Robbie D. Gordon

The applicant sought an order quashing a preliminary hearing judge's decision to commit her for trial on five charges, including firearm possession, unlawful transfer, theft of chattels, unlawful entry into a dwelling, and possession of a firearm obtained by crime.

The court reviewed the committal for jurisdictional error, specifically the absence of evidence on essential elements.

The court found sufficient evidence for committal on the firearm charges (Counts 1, 2, 5) and theft (Count 3, limited to money and the firearm).

However, the committal for unlawful entry (Count 4) was quashed because the applicant, as a joint owner of the matrimonial home without an exclusive possession order, had a lawful right to be there.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking rectification of two mortgages registered against the defendants' abutting properties to comply with the Planning Act, as well as possession of the properties.

The defendants had defaulted on the loan and entered bankruptcy.

The court found that the parties had a common continuing intention to mortgage both properties as security for the loan, and that the failure to cross-reference the mortgages was a mistake.

The court granted rectification, deemed the notices of sale sufficient, and granted judgment for possession.

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice as the counterclaim remained stayed under Rule 11 due to the bankruptcy.

The Crown applied under section 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code for an order allowing two child witnesses to testify via video link from outside the courtroom in a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defence objected to the use of remote video technology, arguing the court had discretion to order a different accommodation, such as testifying behind a screen.

The court held that under section 486.2(1), the presiding judge has no discretion to alter the requested accommodation unless it would interfere with the proper administration of justice.

Finding no such interference, the court granted the Crown's application with specific conditions to ensure trial efficiency.

The applicant general partner sought a declaration that a third‑party offer to purchase limited partnership units was not bona fide and was a sham designed to trigger right‑of‑first‑refusal provisions in a partnership agreement.

The applicant argued the offer was structured to allow a particular limited partner to obtain sufficient units to gain a veto over extraordinary resolutions requiring 75% approval.

The court considered the legal test for bona fide offers in the context of rights of first refusal, including whether the offer was made in good faith, genuine, and not a sham.

The court held that the offer was a legitimate third‑party offer at a reasonable price and that the evidence did not establish an absence of bona fides.

The application for a declaration was dismissed.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing workplace misconduct proceedings, brought an application for judicial review seeking to quash or stay the proceedings.

He argued that the disciplinary process under the Police Services Act violated his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Charter by failing to provide an independent and unbiased tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that section 11 applies only to criminal matters, not employment discipline, and that section 7 is not engaged because there is no constitutional right to practice a profession unfettered by regulatory rules.

The court also declined to order the police association to fund the applicant's legal counsel.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing her application for $200,000 in damages for substantial interference with quiet enjoyment and harassment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was fact-driven and raised no issue of law.

The court also dismissed the landlords' request for a vexatious litigant order, noting that such an application must be brought before a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring her to pay $26,232.53 owing on a small business line of credit to the respondent bank.

The appellant argued that the bank had verbally promised not to close the account, that the bank treated her unfairly due to her disability, and that the rules of civil procedure violated her Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank had a contractual right to demand repayment, the requirements for promissory estoppel were not met, and the Charter does not apply to private corporations or provide a defence to a legal debt.

The applicant sought certiorari quashing a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision committing him to stand trial on charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The applicant argued that the committal was made in the absence of evidence on an essential element of the offence, namely the purpose of trafficking.

The reviewing court applied the test from R. v. Arcuri and held that the preliminary inquiry judge’s role is limited to determining whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty.

Considering the circumstantial evidence collectively, including the drugs found, cash in multiple locations, and a brief vehicle interaction consistent with drug transactions, the court found that a reasonable inference of trafficking could be drawn.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision after losing control of her vehicle on a snow-covered and slippery municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the municipality for negligence in its winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair due to a 'refreeze' of brine, which caused the accident.

The municipality failed to meet its own maintenance quality standards by leaving the road untreated for over three hours during a winter storm.

The court held the municipality liable for the agreed damages of $12 million and found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

Following the breakdown of a 13‑year common‑law relationship, the applicant sought spousal support and a monetary remedy based on unjust enrichment.

The court found entitlement to spousal support on a non‑compensatory basis under ss. 30 and 33 of the Family Law Act due to economic dependency and hardship following separation.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court awarded retroactive and ongoing support, including a lump‑sum payment reflecting discounted retroactive amounts and ongoing monthly support for a limited duration.

The court also examined the claim for unjust enrichment using the joint family venture framework from Kerr v. Baranow but concluded the distribution of wealth between the parties was not inappropriately disproportionate.

As a result, no property remedy was granted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the roadside screening demand was not made forthwith and that police breached his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, that the evidentiary breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, and that deficiencies in breath‑testing procedures undermined the reliability of the results.

The court held the trial judge applied the correct legal tests and made reasonable factual findings regarding the short delay in obtaining an Approved Screening Device, the timing of the breath tests, and the functioning of the approved instrument.

The court found no Charter breach and no evidentiary basis to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy of the breath readings.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a mortgage enforcement action seeking repayment and possession of the mortgaged property following default.

The defendants argued that the parties had reached an oral agreement granting a moratorium on payments and suspending enforcement while the development project progressed.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court used its fact‑finding powers to evaluate credibility and draw inferences from the evidentiary record.

The court found no credible evidence establishing a binding forbearance agreement and concluded that the defendants failed to prove any modification to the mortgage terms.

Summary judgment was granted and the plaintiff obtained judgment for the principal, interest, and possession of the property.

The respondent union brought a motion to strike portions of an affidavit and factum filed by the applicant employer in an application for judicial review of an arbitration award.

The employer alleged the arbitrator breached natural justice by deciding a classification issue without allowing it to lead evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the affidavit evidence, including an expert report, was admissible as an exception to the general rule against supplementing the record on judicial review, because it was necessary to demonstrate the alleged breach of natural justice.

A farmer sued his insurance broker alleging negligence for failing to obtain insurance coverage for collapse of a tarp barn due to snow load.

Both parties brought competing motions for summary judgment.

The court held that the broker breached its duty of care by failing to adequately advise the client about coverage and foreseeable risks.

However, the plaintiff failed to prove causation because the evidence did not establish that the collapse was more likely than not caused by snow load rather than other possible causes such as wind, design flaws, or construction defects.

As a result, the plaintiff could not establish that the broker’s breach caused the loss.

The appellants appealed the Ontario Securities Commission's (OSC) decisions on the merits and sanctions regarding their conduct in the investment industry.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for the OSC's decisions is reasonableness, except for procedural fairness.

The court found that the OSC reasonably excluded fresh evidence, reasonably upheld the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada's (IIROC) findings on the merits, and conducted a procedurally fair fresh sanctions hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion arising from an assessment of costs, seeking to invalidate a contingency fee agreement (CFA) because it lacked a mandatory statement regarding his right to make critical decisions.

The respondent law firm brought a cross-motion to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant.

The court found the CFA was fair and reasonable because the applicant's conduct demonstrated he was fully aware of his right to control the litigation.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, holding it lacked jurisdiction to declare a vexatious litigant on a motion rather than an application.

Both motions were dismissed with no order as to costs, and the matter was remitted to the assessment officer.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing a former employee's action arising from events in the 1990s concerning workplace accommodation, alleged discrimination, alleged bad faith adjudication of workers' compensation claims, and related public law and tort allegations.

The court held that all claims grounded in the plaintiff's treatment as an employee or claimant were discovered more than fifteen years before the action was commenced and were therefore statute-barred.

The court further held that challenges to the adjudication of workers' compensation benefits fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and were not reviewable in a civil action.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action.

In an estates motion arising from a will challenge based on alleged lack of testamentary capacity, the moving party sought removal of counsel acting for the estate trustee.

The impugned will had been prepared by that counsel's office, and two law clerks from the office were likely to be key witnesses on the testator's competence and execution of the will.

Applying the factors governing removal of counsel in civil proceedings, the court held there was a significant likelihood of a real conflict and that counsel's ability to assess the evidence independently would be affected by his interest in defending his firm's legal services.

The motion was granted and counsel was removed as solicitor of record.

The court also rejected the argument that Rule 75.06(1) required a prima facie case before a motion for directions could proceed.

The moving defendant sought dismissal of a long-standing civil action for delay under Rule 24.01 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

The court held that the delay, exceeding thirteen years from commencement, was inordinate and largely inexcusable, although it was not intentional and contumelious and the responding parties had rebutted the presumption that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The court nevertheless found that five years of unexplained post-2008 inactivity, coupled with non-response to defence inquiries and no realistic prospect of timely trial, amounted to an abuse of the civil justice system.

The claims against the moving defendant were dismissed under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Following a long marriage, the court determined divorce and multiple financial consequences of separation, including child support, section 7 expenses, spousal support, equalization, occupation rent, and post-separation adjustments relating to the matrimonial home.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the children had repudiated the relationship so as to disentitle them to support, finding their estrangement was materially influenced by the applicant.

Child support continued, retrospective child support and section 7 arrears were fixed, and future support was based on imputed employment insurance income after the respondent's business failed.

The court denied spousal support, ordered an equalization payment in favour of the respondent, assessed occupation rent with set-offs, and directed sale of the matrimonial home with a net payment from the applicant's share to the respondent.