Robbie D. Gordon

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude DNA and fingerprint evidence, arguing that police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching a public genetic genealogy database (GEDmatch) and seizing cast-off DNA without judicial authorization.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public database search results.

Furthermore, applying horizontal stare decisis, the court held it was bound by prior decisions establishing that the seizure of discarded items for DNA analysis does not violate s. 8.

The applicant landlord sought overholding rent, damages to the premises, and unpaid water bills from the respondent tenant after the tenant failed to renew its commercial lease and eventually vacated the premises.

The court found it would be inequitable to enforce the full overholding rent provision due to delays in the court process, and ordered a reduced amount.

The court also awarded partial damages for repairs to the premises, dismissing claims that were unproven or already addressed by the tenant.

The tenant conceded liability for the water arrears.

Judgment was issued in favour of the landlord for $82,293.69.

The moving party, Eacom Timber Corporation, brought a motion to strike a counterclaim against it on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The responding parties sought contribution and indemnity from Eacom for amounts they might owe under equipment leases, alleging Eacom wrongfully terminated a related contract.

The court found no reasonable cause of action because there was no tort alleged and no contractual provision requiring Eacom to indemnify the responding parties.

The court struck the counterclaim and denied leave to amend, noting the responding parties had already claimed the same damages in a separate outstanding action against Eacom.

The appellant pharmacist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed professional misconduct by breaching a condition prohibiting him from dispensing to or interacting with minors unsupervised.

The Divisional Court found the Committee interpreted the condition over-broadly and made palpable and overriding errors of fact regarding three of the four alleged breaches.

The appeal was allowed in part, three findings of misconduct were set aside, and the penalty and costs orders were remitted to the Committee for redetermination.

The College's cross-appeal seeking revocation of the appellant's certificate was dismissed.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) decision confirming an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education or remediation program (SCERP) on informed consent.

The order arose from a patient complaint regarding the administration of conscious sedation during a wisdom tooth extraction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC's concerns about the lack of one-on-one communication and the applicant's reliance on staff for informed consent were supported by the record, making the HPARB's confirmation of the decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision dismissing his application for income replacement benefits as an abuse of process.

The Tribunal had dismissed the application after the appellant repeatedly failed to cooperate with an ordered independent psychological examination, including raising consent issues and threatening the psychologist.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant's conduct constituted an abuse of process under its rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order and requested a stay.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the motions judge erred in principle by relying on the responding party's evidence from an adjourned cross-motion without allowing the moving party an opportunity to respond.

The request for a stay was refused, and costs were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the order as issued and entered was not a final order.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of Di Luca J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 27, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

This class action, initiated in 2017 following a 2015 train derailment, faced a motion by Canadian National Railway Company (CN) for dismissal due to delay under section 29.1(1) of the Class Proceeding Act, 1992.

CN argued that no certification motion was pending, nor was there a court-ordered timetable for advancement by the October 1, 2021, deadline.

The plaintiffs contended that the court had established a timetable through prior case management conference endorsements, which included steps like environmental assessments and subsequent case management conferences.

The court found that the ordered environmental assessment and subsequent case management conferences constituted "steps required to advance the proceeding" and thus a valid timetable under the Act.

Consequently, the motion to dismiss for delay was refused.

This appeal concerned a motion to change a child support order, specifically challenging the calculation of arrears based on the child's enrollment in post-secondary education.

The appellant father argued that the lower court erred in finding the child entitled to support for periods where there was insufficient evidence of full-time educational enrollment.

The court found that while there was some evidence for certain periods, there was a complete lack of evidence for other periods (July 2018 - December 2018 and May 2019 - August 2019), constituting an error of law.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, and the child support arrears owed by the father were significantly reduced.

The plaintiff physician brought an action against the defendant hospital and individuals for damages arising from a de facto suspension of his hospital privileges and alleged breach of a prior settlement agreement.

The defendants moved to strike the claim for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the plaintiff had not exhausted his remedies under the Public Hospitals Act (PHA), and on grounds of res judicata and abuse of process.

The court found that while the action was premature because the plaintiff had not exhausted his PHA remedies regarding the de facto suspension, the appropriate remedy was to stay the action rather than strike it.

The court dismissed the defendants' arguments on res judicata and abuse of process, but struck certain paragraphs of the statement of claim that made unfounded attacks on the hospital's legal counsel, with leave to amend.

This trial determined damages for the plaintiff, Katrina Pisani, who sustained injuries in a rear-end motor vehicle collision where liability was admitted by the defendant, Holly McDaniel.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff's injuries met the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" threshold under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff's chronic pain, sleep disruption, fatigue, irritability, depression, and anxiety constituted permanent, serious, and important impairments, thereby meeting the threshold.

The court awarded general damages, past loss of income, loss of competitive advantage, past and future loss of housekeeping and home maintenance ability, and costs of future care.

The claim for out-of-pocket expenses was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside the noting in default of the respondent and permanently staying a third party claim brought under the Construction Act.

The appellant had commenced the third party claim without seeking the required leave and sought to convert it to an ordinary civil proceeding more than five years after the limitation period expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a motion for leave to convert a construction lien third party claim must be brought before the expiry of the limitation period, and the motion judge made no error in refusing to grant leave nunc pro tunc.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Supreme Court of Canada costs order.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff was only required to repay $12,180, while the defendants argued the order required repayment of $200,000.

Rather than deciding the appeal, the Divisional Court ordered the parties to jointly apply to the Supreme Court of Canada for clarification of its own order, finding this to be the most efficient and proportionate method of resolving the ambiguity.

The plaintiff, an unpaid supplier of building materials, brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of sale from one of the contractor's construction sites held in court pending the outcome of its action.

The plaintiff argued that the entire proceeds constituted a trust fund under section 8 of the Construction Act, even though the amount owed for materials supplied to that specific property was much less than the total debt owed across multiple projects.

The court held that the statutory trust under section 8 is project-specific, limiting the plaintiff's trust claim to the value of materials supplied to that particular property.

The motion was granted in part, with only the amount owed for that specific property, plus interest, ordered to be retained in court.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge ordered the NCR assessment without any evidentiary basis.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Superior Court of Justice held the proviso did not apply because the error was not harmless and the evidence of NCR was not overwhelming without the improperly ordered assessment.

The NCR finding was set aside, convictions were entered, and the appellant was sentenced to one day in jail, having already spent nine years in custody.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's decision declining to reactivate her application after a workplace grievance was withdrawn.

The Tribunal found she failed to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay in requesting reactivation, as her medical evidence did not establish she was prevented from pursuing her legal rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable, its assessment of the medical evidence entitled to deference, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board declining to void an eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The Board had found that the tenant failed to pay all arrears, costs, and enforcement fees under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Board erred in law by including enforcement fees in its determination of whether the tenant met the requirements of s. 74(11) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for a new hearing.