Robbie D. Gordon

The respondents brought a motion to transfer the hearing of an application regarding a road access dispute from Toronto to Parry Sound.

The applicants, who reside in British Columbia, commenced the application in Toronto.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the events occurred in Parry Sound and the subject property is located there, the court found that transferring the matter would not be desirable in the interests of justice, primarily because an expeditious hearing date had already been set in Toronto and it was unclear if a timely hearing could be accommodated in Parry Sound.

The motion was dismissed.

Following dismissal of a child protection appeal, the successful respondent sought a full recovery costs award.

The court considered Family Law Rule 24, which removes the usual presumption that a successful party receives costs in child protection matters.

Applying discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and by analogy to Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court evaluated factors including the result, settlement offers, importance of the issues, conduct of the parties, and policy considerations related to the statutory mandate of children’s aid societies.

Although the respondent had succeeded and had made a written settlement offer, the court found the society acted reasonably in pursuing the appeal given the seriousness of the allegations and prior judicial comments that the appeal raised serious issues.

In light of the policy that child protection authorities should not be discouraged from pursuing their statutory mandate, the court declined to award costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to exclude the medical report and evidence of a defence expert, Dr. Bednar, prior to trial.

The motions judge had declined to rule on the admissibility, holding that such a determination should be reserved for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, with the majority finding that it would be extremely rare for a motions judge to be in an equal or better position than the trial judge to rule on the exclusion of expert evidence.

Matlow J. dissented, arguing the motions judge had jurisdiction under Rule 37.02(1) and should have considered the merits.

The appellant licensee appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario finding that it breached s. 45(1) of the Liquor Licence Act by permitting drunkenness on its premises, and imposing a 10-day licence suspension.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 45(1) applies to anyone on the premises, not just patrons, and that due diligence is not an available defence in this regulatory context.

The majority found the Board's factual findings and the penalty reasonable.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the Board failed to properly analyze whether the licensee 'permitted' the drunkenness.

The appellant credit card issuer appealed a trial decision dismissing its claim against the respondent employer for unauthorized cigarette purchases made by an employee using a company credit card.

The trial judge found the cards were issued for fuel purchases only.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the trial judge erred in requiring specific acknowledgment of the cardholder agreement's liability clauses, the appellant breached its contractual obligation to use reasonable commercial efforts to enforce the fuel-only restriction.

The court also rejected the appellant's arguments regarding contributory negligence and vicarious liability, finding the employer did not enhance the risk of the employee's wrongful act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their appeal of a No Permit Order issued by a municipal building inspector regarding the construction of a front deck.

The inspector had measured the deck mid-construction and found it exceeded the two-foot height exemption for building permits.

The Divisional Court allowed fresh evidence showing the completed deck met the height requirements.

The Court held that the appropriate time for inspection was upon completion of the project, not mid-construction, and found the lower court's decision unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the No Permit Order rescinded, and costs awarded to the appellants.