding defendant and 15% against the moving defendant after the parties had settled the plaintiff’s claim for $1.2 million.

The moving defendant sought partial indemnity costs up to the offer and substantial indemnity thereafter, while the responding defendant argued for a modest partial indemnity award.

The court held that Rule 49.12 governing offers to contribute between defendants does not entitle a successful party to substantial indemnity costs.

Balancing the Rule 57.01 factors and the circumstances of the six-day jury trial, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $50,000 plus HST and expert witness fees.

The plaintiff sought a declaration under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act that the transfer of a residential property by his spouse to her mother was void as a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat his potential claims arising from matrimonial proceedings.

The court examined badges of fraud including lack of consideration, secrecy of the transfer, and the close relationship between transferor and transferee.

After reviewing credibility issues and conflicting evidence, the court found the spouse was the true owner of the property and transferred it during a troubled marriage to prevent its inclusion in equalization calculations under the Family Law Act.

The court held that the plaintiff qualified as a creditor within the meaning of the statute.

The conveyance was declared null and void.

The moving party sought to set aside prior Mareva injunction orders under Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the orders were obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations.

The alleged fraud concerned a business partner’s denial of authorship of an email offering the moving party a profit-sharing interest, which later emerged during related criminal proceedings as authentic.

The court found that the denial of the email constituted fraudulent testimony.

However, the court held that the email was not material to the motions judge’s earlier decision granting and maintaining the Mareva injunctions, which rested on separate findings regarding unauthorized diversion of company assets.

As the alleged fraud did not form part of the foundation of the earlier orders, the motion to set them aside was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for contempt against the respondent for failing to comply with a previous court order.

The parties settled the motion on the morning of the hearing.

The self-represented applicant sought costs of $42,994.75 on a full indemnity basis.

The court balanced the respondent's deliberate flouting of the order against the crushing burden of existing costs orders and the late settlement, fixing costs at $15,000 inclusive.

The plaintiff property management company brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain former employees and their new company from soliciting its clients and employees.

The plaintiff alleged the former employees breached non-solicitation clauses in their employment contracts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious question about whether the defendants were bound by the clauses, there was no evidence of actual solicitation.

Furthermore, the court found the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, as any potential losses could be quantified and recovered through damages.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued his former employer for an unpaid bonus after being dismissed without cause.

The employment contract contained a limitation clause stating that bonuses did not accrue and were only payable if the employee was actively employed on the payout date.

The plaintiff argued the clause was contrary to public policy, inconsistently applied, and ambiguous.

The court found that while the bonus was an integral part of compensation and the entire agreement clause did not exclude prior oral representations, the limitation clause itself was unambiguous and enforceable.

The plaintiff had accepted the contract with full knowledge of its terms.

The action was dismissed.

On a Rule 21 motion, the court considered whether a child protection agency owes a duty of care to foster parents whose foster home was closed after abuse allegations against their biological child.

Applying the plain and obvious standard and the duty of care framework discussed in Syl Apps, the court held that no such duty is recognized in Canadian law.

The court rejected an attempt to distinguish biological parents from foster parents and found that imposing a duty to foster parents would conflict with the statutory mandate to treat the child’s interests as paramount.

The adult plaintiffs' claim in negligence against the agency was struck and the action dismissed as against that defendant.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The court reviewed the statutory definition of capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and applied the framework from Starson v. Swayze, emphasizing that a patient need not agree with a diagnosis but must recognize the possibility of being affected by the condition's manifestations.

The court held there was ample corroborated evidence that the appellant suffered from schizophrenia, benefitted from medication, and failed to appreciate that her relapse resulted from reduced medication.

The Board's conclusion fell within the range of reasonable outcomes, and the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the appellant incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment while detained after an NCR finding.

The court held that the Board properly applied the governing capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, including the requirement that a patient recognize the possibility of being affected by the manifestations of a mental condition, without impermissibly equating mental disorder with incapacity.

The court further held that the Board’s findings were supported by corroborated documentary and viva voce evidence of paranoid delusions, auditory hallucinations, and lack of insight.

Although the Board’s reasons were imperfect, they were sufficient when read in light of the evidentiary record, submissions, and process.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found NCR for First Degree Murder and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, stopped taking his medication and his mental health deteriorated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant lacked insight into his illness and could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The moving party tenant sought summary judgment ordering the respondent landlord to indemnify it for the costs of litigating a personal injury claim arising from a slip and fall in the mall's common area.

The landlord and its snow removal contractor had previously settled with the plaintiff via a Pierringer Agreement.

The court interpreted the indemnification and insurance provisions of the commercial lease.

The court found that the tenant was required to, and did, maintain insurance for the common areas, which triggered a proviso relieving the landlord of its duty to indemnify.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendant, a lawyer, for outstanding loans.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant acted as her lawyer, breached his duty of care by acting in a conflict of interest, borrowed money from her, and failed to disclose material facts about the borrowers' insolvency.

The court found a solicitor-client relationship existed and that the defendant breached his duty of care.

The court held that expert evidence was not required to establish negligence in these circumstances.

Summary judgment was granted for the principal amounts of the loans, but the claim against LawPRO was dismissed as it was not a party to the proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced two identical actions, one of which was dismissed as abandoned.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim that they discovered the cause of action in September 2011 was inconsistent with their pleadings in the prior action and unsupported by evidence.

Applying the statutory presumption of discoverability, the court concluded the action was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from transferring or encumbering assets connected to a rooftop solar energy project.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court accepted that there was a serious issue to be tried but rejected the argument that a modified property-rights injunction test applied.

The court held the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm because the responding parties had already undertaken not to assign, transfer, or encumber the project assets without a court order and any loss would be quantifiable in damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured refusing the injunction.

The motion was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.